Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2

Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

We examine self-referential games in which there is a chance of understanding an opponent's intentions. Even when this source of information is weak, we are able to prove a folk-like theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. Our main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents' play: direct observation of the opponent's intentions, and indirect observation of the opponent's play in a repeated setting.Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0498-2

Mapping and analysis of the current self- and co- regulatory framework of commercial communication aimed at minors

As the advertising sector has been very active in self-regulating commercial communication aimed at children, a patchwork of different rules and instruments exist, drafted by different self-regulatory organisations at international, European and national level. In order to determine the scope and contents of these rules, and hence, the actual level of protection of children, a structured mapping of these rules is needed. As such, this report aims to provide an overview of different categories of Alternative Regulatory Instruments(ARIs,such as self- and co-regulation regarding (new) advertising formats aimed at children. This report complements the first legal AdLit research report, which provided an overview of the legislative provisions in this domain.status: publishe

A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case

Two players can make use of a trusted third party who mediates and partially resolves their conflict. Usually, the mediator should be aware of the situation and give suggestions to the players accordingly. However, a corrupt mediator can have a big influence on the outcome of the game. We single out a transparent mediator which can be safely applied in any two player game without loss of efficiency. That is, the mediator is independent of the game and the desired outcome. Technically, we show that any correlated equilibrium of any two player game can be obtained as Nash equilibria of the game, extended with cheap, pre-play communication, where players can communicate through the proposed mediator. The key idea is that after the mediated communication the players can have a plain conversation. In particular, the mediating communication device is transparent, controllable and is the same for all games and for all equilibrium distributions. We extend the result to three player games and show that one of the players can play the role of the mediator. We implement the set of correlated equilibrium in Nash equilibria of an extended game where the players have a plain conversation. The central assumption is that players can be invited to eavesdrop a private conversation. We extend the analysis to games with incomplete information and to the set of communication equilibria.cheap talk, communication device, correlated equilibrium, communi- cation equilibrium, detail-free mechanism, mediator

Essays on Self-Referential Games

This dissertation studies self-referential games in which agents can learn (perfectly and imperfectly) about an opponents\u27 intentions from a private signal. In the first chapter, my main focus is on the interaction of two sources of information about opponents\u27 play: direct observation of an opponent\u27s code of conduct and indirect observation of the same opponent\u27s play in a repeated setting. Using both sources of information I prove a folk theorem for repeated self-referential games with private monitoring. In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of self-referentiality on bad reputation games in which the long-run player must choose specific actions to make short-run players participate in the game. Since these particular actions could be interpreted as evidence of perverse behavior, the long-run agent attempts to separate himself from other types and this results in efficiency losses. When players identify intentions perfectly, I show that inefficiencies and reputational concerns due to a bad reputation disappear. In the case of imperfect observation, I find that self-referentiality and stochastic renewal of the long-run player together overcome inefficiencies because of bad reputation. In the third chapter, I address the timing of signals in self-referential games. These models typically suppose that intentions are divined in a pre-play phase; however, in many applications this may not be the case. For games with perfect information when players observe signals in advance, I show that any subgame perfect equilibria of an infinite-horizon game coincides with a Nash equilibrium of the self-referential finite-horizon approximation of the original game. Then, I focus on two specific classes of games. First, in finitely repeated games with discounting I show that a version of the folk theorem holds regardless of the time at which signals are observed. Second, I examine exit games in which players can terminate the game at any stage. In contrast to repeated games, I find that the equilibrium outcome of the self-referential exit game is unique if signals arrive after the first stage, whereas a folk theorem results only if they occur before the first stage. Finally, I explore asynchronous monitoring of intentions where players may not receive signals simultaneously. With asynchronicity, a folk theorem continues to apply for repeated games; however, for exit games there is a unique equilibrium outcome independent of signal timing, or indeed, independent of having a signal

