Evolutionary intelligent agents for e-commerce: Generic preference detection with feature analysis

Product recommendation and preference tracking systems have been adopted extensively in e-commerce businesses. However, the heterogeneity of product attributes results in undesired impediment for an efficient yet personalized e-commerce product brokering. Amid the assortment of product attributes, there are some intrinsic generic attributes having significant relation to a customer’s generic preference. This paper proposes a novel approach in the detection of generic product attributes through feature analysis. The objective is to provide an insight to the understanding of customers’ generic preference. Furthermore, a genetic algorithm is used to find the suitable feature weight set, hence reducing the rate of misclassification. A prototype has been implemented and the experimental results are promising

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

Evolutionary Tournament-Based Comparison of Learning and Non-Learning Algorithms for Iterated Games

Evolutionary tournaments have been used effectively as a tool for comparing game-playing algorithms. For instance, in the late 1970's, Axelrod organized tournaments to compare algorithms for playing the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. These tournaments capture the dynamics in a population of agents that periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the environment. While these tournaments have provided us with a better understanding of the relative merits of algorithms for iterated PD, our understanding is less clear about algorithms for playing iterated versions of arbitrary single-stage games in an environment of heterogeneous agents. While the Nash equilibrium solution concept has been used to recommend using Nash equilibrium strategies for rational players playing general-sum games, learning algorithms like fictitious play may be preferred for playing against sub-rational players. In this paper, we study the relative performance of learning and non-learning algorithms in an evolutionary tournament where agents periodically adopt relatively successful algorithms in the population. The tournament is played over a testbed composed of all possible structurally distinct 2×2 conflicted games with ordinal payoffs: a baseline, neutral testbed for comparing algorithms. Before analyzing results from the evolutionary tournament, we discuss the testbed, our choice of representative learning and non-learning algorithms and relative rankings of these algorithms in a round-robin competition. The results from the tournament highlight the advantage of learning algorithms over players using static equilibrium strategies for repeated plays of arbitrary single-stage games. The results are likely to be of more benefit compared to work on static analysis of equilibrium strategies for choosing decision procedures for open, adapting agent society consisting of a variety of competitors.Repeated Games, Evolution, Simulation

Generic Methods for Adaptive Management of Service Level Agreements in Cloud Computing

The adoption of cloud computing to build and deliver application services has been nothing less than phenomenal. Service oriented systems are being built using disparate sources composed of web services, replicable datastores, messaging, monitoring and analytics functions and more. Clouds augment these systems with advanced features such as high availability, customer affinity and autoscaling on a fair pay-per-use cost model. The challenge lies in using the utility paradigm of cloud beyond its current exploit. Major trends show that multi-domain synergies are creating added-value service propositions. This raises two questions on autonomic behaviors, which are specifically ad- dressed by this thesis. The first question deals with mechanism design that brings the customer and provider(s) together in the procurement process. The purpose is that considering customer requirements for quality of service and other non functional properties, service dependencies need to be efficiently resolved and legally stipulated. The second question deals with effective management of cloud infrastructures such that commitments to customers are fulfilled and the infrastructure is optimally operated in accordance with provider policies. This thesis finds motivation in Service Level Agreements (SLAs) to answer these questions. The role of SLAs is explored as instruments to build and maintain trust in an economy where services are increasingly interdependent. The thesis takes a wholesome approach and develops generic methods to automate SLA lifecycle management, by identifying and solving relevant research problems. The methods afford adaptiveness in changing business landscape and can be localized through policy based controls. A thematic vision that emerges from this work is that business models, services and the delivery technology are in- dependent concepts that can be finely knitted together by SLAs. Experimental evaluations support the message of this thesis, that exploiting SLAs as foundations for market innovation and infrastructure governance indeed holds win-win opportunities for both cloud customers and cloud providers

The significance of bidding, accepting and opponent modeling in automated negotiation

Given the growing interest in automated negotiation, the search for effective strategies has produced a variety of different negotiation agents. Despite their diversity, there is a common structure to their design. A negotiation agent comprises three key components: the bidding strategy, the opponent model and the acceptance criteria. We show that this three-component view of a negotiating architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing such agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By combining these components in varying ways, we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and thus determine the key contributing components. Moreover, we are able to study the interaction between components and present detailed interaction effects. Furthermore, we find that the bidding strategy in particular is of critical importance to the negotiator's success and far exceeds the importance of opponent preference modeling techniques. Our results contribute to the shaping of a research agenda for negotiating agent design by providing guidelines on how agent developers can spend their time most effectively

Coordination and allocation on land markets under increasing scale economies and heterogeneous actors - An experimental study

Economies of scale and scope are often not exploited in Western agriculture. A general reason is probably that various types of transaction costs limit coordination among farmers. A more specific explanation is that coordination on land markets or machinery cooperation is difficult to achieve when farmers are heterogeneous as some kind of price differentiation is necessary for a Pareto-superior solution. This paper investigates experimentally such a coordination game with heterogeneous agents using an example inspired by agricultural land markets. The experimental findings suggest that a Pareto-optimal solution may not be found when agents are heterogeneous. The findings provide evidence for market failures and cooperation deficits as reasons for unexploited economies of scale in agriculture. Our findings are consistent with coordination failures that appear to be driven by behavioural factors such as anchoring-and-adjustment, inequity aversion, and a reverse form of winner’s curse.Land Markets, Coordination and Allocation, Experimental Economics, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management, Land Economics/Use,

Cloud computing resource scheduling and a survey of its evolutionary approaches

A disruptive technology fundamentally transforming the way that computing services are delivered, cloud computing offers information and communication technology users a new dimension of convenience of resources, as services via the Internet. Because cloud provides a finite pool of virtualized on-demand resources, optimally scheduling them has become an essential and rewarding topic, where a trend of using Evolutionary Computation (EC) algorithms is emerging rapidly. Through analyzing the cloud computing architecture, this survey first presents taxonomy at two levels of scheduling cloud resources. It then paints a landscape of the scheduling problem and solutions. According to the taxonomy, a comprehensive survey of state-of-the-art approaches is presented systematically. Looking forward, challenges and potential future research directions are investigated and invited, including real-time scheduling, adaptive dynamic scheduling, large-scale scheduling, multiobjective scheduling, and distributed and parallel scheduling. At the dawn of Industry 4.0, cloud computing scheduling for cyber-physical integration with the presence of big data is also discussed. Research in this area is only in its infancy, but with the rapid fusion of information and data technology, more exciting and agenda-setting topics are likely to emerge on the horizon