This thesis argues that air power's cyber risk which has emerged from operational causes will create profound strategic consequences. Through a comprehensive
examination of existing literature, it challenges prevailing perspectives by highlighting a critical gap in knowledge: a failure to map the link between operational causes and strategic consequences of air power’s cyber risk which,
when realised, will threaten the roles and, in extremis, survival of states. While acknowledging the risks emergent nature and situational specificity with not all
states reliant on air power and size inverse to severity, the thesis asserts that the realisation of these strategic consequences is a matter of 'when', not 'if'. Developed within a risk management framework, supported by literature reviews and case studies, and leading to observations and recommendations, the thesis responds by offering a pathway for further research which can mitigate air power’s cyber risk. If embraced, an opportunity exists for academia and practitioners to act in synergy, fill the identified gap in knowledge and address the risk proactively. Conversely, if ignored and the pathway is not followed, the implications will, the thesis predicts, result in the unmitigated strategic
consequences of air power’s cyber risk reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century
