A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax

In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his 1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a [standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical predicate calculus QC. The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment, identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel - and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type theories. The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation (incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic

Provability in BI's Sequent Calculus is Decidable

The logic of Bunched Implications (BI) combines both additive and multiplicative connectives, which include two primitive intuitionistic implications. As a consequence, contexts in the sequent presentation are not lists, nor multisets, but rather tree-like structures called bunches. This additional complexity notwithstanding, the logic has a well-behaved metatheory admitting all the familiar forms of semantics and proof systems. However, the presentation of an effective proof-search procedure has been elusive since the logic's debut. We show that one can reduce the proof-search space for any given sequent to a primitive recursive set, the argument generalizing Gentzen's decidability argument for classical propositional logic and combining key features of Dyckhoff's contraction-elimination argument for intuitionistic logic. An effective proof-search procedure, and hence decidability of provability, follows as a corollary.Comment: Submitted to CADE-2

Ecumenical modal logic

The discussion about how to put together Gentzen's systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system is back in fashion. Indeed, recently Prawitz and others have been discussing the so called Ecumenical Systems, where connectives from these logics can co-exist in peace. In Prawitz' system, the classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the universal quantifier, conjunction, negation, and the constant for the absurd, but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction, and implication, with different meanings. Prawitz' main idea is that these different meanings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by both parties. In a recent work, Ecumenical sequent calculi and a nested system were presented, and some very interesting proof theoretical properties of the systems were established. In this work we extend Prawitz' Ecumenical idea to alethic K-modalities

An Intuitionistic Formula Hierarchy Based on High-School Identities

We revisit the notion of intuitionistic equivalence and formal proof representations by adopting the view of formulas as exponential polynomials. After observing that most of the invertible proof rules of intuitionistic (minimal) propositional sequent calculi are formula (i.e. sequent) isomorphisms corresponding to the high-school identities, we show that one can obtain a more compact variant of a proof system, consisting of non-invertible proof rules only, and where the invertible proof rules have been replaced by a formula normalisation procedure. Moreover, for certain proof systems such as the G4ip sequent calculus of Vorob'ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff, it is even possible to see all of the non-invertible proof rules as strict inequalities between exponential polynomials; a careful combinatorial treatment is given in order to establish this fact. Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy to the first-order quantifiers, showing that it gives rise to an intuitionistic hierarchy of formulas, resembling the classical arithmetical hierarchy, and the first one that classifies formulas while preserving isomorphism

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later

A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. II: Semantics

Three classes of models of QHC, the joint logic of problems and propositions, are constructed, including a class of subset/sheaf-valued models that is related to solutions of some actual problems (such as solutions of algebraic equations) and combines the familiar Leibniz-Euler-Venn semantics of classical logic with a BHK-type semantics of intuitionistic logic. To test the models, we consider a number of principles and rules, which empirically appear to cover all "sufficiently simple" natural conjectures about the behaviour of the operators ! and ?, and include two hypotheses put forward by Hilbert and Kolmogorov, as formalized in the language of QHC. Each of these turns out to be either derivable in QHC or equivalent to one of only 13 principles and 1 rule, of which 10 principles and 1 rule are conservative over classical and intuitionistic logics. The three classes of models together suffice to confirm the independence of these 10 principles and 1 rule, and to determine the full lattice of implications between them, apart from one potential implication.Comment: 35 pages. v4: Section 4.6 "Summary" is added at the end of the paper. v3: Major revision of a half of v2. The results are improved and rewritten in terms of the meta-logic. The other half of v2 (Euclid's Elements as a theory over QHC) is expected to make part III after a revisio

Correspondences between Classical, Intuitionistic and Uniform Provability

Based on an analysis of the inference rules used, we provide a characterization of the situations in which classical provability entails intuitionistic provability. We then examine the relationship of these derivability notions to uniform provability, a restriction of intuitionistic provability that embodies a special form of goal-directedness. We determine, first, the circumstances in which the former relations imply the latter. Using this result, we identify the richest versions of the so-called abstract logic programming languages in classical and intuitionistic logic. We then study the reduction of classical and, derivatively, intuitionistic provability to uniform provability via the addition to the assumption set of the negation of the formula to be proved. Our focus here is on understanding the situations in which this reduction is achieved. However, our discussions indicate the structure of a proof procedure based on the reduction, a matter also considered explicitly elsewhere.Comment: 31 page

Interval-valued and intuitionistic fuzzy mathematical morphologies as special cases of L-fuzzy mathematical morphology

Mathematical morphology (MM) offers a wide range of tools for image processing and computer vision. MM was originally conceived for the processing of binary images and later extended to gray-scale morphology. Extensions of classical binary morphology to gray-scale morphology include approaches based on fuzzy set theory that give rise to fuzzy mathematical morphology (FMM). From a mathematical point of view, FMM relies on the fact that the class of all fuzzy sets over a certain universe forms a complete lattice. Recall that complete lattices provide for the most general framework in which MM can be conducted. The concept of L-fuzzy set generalizes not only the concept of fuzzy set but also the concepts of interval-valued fuzzy set and Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy set. In addition, the class of L-fuzzy sets forms a complete lattice whenever the underlying set L constitutes a complete lattice. Based on these observations, we develop a general approach towards L-fuzzy mathematical morphology in this paper. Our focus is in particular on the construction of connectives for interval-valued and intuitionistic fuzzy mathematical morphologies that arise as special, isomorphic cases of L-fuzzy MM. As an application of these ideas, we generate a combination of some well-known medical image reconstruction techniques in terms of interval-valued fuzzy image processing

From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation

We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio