Construal in expression : An intersubjective approach to Cognitive Grammar

This doctoral dissertation is a metatheoretical survey into the central semantic concepts of Cognitive Grammar (CG), a semantics-driven theoretical grammar developed by Ronald W. Langacker. CG approaches language as a semiotic system inherently structured by certain cognition-general capacities, and it defends a usage-based conception of language, therefore denying the strict dichotomy between language and other realms of conceptualization and human experience. For CG, linguistic meaning is thus defined relative to our general cognitive and bodily disposition, as well as to the contents of experience the former structure. The cognitive and experiential aspects of meaning are described relative to so-called dimensions of construal. In this study, I will provide a systematic critical account of the theoretical explanation Cognitive Grammar provides for the dimensions of construal. The point of departure will be in social ontology of linguistic meaning developed and defended by Esa Itkonen, who has accordingly criticized Cognitive Grammar for inconsistent psychologism. According to Itkonen, linguistic meaning is an object of common knowledge and cannot be reduced into an individual s conceptualization; the dimensions of construal capture experiential meaning that is part of language as a social semiotic resource. This entails that linguistic semantics assume as its object of description non-objective, perspectival meanings that are commonly known. It will be argued that the usage-based nature of CG provides a way to release this tension between objective and non-objective aspects of meaning by explaining how perspectivity of semantics results from the acquisition and adjustment of meanings in actual discourse. This, however, necessitates an ontological revision of Cognitive Grammar and rehabilitation of the sociality of a linguistic meaning, which is the topic of this study. In addition to the work by Itkonen, prominent socially oriented cognitive linguists, such as Jordan Zlatev, have emphasized the necessary intersubjective basis of experiential meaning. Within the Fennistic studies, on the other hand, the intersubjective approach to CG and Cognitive Linguistics in general has taken the form of combining cognitive linguistic methodologies with Conversation Analysis. This study combines elements from both of these approaches in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the notion of construal in CG. In so being, the main task of this study is to critically evaluate the cognition-based explanation for the dimensions of construal, provide a socially grounded alternative, and apply the alternative into analysis of construal in (written discourse). The thesis demonstrates that the dimensions of construal are not dependent on the aspects of cognitive theory on the basis of which they are argued for. Instead, the notion of construal is shown to be inherently intersubjective and context-sensitive. Construal captures aspects of semantic organization that are correlates of intersubjective alignment between conceptualizing subjects in a given discursive context.Kielellinen merkitys sisältää väistämättä jonkinlaisen näkökulman siihen, mihin kielellinen merkki, kuten sana tai syntaktinen kokonaisuus, viittaa. Esimerkiksi ilmauksia avohoitotapaus ja mielenterveyskuntoutuja voidaan käyttää sujuvasti samasta ihmisestä tai ihmisryhmästä, mutta silti niiden merkitys on eri. Ensimmäinen vaihtoehdoista ilmaisee suoraan eräänlaisen hoitopäätöksen synnyttämän kategorian (avohoito-) yhdistettynä kokonaisilmauksen alentavuutta alleviivaavaan pääsanaan (-tapaus). Toinen ilmauksista taas esittää kuvatun ihmisen aktiivisena toimijana, joka itse työskentelee terveytensä parantamiseksi. Merkityksen näkökulmaisuus voidaan mieltää ilmaistun asian tai asiaintilan ja kieleen kirjautuneen käsitteistäjän väliseksi suhteeksi: asiaa tai asiantilaa ikään kuin tarkastellaan jostakin sijainnista käsin kielellisesti. Toisaalta näkökulmaisuus on kaikille kielenkäyttäjille yhteistä tietoa. Kielitieteessä teoreettisena haasteena on pitkään ollut se, miten tämä näkökulmaisuuden ja jaettuuden yhdistelmä voidaan selittää ja kuvata johdonmukaisesti merkityksen tutkimuksessa. Tässä väitöstutkimuksessa otetaan kriittiseen tarkasteluun kognitiivisena kielioppina tunnettu teoreettinen kielioppi ja arvioidaan sen kykyä selittää ja kuvata merkityksen näkökulmaisuus käsitteen konstruointi ( construal ) kautta. Konstruointi käsittää joukon ulottuvuuksia, joiden arvoja muuttamalla sama asia voidaan ilmaista lukuisin eri tavoin: esimerkki-ilmauksissa yllä vaihtelee vaikkapa se, mikä viitatusta ihmisryhmästä profiloidaan eli tuodaan ilmauksen ilmitasolle. Tarkkaan ottaen tutkimus käsittelee näiden eri ulottuvuuksien teoreettista perustelua ja toisaalta sitä, kuinka koherentteja ne ovat kuvauskäsitteinä. Väitöstutkimus osoittaa, että konstruoinnin ulottuvuuksien avulla voidaan kuvata tehokkaasti ilmausten ymmärrettävyyden kannalta välttämättömiä merkityspiirteitä. Toisaalta konstruoinnin ulottuvuuksien teoreettinen perustelu on ongelmallinen. Kognitiivinen kielioppi pyrkii selittämään konstruoinnin ulottuvuudet yksilön kielellisen prosessoinnin ominaisuuksina, mikä on ristiriidassa kielellisen merkityksen jaettuuden kanssa. Väitöstutkimus osoittaa tämän selitystavan loogiset heikkoudet ja esittää konstruoinnille vaihtoehtoisen perustelun. Tässä perustelussa konstruointi esitetään ensisijaisesti sosiaalisena, ilmauksen ymmärrettävyyteen ja kohdennettuuteen liittyvänä ilmiönä

