12,524 research outputs found
Impossible Differential Attack on Simpira v2
Simpira v2 is a family of cryptographic permutations proposed at ASIACRYPT 2016 which can be used to construct high throughput block ciphers using the Even-Mansour construction, permutation-based hashing and wide-block authenticated encryption. In this paper, we give a 9-round impossible differential of Simpira-4, which turns out to be the first 9-round impossible differential.
In order to get some efficient key recovery attacks on its block cipher mode (EM construction with Simpira-4), we use some 6/7-round shrunken impossible differentials. Based on eight different 6-round impossible differentials,
we propose a series of 7-round key recovery attacks on the block cipher mode, each 6-round impossible differential helps to recover 32-bit of the master key (512-bit) and totally half of the master key bits are recovered. The attacks need chosen plaintexts and 7-round encryptions.
Furthermore, based on ten 7-round impossible differentials, we add one round on the top or at the bottom to mount ten 8-round key recovery attacks on the block cipher mode, which recover the full key space (512-bit) with the data complexity of chosen plaintexts and time complexity of 8-round encryptions. Those are the first attacks on round-reduced Simpira v2 and do not threaten the EM mode with the full 15-round Simpira-4
CTC2 and Fast Algebraic Attacks on Block Ciphers Revisited
The cipher CTC (Courtois Toy Cipher) has been designed to demonstrate that it is possible to break on a PC a block cipher with good diffusion and very small number of known (or chosen) plaintexts.
It has however never been designed to withstand all known attacks on block ciphers and Dunkelman and Keller have shown that a few bits of the key can be recovered by Linear Cryptanalysis (LC) - which cannot however compromise the security of a large key. This weakness can easily be avoided: in this paper we give a specification of CTC2, a tweaked version of CTC. The new cipher is MUCH more secure than CTC against LC and the key scheduling of CTC has been extended to use
any key size, independently from the block size. Otherwise, there is little difference between CTC and CTC2. We will show that up to 10 rounds of CTC2 can be broken by simple algebraic attacks
Freestyle, a randomized version of ChaCha for resisting offline brute-force and dictionary attacks
This paper introduces Freestyle, a randomized and variable round version of
the ChaCha cipher. Freestyle uses the concept of hash based halting condition
where a decryption attempt with an incorrect key is likely to take longer time
to halt. This makes Freestyle resistant to key-guessing attacks i.e.
brute-force and dictionary based attacks. Freestyle demonstrates a novel
approach for ciphertext randomization by using random number of rounds for each
block, where the exact number of rounds are unknown to the receiver in advance.
Freestyle provides the possibility of generating different
ciphertexts for a given key, nonce, and message; thus resisting key and nonce
reuse attacks. Due to its inherent random behavior, Freestyle makes
cryptanalysis through known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, and chosen-ciphertext
attacks difficult in practice. On the other hand, Freestyle has costlier cipher
initialization process, typically generates 3.125% larger ciphertext, and was
found to be 1.6 to 3.2 times slower than ChaCha20. Freestyle is suitable for
applications that favor ciphertext randomization and resistance to key-guessing
and key reuse attacks over performance and ciphertext size. Freestyle is ideal
for applications where ciphertext can be assumed to be in full control of an
adversary, and an offline key-guessing attack can be carried out
On the Provable Security of the Iterated Even-Mansour Cipher against Related-Key and Chosen-Key Attacks
The iterated Even-Mansour cipher is a construction of a block cipher from public permutations which abstracts in a generic way the structure of key-alternating ciphers. The indistinguishability of this construction from a truly random permutation by an adversary with oracle access to the inner permutations has been investigated in a series of recent papers. This construction has also been shown to be (fully) indifferentiable from an ideal cipher for a sufficient number of rounds (five or twelve depending on the assumptions on the key-schedule). In this paper, we extend this line of work by considering the resistance of the iterated Even-Mansour cipher to xor-induced related-key attacks (i.e., related-key attacks where the adversary is allowed to xor any constant of its choice to the secret key) and to chosen-key attacks. For xor-induced related-key attacks, we first provide a distinguishing attack for two rounds, assuming the key-schedule is linear. We then prove that for a linear key-schedule, three rounds yield a cipher which is secure against xor-induced related-key attacks up to queries of the adversary, whereas for a nonlinear key-schedule, one round is sufficient to obtain a similar security bound. We also show that the iterated Even-Mansour cipher with four rounds offers some form of provable resistance to chosen-key attacks, which is the minimal number of rounds to achieve this property. The main technical tool that we use to prove this result is \emph{sequential indifferentiability}, a weakened variant of (full) indifferentiability introduced by Mandal \emph{et al.} (TCC~2010)
Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE
We introduce a new technique for doing the key recovery part of an integral or higher order differential attack. This technique speeds up the key recovery phase significantly and can be applied to any block cipher with S-boxes. We show several properties of this technique, then apply it to PRINCE and report on the improvements in complexity from earlier integral and higher order differential attacks on this cipher. Our attacks on 4 and 6 rounds were the fastest and the winner of PRINCE Challenge\u27s last round in the category of chosen plaintext attack
Statistics of Random Permutations and the Cryptanalysis Of Periodic Block Ciphers
A block cipher is intended to be computationally indistinguishable from a
random permutation of appropriate domain and range. But what are the properties
of a random permutation? By the aid of exponential and ordinary generating
functions, we derive a series of collolaries of interest to the cryptographic
community. These follow from the Strong Cycle Structure Theorem of
permutations, and are useful in rendering rigorous two attacks on Keeloq, a
block cipher in wide-spread use. These attacks formerly had heuristic
approximations of their probability of success. Moreover, we delineate an
attack against the (roughly) millionth-fold iteration of a random permutation.
