Air Power’s Cyber Risk: How Operational Causes will have Strategic Consequences

This thesis argues that air power's cyber risk which has emerged from operational causes will create profound strategic consequences. Through a comprehensive examination of existing literature, it challenges prevailing perspectives by highlighting a critical gap in knowledge: a failure to map the link between operational causes and strategic consequences of air power’s cyber risk which, when realised, will threaten the roles and, in extremis, survival of states. While acknowledging the risks emergent nature and situational specificity with not all states reliant on air power and size inverse to severity, the thesis asserts that the realisation of these strategic consequences is a matter of 'when', not 'if'. Developed within a risk management framework, supported by literature reviews and case studies, and leading to observations and recommendations, the thesis responds by offering a pathway for further research which can mitigate air power’s cyber risk. If embraced, an opportunity exists for academia and practitioners to act in synergy, fill the identified gap in knowledge and address the risk proactively. Conversely, if ignored and the pathway is not followed, the implications will, the thesis predicts, result in the unmitigated strategic consequences of air power’s cyber risk reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century

Berkeleyho metafyzika a epistemologie mezi common sense a vědou

Cílem práce je vstřícná interpretace Berkeleyho imaterialismu, která nevychází z předpokladu, že celý systém je v zásadním smyslu chybný. Čtení základních textů odkrývá nové sémantické vztahy mezi důležitými filozofickými pojmy v imaterialismu. Tradiční interpretace vnímá rozpor imaterialismu a common sense (zdravý rozum), přestože Berkeley věnuje celou jednu knihu vysvětlování své pozice v tomto směru. Tvrdí, že jeho systém je bližší common sense než materialismus, protože nepřekrucuje významy klíčových slov "vědět", "jistý" a "skutečný". Zároveň poukazuje na nesmyslnost slov "vnější předmět", "absolutní existence" atd., čímž zamítá už samotný sémantický rámec, ve kterém se odehrává tradiční diskuse o realismu, idealismu, fenomenalismu a solipsismu. Berkeleyho vlastní definice předmětu vnímání se primárně nachází v jeho vědecké teorii vidění, ze které je zobecněna na metafyzickou úroveň. A jelikož jeho optický program se v podstatě skládá z psychologie vidění, je i jeho metafyzické ukotvení omezeno na spojování idejí jakožto psychologických entit, které jsou privátní každému vnímajícímu, z nichž tento konstruuje předměty vnímání. Pokud jsou ale věci pouhými soubory idejí a ideje závisejí na vnímající mysli co do své existence, co se s věcmi stane, když ideje nejsou v mysli, když nejsou vnímány? Ortodoxní...The aim of the dissertation is to provide a sympathetic interpretation of Berkeley's immaterialism that does not proceed on the assumption that there is something fundamentally wrong with the system itself. Careful close reading uncovers new semantic relationships between important philosophical concepts in immaterialism. Although traditionally viewed as anti common-sense, Berkeley devotes one whole book to explaining his position on common sense. He claims that his system is closer to it than materialism because it does not distort the meanings of such key words as "know", "certain" and "real". Furthermore, he empties words "external object", "absolute existence" etc. of their meaning, thus precluding the very semantic framework within which the traditional debate about realism, idealism, phenomenalism and solipsism takes place. Berkeley's own definition of the object of perception is to be found primarily in his scientific theory of vision, from which it is generalized into a metaphysics. And since his optical programme provides a psychology of vision, also the immaterialist metaphysical underpinning limits itself to connecting ideas as psychological entities private to each perceiver and construing objects of perception out of them. But if things are just collections of ideas and ideas are mind-dependent...Institute of Philosophy and Religious StudiesÚstav filosofie a religionistikyFilozofická fakultaFaculty of Art

Balancing the rise of China: United States policy in the South China Sea

Thesis (M.A.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, 2013.The threat of a rising China to the U.S. led international system has resulted in the increase in competition and tension between the two states. The disputed South China Sea (SCS) is one of the theatres in which this developing competition takes place. Utilizing Offensive Realism theory as a framework, the SCS is examined as a potential flashpoint for the escalation of an international incident into conflict between the U.S. and China. The political/security context in which Sino-U.S. relations occur is established through an analysis of the law of claims at sea and the disputes claimants. The theoretical framework provides a means to interpret the actions of both China and the U.S. in the context of a competition for power, by establishing the causes of war and the strategies utilized by rising and status quo powers against each other. The conduct of China and the U.S. both generally and regionally are then examined on three levels: national opinion, strategy and tactics. The results of each level are then juxtaposed to determine their effect on tension and thus the likelihood of conflict occurring. It is determined that the national opinion and strategy levels have a net effect of decreasing tension, whilst the tactical level dramatically increases tension within the region. The tension in the region is therefore moderated by the national opinion and strategy levels, limiting the potential of an international incident acting as a flashpoint for conflict, but ensuring the likelihood of a prolonged stalemate and the emergence of a new Cold War

Does autism merit belief?:Developing an account of scientific realism for psychiatry

