Pattern matching in compilers

In this thesis we develop tools for effective and flexible pattern matching. We introduce a new pattern matching system called amethyst. Amethyst is not only a generator of parsers of programming languages, but can also serve as an alternative to tools for matching regular expressions. Our framework also produces dynamic parsers. Its intended use is in the context of IDE (accurate syntax highlighting and error detection on the fly). Amethyst offers pattern matching of general data structures. This makes it a useful tool for implementing compiler optimizations such as constant folding, instruction scheduling, and dataflow analysis in general. The parsers produced are essentially top-down parsers. Linear time complexity is obtained by introducing the novel notion of structured grammars and regularized regular expressions. Amethyst uses techniques known from compiler optimizations to produce effective parsers.Comment: master thesi

Certifying cost annotations in compilers

We discuss the problem of building a compiler which can lift in a provably correct way pieces of information on the execution cost of the object code to cost annotations on the source code. To this end, we need a clear and flexible picture of: (i) the meaning of cost annotations, (ii) the method to prove them sound and precise, and (iii) the way such proofs can be composed. We propose a so-called labelling approach to these three questions. As a first step, we examine its application to a toy compiler. This formal study suggests that the labelling approach has good compositionality and scalability properties. In order to provide further evidence for this claim, we report our successful experience in implementing and testing the labelling approach on top of a prototype compiler written in OCAML for (a large fragment of) the C language

CapablePtrs: Securely Compiling Partial Programs using the Pointers-as-Capabilities Principle

Capability machines such as CHERI provide memory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by following a principle called "pointers as capabilities" (PAC). Informally, PAC says that a compiler should represent a source language pointer as a machine code capability. But the security properties of PAC compilers are not yet well understood. We show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC compilers can provide significant additional security guarantees for partial programs: the compiler can provide guarantees for a compilation unit, even if that compilation unit is later linked to attacker-controlled machine code. This paper is the first to study the security of PAC compilers for partial programs formally. We prove for a model of such a compiler that it is fully abstract. The proof uses a novel proof technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which is of broad interest because it reuses and extends the compiler correctness relation in a natural way, as we demonstrate. We implement our compiler on top of the CHERI platform and show that it can compile legacy C code with minimal code changes. We provide performance benchmarks that show how performance overhead is proportional to the number of cross-compilation-unit function calls