In particular, we create a distinguishing attack, whereby the iteration of a
cipher a number of times equal to a particularly chosen highly-composite number
is breakable, but merely one fewer round is considerably more secure. We then
extend this to a key-recovery attack in a "Triple-DES" style construction, but
using AES-256 and iterating the middle cipher (roughly) a million-fold. It is
hoped that these results will showcase the utility of exponential and ordinary
generating functions and will encourage their use in cryptanalytic research.Comment: 20 page
Improved Meet-in-the-Middle Cryptanalysis of KTANTAN
We revisit meet-in-the-middle attacks on block ciphers and recent developments in meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks on hash functions. Despite the presence of a secret key in the block cipher case, we identify techniques that can also be mounted on block ciphers, thus allowing us to improve the cryptanalysis of the block cipher KTANTAN family. The first and major contribution is that we spot errors in previous cryptanalysis, secondly we improve upon the corrected results. Especially, the technique indirect-partial-matching can be used to increase the number of matched bits significantly, as exemplified by our attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a splice-and-cut meet-in-the-middle attack is applied to block ciphers. When the splitting point is close to the start or the end of the cipher, the attack remains to be at very low data complexity. The secret key of the full cipher can be recovered faster than exhaustive search for all three block sizes in the KTANTAN family. The attack on KTANTAN32 works with a time complexity in terms of full round encryptions. The attack has a time complexity of and on KTANTAN48 and KTANTAN64, respectively. Moreover, all the three attacks work with 4 chosen ciphertexts only. These results compare favourably with the factor 2 speed-up over brute force obtained in earlier work 4 , and hence these attacks are the best cryptanalysis results so far
Total Break of Zorro using Linear and Differential Attacks
An AES-like lightweight block cipher, namely Zorro, was proposed in CHES 2013. While it has a 16-byte state, it uses only 4 S-Boxes per round. This weak nonlinearity was widely criticized, insofar as it has been directly exploited in all the attacks on Zorro reported by now, including the weak key, reduced round, and even full round attacks.
In this paper, using some properties discovered by Wang et al., we present new differential and linear attacks on Zorro, both of which recover the full secret key with practical complexities. These attacks are based on very efficient distinguishers that have only two active S-Boxes per four rounds. The time complexity of our differential and linear attacks are and and the data complexity are chosen plaintexts and known plaintexts, respectively. The results clearly show that the block cipher Zorro does not have enough security against differential and linear attacks
Truncated Differential Analysis of Round-Reduced RoadRunneR Block Cipher
RoadRunneR is a small and fast bitslice lightweight block cipher for low cost 8-bit processors proposed by Adnan Baysal and Sa ̈hap S ̧ahin in the LightSec 2015 conference. While most software efficient lightweight block ciphers lacking a security proof, RoadRunneR’s security is provable against differential and linear attacks. RoadRunneR is a Feistel structure block cipher with 64-bit block size. RoadRunneR-80 is a vision with 80-bit key and 10 rounds, and RoadRunneR-128 is a vision with 128-bit key and 12 rounds. In this paper, we obtain 5-round truncated differentials of RoadRunneR-80 and RoadRunneR-128 with probability 2^{−56}. Using the truncated differentials, we give a truncated differential attack on 7-round RoadRunneR-128 without whitening keys with data complexity of 2^{55} chosen plaintexts, time complexity of 2^{121} encryptions and memory complexity of 2^{68}. This is first known attack on RoadRunneR block cipher
Security Analysis of PRINCE
Publié à FSE 2013International audienceIn this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the α parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE
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