784 research outputs found
Feature Selection via Coalitional Game Theory
We present and study the contribution-selection algorithm (CSA), a novel algorithm for feature selection. The algorithm is based on the multiperturbation shapley analysis (MSA), a framework that relies on game theory to estimate usefulness. The algorithm iteratively estimates the usefulness of features and selects them accordingly, using either forward selection or backward elimination. It can optimize various performance measures over unseen data such as accuracy, balanced error rate, and area under receiver-operator-characteristic curve. Empirical comparison with several other existing feature selection methods shows that the backward elimination variant of CSA leads to the most accurate classification results on an array of data sets
On the Shapley value and its application to the Italian VQR research assessment exercise
Research assessment exercises have now become common evaluation tools in a number of countries. These exercises have the goal of guiding merit-based public funds allocation, stimulating improvement of research productivity through competition and assessing the impact of adopted research support policies. One case in point is Italy's most recent research assessment effort, VQR 2011–2014 (Research Quality Evaluation), which, in addition to research institutions, also evaluated university departments, and individuals in some cases (i.e., recently hired research staff and members of PhD committees). However, the way an institution's score was divided, according to VQR rules, between its constituent departments or its staff members does not enjoy many desirable properties well known from coalitional game theory (e.g., budget balance, fairness, marginality). We propose, instead, an alternative score division rule that is based on the notion of Shapley value, a well known solution concept in coalitional game theory, which enjoys the desirable properties mentioned above. For a significant test case (namely, Sapienza University of Rome, the largest university in Italy), we present a detailed comparison of the scores obtained, for substructures and individuals, by applying the official VQR rules, with those resulting from Shapley value computations. We show that there are significant differences in the resulting scores, making room for improvements in the allocation rules used in research assessment exercises
Coalitional Game Theory for Communication Networks: A Tutorial
Game theoretical techniques have recently become prevalent in many
engineering applications, notably in communications. With the emergence of
cooperation as a new communication paradigm, and the need for self-organizing,
decentralized, and autonomic networks, it has become imperative to seek
suitable game theoretical tools that allow to analyze and study the behavior
and interactions of the nodes in future communication networks. In this
context, this tutorial introduces the concepts of cooperative game theory,
namely coalitional games, and their potential applications in communication and
wireless networks. For this purpose, we classify coalitional games into three
categories: Canonical coalitional games, coalition formation games, and
coalitional graph games. This new classification represents an
application-oriented approach for understanding and analyzing coalitional
games. For each class of coalitional games, we present the fundamental
components, introduce the key properties, mathematical techniques, and solution
concepts, and describe the methodologies for applying these games in several
applications drawn from the state-of-the-art research in communications. In a
nutshell, this article constitutes a unified treatment of coalitional game
theory tailored to the demands of communications and network engineers.Comment: IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special Issue on Game Theory, to
appear, 2009. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special Issue on Game Theory,
to appear, 200
Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Cooperative Transmission in Vehicular Networks
Cooperative transmission in vehicular networks is studied by using
coalitional game and pricing in this paper. There are several vehicles and
roadside units (RSUs) in the networks. Each vehicle has a desire to transmit
with a certain probability, which represents its data burtiness. The RSUs can
enhance the vehicles' transmissions by cooperatively relaying the vehicles'
data. We consider two kinds of cooperations: cooperation among the vehicles and
cooperation between the vehicle and RSU. First, vehicles cooperate to avoid
interfering transmissions by scheduling the transmissions of the vehicles in
each coalition. Second, a RSU can join some coalition to cooperate the
transmissions of the vehicles in that coalition. Moreover, due to the mobility
of the vehicles, we introduce the notion of encounter between the vehicle and
RSU to indicate the availability of the relay in space. To stimulate the RSU's
cooperative relaying for the vehicles, the pricing mechanism is applied. A
non-transferable utility (NTU) game is developed to analyze the behaviors of
the vehicles and RSUs. The stability of the formulated game is studied.
Finally, we present and discuss the numerical results for the 2-vehicle and
2-RSU scenario, and the numerical results verify the theoretical analysis.Comment: accepted by IEEE ICC'1
Decentralized Resource Allocation for Interdependent Infrastructure Networks Restoration: A Game Theory Approach
Critical infrastructures are governed by several sectors working together to maintain social, economic and environmental well-being. These infrastructures are interdependent and rely on a complex schedule of repair after a disruptive event. Decision makers seek to restore the infrastructure networks as quickly as possible while balancing time and resource constraints. Although many models focus on a centralized view for networks, rarely is there only one decision maker for the infrastructure networks, making decentralization a more realistic view. In decentralized decision-making paradigm, individual decision makers need to decide how to prioritize areas of the network and eventually improve the aggregated infrastructure systems resilience. Existing literature advocates cooperative management strategies to enhance infrastructure systems resilience. However, there is a dearth of quantitative studies analyzing resource allocation decisions considering both decentralized and cooperative aspects. In light of cooperative game theory, interdependent infrastructure systems can be modeled as coalitions of service providers pooling their resources to meet the global performance. This work relies on coalitional game theory to address decentralized resource allocation for interdependent water distribution and road networks. Coalitional game theory addresses the fair allocation of resources for nodes that surround an important area to the infrastructure and the need to decentralize the overall interdependent network. In particular, combining coalitional game theory with weighted graphs creates an order of repair for each node in the coalitions. Subsequently, the decision makers can pass information on to the master problem, reducing the complexity of the resource allocation problem for the interdependent networks. The proposed approach is applied to water distribution and transportation networks in the City of Tampa, FL. We compare the decentralized solutions to centralized solutions in different scenarios to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach for the city-scale networks
Coalitional Game Theory based Value Sharing in Energy Communities
This paper presents a coalitional game for value sharing in energy communities (ECs). It is proved that the game is super-additive, and the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff. It is also proved that the model is balanced and thus, it has a nonempty core. This means there always exists at least one value sharing mechanism that makes the grand coalition stable. Therefore, prosumers will always achieve lower bills if they join to form larger ECs. A counterexample is presented to demonstrate that the game is not convex and value sharing based on Shapley values does not necessarily ensure the stability of the coalition. To find a stabilizing value sharing mechanism that belongs to the core of the game, the worst-case excess minimization concept is applied. In this concept, however, size of the optimization problem increases exponentially with respect to the number of members in EC. To make the problem computationally tractable, the idea of clustering members based on their generation/load profiles and considering the same profile and share for members in the same cluster is proposed here. K-means algorithm is used for clustering prosumers’ profiles. This way, the problem would have several redundant constraints that can be removed. The redundant constraints are identified and removed via the generalized Llewellyn’s rules. Finally, value sharing in an apartment building in the southern part of Finland in the metropolitan area is studied to demonstrate effectiveness of the method
Pilot Clustering in Asymmetric Massive MIMO Networks
We consider the uplink of a cellular massive MIMO network. Since the spectral
efficiency of these networks is limited by pilot contamination, the pilot
allocation across cells is of paramount importance. However, finding efficient
pilot reuse patterns is non-trivial especially in practical asymmetric base
station deployments. In this paper, we approach this problem using coalitional
game theory. Each cell has its own unique pilots and can form coalitions with
other cells to gain access to more pilots. We develop a low-complexity
distributed algorithm and prove convergence to an individually stable coalition
structure. Simulations reveal fast algorithmic convergence and substantial
performance gains over one-cell coalitions and full pilot reuse.Comment: Published in Proc. of IEEE International Workshop on Signal
Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC '15), 5 pages, 1
tables, 5 figure
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