Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements

This paper aims to address two issues related to simultaneous aggregation of utilities and beliefs. The first one is related to how to integrate both inequality and uncertainty considerations into social decision making. The second one is related to how social decision should take disagreements in beliefs into account. To accomplish this, whereas individuals are assumed to abide by Savage model’s of subjective expected utility, society is assumed to prescribe, either to each individual when the ex ante individual well-being is favored or to itself when the ex post individual well-being is favored, acting in accordance with the maximin expected utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153, 1989). Furthermore, it adapts an ex ante Pareto-type condition proposed by Gayer et al. (J Legal Stud 43:151–171, 2014), which says that a prospect Pareto dominates another one if the former gives a higher expected utility than the latter one, for each individual, for all individuals’ beliefs. In the context where the ex ante individual welfare is favored, our ex ante Pareto-type condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility taking the form of a MaxMinMin social welfare function, as well as to the individual set of priors being contained within the range of individual beliefs. However, when the ex post individual welfare is favored, the same Pareto-type condition is shown to be equivalent to social utility taking the form of a MaxMinMin social welfare function, as well as to the social set of priors containing only weighted averages of individual beliefs

Numerical Representations of Acceptance

Accepting a proposition means that our confidence in this proposition is strictly greater than the confidence in its negation. This paper investigates the subclass of uncertainty measures, expressing confidence, that capture the idea of acceptance, what we call acceptance functions. Due to the monotonicity property of confidence measures, the acceptance of a proposition entails the acceptance of any of its logical consequences. In agreement with the idea that a belief set (in the sense of Gardenfors) must be closed under logical consequence, it is also required that the separate acceptance o two propositions entail the acceptance of their conjunction. Necessity (and possibility) measures agree with this view of acceptance while probability and belief functions generally do not. General properties of acceptance functions are estabilished. The motivation behind this work is the investigation of a setting for belief revision more general than the one proposed by Alchourron, Gardenfors and Makinson, in connection with the notion of conditioning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Eleventh Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1995

The Effects of Beliefs versus Risk Preferences on Bargaining Outcomes

In bargaining environments with uncertain impasse outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that confounds data interpretation. In such environments, the minimally acceptable settlement value from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased bargainer is empirically indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimism (optimism). This paper reports data from a controlled bargaining experiment where risk preferences and beliefs are both measured in order to assess their relative importance in bargaining outcomes. The average lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic, which is consistent with existing studies that examine each in isolation. I also find that the effects of optimism dominate those of risk-aversion. Optimistic bargainers are significantly more likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions. Dispute rates are not statistically affected by risk preferences, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to less aggressive bargaining positions and lower payoff outcomes. A key implication is that increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.risk preference, optimism, bargaining, experiments

Confidence and ambiguity

This paper proposes a model of the decision-maker’s confidence in his probability judgements, in terms of an implausibility measure – a real-valued function on the set of probability functions. A decision rule is axiomatised according to which the decision-maker evaluates acts using sets of probability functions which vary depending on the agent’s implausibility measure and on what is at stake in the choice of the act. The framework proposed yields a natural notion of comparative aversion to lack of confidence, or ambiguity aversion, and allows the definition of an ambiguity premium. It is shown that these notions are equivalent and can be characterised in terms of the implausibility measure representing the agent’s confidence. A simple portfolio example is presented.Confidence; multiple priors; ambiguity aversion; ambiguity premium; implausibility measure

Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs

A buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations. The seller's valuation is common knowledge, but the buyer's valuation is known only by the buyer. Impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources: the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining. Equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade, delayed trade, or immediate termination, depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs. This contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs, and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs.Bargaining; Negotiation; Delay; Signalling Games; Transaction Costs.

Distinguishing personal belief from scientific knowledge for the betterment of killer whale welfare – a commentary

We contest publication of Marino et al. regarding captive killer whale (Orcinus orca) welfare because of misrepresentations of available data and the use of citations that do not support assertions. Marino et al. misrepresent stress response concepts and erroneously cite studies, which appear to support Marino et al.’s philosophical beliefs regarding the cetacean hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis. To be clear, these misrepresentations are not differences of scientific opinion, as the authors’ conclusions lack any scientific basis. More extensive review of Marino et al.’s citations reveal a dearth of empirical evidence to support their assertions. Further, Marino et al.’s approach to animal welfare is not consistent with conventional veterinary approaches to animal welfare, including their apparent opposition to use of preventative and therapeutic veterinary interventions. While Marino et al. argue that killer whales’ cognitive and spatial needs preclude management of this species under human care, misrepresentation of the citations used to support this opinion invalidates their arguments. Misleading interpretations of data relative to killer whales’ cognitive and emotional needs and specious and unsubstantiated comparisons with states experienced by humans with posttraumatic stress disorder and other conditions, represent a number of strategies used to misrepresent knowledge regarding killer whale welfare. These misrepresentations and fallacies are inconsistent with scientific ethical standards for credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018), and are barriers to rigorous discourse and identification of strategies for optimizing killer whale welfare. Assertions in the paper amount to nothing more than a compilation of conclusory, philosophical statements. We would also like to mention that manuscripts such as Marino et al.’s do great damage to the fields of comparative psychology and to behavioral science as a whole

The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief

This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a ”Normal/Objective Dilemma’, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ”normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and ”objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of ”first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant ”second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a ”Maxim of the Moon’ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age

Dilating and contracting arbitrarily

Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily

Uncertainty Aversion and Technical Barriers to Trade: An Australian Example

International Relations/Trade,

"What is Bread?" The Anthropology of Belief

This is a postprint (accepted manuscript) version of the article published in Ethos 40(3):341-357 in September 2012. The final version of the article can be found at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1548-1352.2012.01261.x/abstract (login required to access content). The version made available in Digital Common was supplied by the author.Accepted Manuscripttru