Word Knowledge and Word Usage

Word storage and processing define a multi-factorial domain of scientific inquiry whose thorough investigation goes well beyond the boundaries of traditional disciplinary taxonomies, to require synergic integration of a wide range of methods, techniques and empirical and experimental findings. The present book intends to approach a few central issues concerning the organization, structure and functioning of the Mental Lexicon, by asking domain experts to look at common, central topics from complementary standpoints, and discuss the advantages of developing converging perspectives. The book will explore the connections between computational and algorithmic models of the mental lexicon, word frequency distributions and information theoretical measures of word families, statistical correlations across psycho-linguistic and cognitive evidence, principles of machine learning and integrative brain models of word storage and processing. Main goal of the book will be to map out the landscape of future research in this area, to foster the development of interdisciplinary curricula and help single-domain specialists understand and address issues and questions as they are raised in other disciplines

Compositionality of Team Mental Models in Relation to Sharedness and Team Performance

Abstract. “The better the team mental model, the better the teamwork”, or so is said, in which better model refers to the extent to which the model is shared by the team members. This paper argues that according to circumstances, some components of that model are more relevant with respect to team performance than others. Circumstances change with the dynamics of the environment, the team composition and organization, its members, and the team task. Consequently, a compositional approach to measuring sharedness of team mental models is proposed. A case study illustrates the argument and the approach

Metaphor, Imagery, and Culture. Spatialized Ontologies, Mental Tools, and Multimedia in the Making.

The thesis deals with metaphor and imagery in cultural thought-models, the aim being an integrative framework for a rapprochement between cognitive science, cultural anthropology , and linguistics. The work couches previous ethnographic data in the theoretical apparatus of cognitive linguistics (as pioneered by G. Lakoff and R. Langacker), which is horizontally extended to include non-linguistic phenomena and vertically extended to include high-level mental tools. As groundwork for understanding cultural cognition in Part One I undertake a reappraisal of the theory of conceptual metaphor from a genuinely anthropological perspective: I elaborate (1) the multiplicity of metaphor's socio-cognitive functions, its embedding in complex 'polytropes', and its interplay with higher-level cultural schemas; (2)I propose a balanced view between universality and cultural variation in metaphor; and (3) I advocate an intensified focus on cultural body knowledge as the basis of metaphor. Part Two sets as its goal to contour the scope of cultural imagery by extending the theory of dynamic image schemas, as laid out by Langacker, beyond language itself: (4) I analyze essentialist and processual ontologies as being defined through basic imagery types and dynamic switches between ontologies through image schema transformations. (5) Next, I argue for the necessity of cognitive multimedia analysis and offer a model based on the presupposition that various aspects of language, non-linguistic symbolism, action schemas, and body feelings operate in a continuous mental substrate, namely image schemas. (6) Finally, taking the lead from Lakoff's 'spatialization of form' hypothesis, I challenge the broader cognitive sciences with a multi-level theory of spatialized ('geometric') imagery that spans from semantics to general-purpose mental 'tools'. Its upshot is a relativization of symbolic or propositional approaches to thought as well as faculty psychology

Social ontology and agency. Methodological holism naturalised.

Contemporary philosophy of the social sciences is dominated by methodological individualism. Intentional agency is assumed to be conceptually and explanatorily prior to social facts and social practices. In particular, it is generally thought that denials of methodological individualism are bound to include ontologically unnatural and, thereby, unacceptable views. This dissertation provides a comprehensive criticism of this orthodoxy. Part I argues that social facts do not have to be understood as aggregates of actions and attitudes of essentially asocial individuals. Rather, the construction of social facts requires that acting as a member of a group rather than as a disparate individual is a fundamental building block of social reality and social facts. This idea is explicated in the anti-individualistic terms of the theory of collective intentionality. Part II tackles the accusation that the theory of collective intentionality is indefensibly anti-naturalistic in the sense that its picture of humans is essentially incompatible with evolutionary biology. This accusation is answered in terms of detailed analyses of evolutionary models of human sociality and empirical studies of the nature of social action. Part II concludes that it is actually the methodologically individualistic picture of social action as strategic individual action that is unacceptable. The theory of collective intentionality is compatible with and supported by scientific naturalism. Part III, then, defends full-blown methodological holism. It is argued that intentional action and agency as we know them actually require that individual agents (qua agents and not qua physical objects) are essentially constituted by social practices. Intentional action must be explained and understood in terms of social practices. However, this view is argued to be perfectly naturalistic both in the sense of not assuming any ontologically suspect entities and in the sense of being supported by the natural sciences. Indeed, it is the individualistic orthodoxy that has to apply unnatural notions