Formal methods for analysing, coordinating, and controlling decisions in multi-agent systems

Multiagentensysteme sind verteilte (Computer)Systeme, die sich aus autonomen interagierenden Systemkomponenten, bezeichnet als Agenten, zusammensetzen. Sie bieten ein flexibles Framework zur Modellierung und Analyse von interaktiven Systemen, in denen Kooperation, Eigeninteresse und Autonomie eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Dies ist zum Beispiel der Fall in Smart Grids. Eine Herausforderung in solchen Systemen ist die Kontrolle und die Koordination von Systemausführungen. Agenten handeln autonom und lassen sich daher oftmals nicht direkt kontrollieren, sondern bestenfalls beeinflussen. Aufgrund der Autonomie und des Selbstinteresses, ist es schwierig, angemessene Kontrollmechanismen zu finden. Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt formale Grundlagen zu den Themen Entscheidungsfindung, Koordination und Kontrolle in Multiagentensystemen. Insbesondere werden in diesem Zusammenhang Logiken zur Analyse und Spezifikation von strategischen Fähigkeiten von Agenten, unter diversen Restriktionen, untersucht. Es werden formale Ansätze zur Beeinflussung und Überwachung von Systemausführungen eingeführt. In einem weiteren Teil der Arbeit wird mittels spieltheoretischer Verfahren analysiert, wie rationale Agenten interagieren und Entscheidungen treffen. Es wird argumentiert, dass formale Methoden und Werkzeuge zur Analyse und Kontrolle von autonomen Systemen entscheidend für deren verlässliche Entwicklung sind.Multi-agent systems (MASs) are distributed (computer) systems composed of autonomously (inter-)acting system components referred to as agents. MASs offer a flexible framework to model and analyse many real world settings in which cooperation, self-interest, and autonomy are crucial elements. A key challenge in such settings is the control and coordination of behavior. However, due to the agents' autonomy behavior can often not be controlled, but at best be influenced in some way or another. For example, agents can be given incentives in order to affect their decision-making in such a way that the emergent behavior of all actors is desirable from the system's perspective. The properties of self-interest and autonomy make it challenging to find appropriate control mechanisms. Existing coordination and control approaches from the distributed system literature are often not applicable due to the lack of direct control on the system components of MASs. New methods and tools are needed. In this thesis formal foundations related to the subjects of decision making, coordination and control in MASs are studied. In particular, we investigate (extensions of) temporal and strategic logics which capture specific capabilities of agents that influence their decision making. We also propose formal approaches to control, coordinate and monitor the emergent behavior in MASs. In the last part of the thesis we analyse how rational agents interact and make decisions using game theoretical methods. We argue that such formal approaches and tools to analyse and control autonomous systems are crucial for the development of reliable and flexible systems and will become even more crucial in the near future

Natural Strategic Ability

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Strategic logics : complexity, completeness and expressivity

by transferring normative attributes from an agent to another. Such interactions are called delegation. Formal models of delegation and control were studied in, e.g., [189, 149, 191]. In this work, we consider the scenario where agents delegate control over propositions to other agents. The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable propositions stems from areas like discrete event systems and control theory, where, e.g., Boutilier [39] studied control in the context of deontic logic. Control and controllable propositions were also studied in [52, 66, 249, 248]. We now give an overview of the thesis. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to introduce basic concepts and notation and to review relevant literature. The first section presents a brief survey on modal logic. Then, in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, we introduce epistemic, temporal and strategic modal logics and state known results that characterise their expressivity and computational complexity. In particular, we consider variants of ATL as extensions of branching-time logics. With such ATL-like logics we can describe dynamic multi-agent interactions. In Section 2.5, we discuss extensions of ATL with epistemic notions. Additionally, we suggest a framework for memory-bounded strategic reasoning. In particular, we introduce an epistemic variant of ATL that accounts for agents with limited memory resources as this case was neglected in the literature to date. In Chapter 3, we investigate the computational complexity of ATL and its epistemic extension ATEL. We show in detail how 'the complexity of the satisfiability problem for both logics can be settled at ExpTIME-complete. The part of the chapter about ATL is based on the paper 'ATL Satisfiability is Indeed ExpTIME-COmplete' by Walther, Lutz, Wolter and Wooldridge in the Journal of Logic and Computation, 2006 (265)' and the part about ATEL is based on the paper 'ATEL with Common and Distributed Knowledge is ExpTime-Complete' by Walther which was presented at the 4th Workshop on Methods for Modalities, Humbolt University, Berlin, December 1-2, 2005 [264]. In Chapter 4, we aim to extend the expressiveness of ATL without increasing its computational complexity. We introduce explicit names for strategies in the object language and extend modal operators with the possibility to bind agents to strategy names. In this way, we can fix the decisions of agents that possibly belong to several coalitions. By identifying the behaviqur of agents, we can reason about the effects of agents changing coalitions. Dynamic coalitions provide more flexibility to adapt abilities to a changing environment. We investigate the expressivity of the resulting logic ATLES and compare it to ATL and ATL*. Moreover, we formulate two model checking problems for ATLES and investigate their complexity as well as the complexity of the satisfiability problem for ATLES. Additionally, we present a complete axiomatisation. This chapter is based on the paper 'Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Explicit Strategies' by Walther, van der Hoek and Wooldridge which is going to presented at the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Brussels, Belgium, June 25-27, 2007 [266]

To Be Announced

In this survey we review dynamic epistemic logics with modalities for quantification over information change. Of such logics we present complete axiomatizations, focussing on axioms involving the interaction between knowledge and such quantifiers, we report on their relative expressivity, on decidability and on the complexity of model checking and satisfiability, and on applications. We focus on open problems and new directions for research

Collective agency:From philosophical and logical perspectives

People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and actions, we confront those of various groups every day. Collective decisions and actions are more complex and bewildering compared to those made by individuals. As members of a collective, we contribute to its decisions, but our contributions may not always align with the outcome. We may also find ourselves excluded from certain groups and passively subjected to their influences without being aware of the source. We are used to being in overlapping groups and may switch identities, supporting or opposing the claims of particular groups. But rarely do we pause to think: What do we talk about when we talk about groups and their decisions?At the heart of this dissertation is the question of collective agency, i.e., in what sense can we treat a group as a rational agent capable of its action. There are two perspectives we take: a philosophical and logical one. The philosophical perspective mainly discusses the ontological and epistemological issues related to collective agency, sorts out the relevant philosophical history, and argues that the combination of a relational view of collective agency and a dispositional view of collective intentionality provides a rational and realistic account. The logical perspective is associated with formal theories of groups, it disregards the psychological content involved in the philosophical perspective, establishes a logical system that is sufficiently formal and objective, and axiomatizes the nature of a collective

Proceedings of The Multi-Agent Logics, Languages, and Organisations Federated Workshops (MALLOW 2010)

http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-627/allproceedings.pdfInternational audienceMALLOW-2010 is a third edition of a series initiated in 2007 in Durham, and pursued in 2009 in Turin. The objective, as initially stated, is to "provide a venue where: the cost of participation was minimum; participants were able to attend various workshops, so fostering collaboration and cross-fertilization; there was a friendly atmosphere and plenty of time for networking, by maximizing the time participants spent together"

COIN@AAMAS2015

COIN@AAMAS2015 is the nineteenth edition of the series and the fourteen papers included in these proceedings demonstrate the vitality of the community and will provide the grounds for a solid workshop program and what we expect will be a most enjoyable and enriching debate.Peer reviewe