3 research outputs found
Evolutionary game of coalition building under external pressure
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting)
evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where
small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the
principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time and the players have a
common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as grows and show that the
problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in
continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space
A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante
Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices
Karos D. Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices. Games and Economic Behavior. 2014;87:239-252