A History of Until

Until is a notoriously difficult temporal operator as it is both existential and universal at the same time: A until B holds at the current time instant w iff either B holds at w or there exists a time instant w' in the future at which B holds and such that A holds in all the time instants between the current one and w'. This "ambivalent" nature poses a significant challenge when attempting to give deduction rules for until. In this paper, in contrast, we make explicit this duality of until to provide well-behaved natural deduction rules for linear-time logics by introducing a new temporal operator that allows us to formalize the "history" of until, i.e., the "internal" universal quantification over the time instants between the current one and w'. This approach provides the basis for formalizing deduction systems for temporal logics endowed with the until operator. For concreteness, we give here a labeled natural deduction system for a linear-time logic endowed with the new operator and show that, via a proper translation, such a system is also sound and complete with respect to the linear temporal logic LTL with until.Comment: 24 pages, full version of paper at Methods for Modalities 2009 (M4M-6

Structural Interactions and Absorption of Structural Rules in BI Sequent Calculus

Development of a contraction-free BI sequent calculus, be the contraction-freeness implicit or explicit, has not been successful in the literature. We address this problem by presenting such a sequent system. Our calculus involves no structural rules. It should be an insight into non-formula contraction absorption in other non-classical logics. Contraction absorption in sequent calculus is associated to simpler cut elimination and to efficient proof searches

Semantic Incompleteness of del Cerro and Herzig's Hilbert System for a Combination of Classical and Intuitionistic Propositional Logic

This paper shows Hilbert system (C+J)-, given by del Cerro and Herzig (1996) is semantically incomplete. This system is proposed as a proof theory for Kripke semantics for a combination of intuitionistic and classical propositional logic, which is obtained by adding the natural semantic clause of classical implication into intuitionistic Kripke semantics. Although Hilbert system (C+J)- contains intuitionistic modus ponens as a rule, it does not contain classical modus ponens. This paper gives an argument ensuring that the system (C+J)- is semantically incomplete because of the absence of classical modus ponens. Our method is based on the logic of paradox, which is a paraconsistent logic proposed by Priest (1979)