Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs

In this paper, we study two models of resource allocation games: the classical load-balancing game and its new variant involving resource activation costs. The resources we consider are identical and the social costs of the games are utilitarian, which are the average of all individual players' costs. Using the social costs we assess the quality of pure Nash equilibria in terms of the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS). For each game problem, we identify suitable problem parameters and provide a parametric bound on the PoA and the PoS. In the case of the load-balancing game, the parametric bounds we provide are sharp and asymptotically tight

The earlier the better: a theory of timed actor interfaces

Programming embedded and cyber-physical systems requires attention not only to functional behavior and correctness, but also to non-functional aspects and specifically timing and performance constraints. A structured, compositional, model-based approach based on stepwise refinement and abstraction techniques can support the development process, increase its quality and reduce development time through automation of synthesis, analysis or verification. For this purpose, we introduce in this paper a general theory of timed actor interfaces. Our theory supports a notion of refinement that is based on the principle of worst-case design that permeates the world of performance-critical systems. This is in contrast with the classical behavioral and functional refinements based on restricting or enlarging sets of behaviors. An important feature of our refinement is that it allows time-deterministic abstractions to be made of time-non-deterministic systems, improving efficiency and reducing complexity of formal analysis. We also show how our theory relates to, and can be used to reconcile a number of existing time and performance models and how their established theories can be exploited to represent and analyze interface specifications and refinement steps.\u

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the price of anarchy is at most two, when the network is a ring and the link latencies are linear. Our bound is tight. This is the first sharp bound for the maximum latency objective.Comment: Full version of WINE 2012 paper, 24 page

Long-time Low-latency Quantum Memory by Dynamical Decoupling

Quantum memory is a central component for quantum information processing devices, and will be required to provide high-fidelity storage of arbitrary states, long storage times and small access latencies. Despite growing interest in applying physical-layer error-suppression strategies to boost fidelities, it has not previously been possible to meet such competing demands with a single approach. Here we use an experimentally validated theoretical framework to identify periodic repetition of a high-order dynamical decoupling sequence as a systematic strategy to meet these challenges. We provide analytic bounds-validated by numerical calculations-on the characteristics of the relevant control sequences and show that a "stroboscopic saturation" of coherence, or coherence plateau, can be engineered, even in the presence of experimental imperfection. This permits high-fidelity storage for times that can be exceptionally long, meaning that our device-independent results should prove instrumental in producing practically useful quantum technologies.Comment: abstract and authors list fixe