The PhD outlines criteria under which a psychiatric classification merits belief and, as a case study, establishes that autism merits belief. Three chapters respond to anti-realist arguments, three chapters establish conditions under which psychiatric classifications merit belief. Chapter one addresses the pessimistic meta-induction. I historically analyse autism to show there has been sufficient historical continuity to avoid the pessimistic meta induction. Chapter two considers arguments from underdetermination. I consider the strongest candidate for an alternative to autism, classificatory changes which occurred between 1980 and 1985. I argue this does not constitute underdetermination because those changes were methodologically and evidentially flawed. Chapter three considers theory-ladenness. I consider the two strongest candidates for background theories which might have a negative epistemic effect (cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis). I show these have little influence on what symptoms are formulated or how symptoms are grouped together. Chapter four argues against psychiatric classifications as natural kinds and against notions that inductive knowledge of psychiatric classifications requires robust causes. I outline psychiatric classifications as scientific laws. They are high level idealised models which guide construction of lower level, more specific, models. This opens alternative routes to belief for psychiatric classification lacking robust causes. Chapter five shows that psychiatric classifications can set relevant populations for deriving statistically significant symptoms. The same behaviour can count as statistically significant for one psychiatric classification but not another. I argue this process strengthens psychiatric classifications inductively, thus contributing to belief. Chapter six bases belief on theoretical virtues. Unifications and causation are the two main theoretical virtues. Autism strongly exhibits unifications, stringently covering a wide range of otherwise unrelated symptoms. Additionally, emphasising causation may reduce unifications and thus reduce belief. Attributing unifications is reliable because autism is accessible without employing extremely complicated experimental processes and relies upon secure background theories

Does autism merit belief?:Developing an account of scientific realism for psychiatry

The PhD outlines criteria under which a psychiatric classification merits belief and, as a case study, establishes that autism merits belief. Three chapters respond to anti-realist arguments, three chapters establish conditions under which psychiatric classifications merit belief. Chapter one addresses the pessimistic meta-induction. I historically analyse autism to show there has been sufficient historical continuity to avoid the pessimistic meta induction. Chapter two considers arguments from underdetermination. I consider the strongest candidate for an alternative to autism, classificatory changes which occurred between 1980 and 1985. I argue this does not constitute underdetermination because those changes were methodologically and evidentially flawed. Chapter three considers theory-ladenness. I consider the two strongest candidates for background theories which might have a negative epistemic effect (cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis). I show these have little influence on what symptoms are formulated or how symptoms are grouped together. Chapter four argues against psychiatric classifications as natural kinds and against notions that inductive knowledge of psychiatric classifications requires robust causes. I outline psychiatric classifications as scientific laws. They are high level idealised models which guide construction of lower level, more specific, models. This opens alternative routes to belief for psychiatric classification lacking robust causes. Chapter five shows that psychiatric classifications can set relevant populations for deriving statistically significant symptoms. The same behaviour can count as statistically significant for one psychiatric classification but not another. I argue this process strengthens psychiatric classifications inductively, thus contributing to belief. Chapter six bases belief on theoretical virtues. Unifications and causation are the two main theoretical virtues. Autism strongly exhibits unifications, stringently covering a wide range of otherwise unrelated symptoms. Additionally, emphasising causation may reduce unifications and thus reduce belief. Attributing unifications is reliable because autism is accessible without employing extremely complicated experimental processes and relies upon secure background theories

The Best Puffery Article Ever

This Article provides the first extensive legal treatment of an important defense in the law of fraud and contracts: puffery. Legal authorities commonly say they make decisions about whether defendants should be able to utter exaggerated, optimistic, lies based on assumptions about buyer behavior, concluding that consumers do not rely on such speech. However, as the Article shows, such analyses are proxies for a deeper analytical question: does the speech encourage or discourage a type of consumption activity that the court deems welfare maximizing? The Article presents a novel constitutional analysis of puffery doctrine that focuses on the meaning of misleading speech, a term of art at the heart of the Supreme Court\u27s contested and still evolving commercial speech jurisprudence. Missing from that jurisprudence is a satisfactory account of how consumers and investors react to speech that is not literally false but which has false implications. I present such an account, focused on the incentives and capabilities of sellers to exploit buyers\u27 cognitive vulnerabilities. I draw on economic, marketing, psychology and consumption literatures. * I conclude by offering a novel liability proposal. Because legal authorities are incapable of satisfactorily drawing a line between harmful and innocuous puffery, the law should make sellers presumptively liable if their speech contains exaggerated, but vague boasts. This approach would place the onus on sellers to balance the costs and benefits of puffery, and thus lead both to more satisfying doctrine and a more optimal level of fraud

An exploratory study investigating the experience of a group of Irish social workers undertaking an applied training in mentalization-based thinking and practice

This qualitative study explored the potential relevance of mentalization-based theory (MBT) and its corollary reflective functioning (RF) within social work practice. A bespoke MBT-informed psychoeducational programme emphasizing a novel tripartite model, comprising MBT, Attachment Theory and Regulation Theory was delivered in two hourly groups over twelve weeks. In addition to the provision of psychoeducational information, the groups incorporated a Tavistock style Work Discussion Group to support the participants’ applied use of MBT to one of their own cases. The study aimed to explore the participants’ own experience of engaging with and acquiring a working knowledge of mentalization, its relevance, both personally and professionally, as well as garnering any learnings from this first attempt to research the provision of introductory MBT training to a group of social worker practitioners. Nine of the eleven social workers, recruited from a large metropolitan area in Ireland completed the programme. Utilizing a thematic analysis in conjunction with a psychoanalytic lens, the transcriptions of the groups were analyzed within a critical realist world view, using Braun and Clarke’s six-stage model. The case studies were subjected to close scrutiny and reflexive considerations from which three central themes emerged for further analysis. The study advances our knowledge by indicating a strong consensus amongst the participants that MBT was a relevant and beneficial theoretical and practice gyroscope to support the social work task. Participants warmly welcomed the new language and ‘Thinking Tools’ of MBT which supported their ability to conceptualize and articulate a level of complexity of their clients and their own intersubjective process which they had previously struggled to enunciate. This novel tripartite model offers significant potential as a centralizing theoretical and practice framework; as such, it warrants further development and research. Future social work practice development could be beneficially advanced in light of these findings