Harnessing the Power of Focal Points To Measure Social Agreement

This paper reports results from an application of Thomas Schelling’s (1960) concept of a focal point to the measure of social agreement on the received tone of media content. In our experiments, subjects rate the tone, positive, negative, or neutral, of newspaper articles and news broadcasts, with an incentive to coordinate responses. We compare the content analysis of a traditional subject pool with those of a representative cross-section of the general public. Our application of the coordination game with strategy labels illustrates that the concept of a focal point can be put to use as a measure of social agreement. Le document présente les résultats obtenus en appliquant le concept de point focal, avancé par Thomas Schelling (1960), à la mesure de l’accord social concernant la perception du ton qui se dégage du contenu médiatique. Dans le cadre des expériences mises sur pied, les sujets évaluent le ton, positif, négatif ou neutre, adopté dans des articles de journaux et des bulletins de nouvelles et sont encouragés, par des mesures incitatives, à coordonner leurs réponses. Nous comparons l’analyse du contenu réalisée par un bassin traditionnel de sujets à celle menée par un échantillon représentatif du grand public. Notre application du jeu de coordination faisant appel à des étiquettes de stratégies démontre que la notion de point focal peut être utilisée pour mesurer l’accord social.Coordination, focal point, experiment, content analysis, media, Coordination, point focal, expérience, analyse du contenu, médias

The Lawyer As Consensus Builder: Ethics For a New Practice

In this Article, I explore the roles of lawyers in alternative dispute resolution ( ADR ), including traditional roles in arbitration and new roles in mediation and facilitation. I also discuss how conventional ethics rules for lawyers fail to provide guidance and best practices for lawyers who serve in these new roles. State legislatures and professional associations, such as the American Arbitration Association ( AAA ), the Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution ( CPR ), and the Association of Conflict Resolution, have adopted ethical codes for mediators and arbitrators. Select professional associations are also developing best practice guides for the provision of ADR services; however, the lack of clarity in the Model Rules is a serious problem. The failure of the Model Rules to recognize the role of lawyers in peacemaking, dispute prevention or resolution, and legal problem solving marks an absence in what is publicly recognized as among the most important roles a lawyer performs - that of a constructive lawyer. Furthermore, the Model Rules misrepresent the legal profession by assuming that representing clients in adversarial matters is the only role lawyers fulfill. Such an assumption fails to give adequate guidance to a lawyer who fulfills a broader, and perhaps, more significant role than that of a hired gun

A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication

We study self-referential games in which players have the ability to commit to a code of conduct—a complete description of how they play and their opponents should play. Each player receives a private signal about each others’ code of conduct and their codes of conduct specify how to react to these signals. When only some players receive informative signals, players are allowed to communicate using public messages. Our characterization of the effect of communication on the equilibrium payoffs yields a folk theorem and players share their private information truthfully in equilibrium. We also provide an application of codes of conduct: games that are played through computer programs.Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support.This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0107-

A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication

This is the final version of the article. It first appeared from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40505-016-0107-yWe study self-referential games in which players have the ability to commit to a code of conduct—a complete description of how they play and their opponents should play. Each player receives a private signal about each others’ code of conduct and their codes of conduct specify how to react to these signals. When only some players receive informative signals, players are allowed to communicate using public messages. Our characterization of the effect of communication on the equilibrium payoffs yields a folk theorem and players share their private information truthfully in equilibrium. We also provide an application of codes of conduct: games that are played through computer programs.Juan Block acknowledges support from the Cambridge-INET Institute, and David Levine thanks the National Science Foundation (Grant SES-0851315) and the European University Institute for financial support

An Experimental Study of the Effects of Inequality and Relative Deprivation on Trusting Behavior

Several non-experimental studies report that income inequality and other forms of population-based heterogeneity reduce levels of trust in society. However, recent work by Glaeser et al. (2000) calls into question the reliability of widely used survey-based measures of trust. Specifically, survey responses regarding trust attitudes did not reflect subjects actual behavior in a trust game. In this paper, we conduct a novel experimental test of the effects of inequality on trust and trustworthiness. Our experimental design induces inequality by varying the show-up fees paid to subjects, in contrast to previous experiments that focus on broad cultural or national differences in trust. We do not find robust support for the hypothesis that inequality per se dampens trusting behavior among all subjects; however, we do find some evidence that trust and rustworthiness are influenced by an individuals relative position in the group. Finally, we confirm previous findings that common survey-based measures of social trust are not associated with actual trusting behavior.Trust, social capital, heterogeneity, inequality, experiment