27,770 research outputs found
The strengths and the opportunities of the New Silk Road strategy in the Middle East
For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Mordechai Chaziza, Senior Lecturer at Ashkelon Academic College in Israel, explains that "BRI has become the main focus of China's foreign policy in the Middle East.
China and the Middle East (1950-1988): A changing framework of relations.
This study examines China's relations with the Middle East. Its primary objective is to determine to what extent, and in what ways, China's involvement with the region has evolved. To accomplish this aim I have adopted an historical approach, examining China's relations with the Middle East between 1950 and 1988. The study is therefore subdivided into seven chapters, each of which treats a 'distinctive' period in the history of China's foreign relations since the founding of the PRC in 1949. For purposes of this study, the 'Middle East' is defined as the 'zone of Arab--Israeli confrontation', comprising the states of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria as well as including the PLO; plus the Persian Gulf, with emphasis on the states of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Each chapter begins with a discussion of China's relations with the superpowers, and with developing countries. By indicating China's general foreign policy concerns, these sections hopefully shed light on the relative priority China attached to the Middle East in any given period. Thereafter, each chapter provides a country-by-country analysis of China's interaction with the Middle East, highlighting the opportunities and dilemmas that China encountered in the course of such involvement with the region. All chapters end with an 'evaluation' which assesses the nature of China's objectives and efforts as well as the success of its involvement. The chief findings of this study are: (1) that the Middle East has never been politically ir relevant or strategically inconsequential to China; (2) that the number of partners with whom China has engaged, along with the range and scale of Chinese involvement with the region (especially in the economic and military spheres), has expanded; (3) that the alternating pattern of 'involvement' and 'retraction' that once characterised China's interaction with the Middle East has, since the early 1970s, given way to a pattern of 'sustained engagement'. Accordingly, the study recommends attention to the prospects for, and possible ramifications of, China's future interaction with the region
China's Belt and Road Initiative: Is it a threat to the United States?
China's 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, a massive campaign to expand trade and to increase international investment, has the potential to replace the current U.S. led international economic order. Equipped with an array of sovereign wealth funds, development banks, and international partnerships, China's lending capacity and willingness to invest abroad demonstrates the country's eagerness to increase its influence in international affairs. China is making significant investments in constructing a dominant global supply chain connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia by land and sea. This paper will analyze the economic and foreign policy implications of China's Belt and Road Initiative with respect to the United States
Will the Explosive Growth of China Continue?
The role of China in the world economy is constantly growing. In particular we observe that it
plays more and more important role in the support of theworld economic growth (as well as high
prices of certain very important commodities). In the meantime the perspectives of the Chinese
economy (as well as possible fates of the Chinese society) remain unclear, whereas respective
forecasts look rather contradictory. That is why the search for new aspects and modes of analysis
of possible development of China turns out to be rather important for the forecasting of global
futures. This article employs a combination of scientific methods that imply (a) the analysis at the
level of Chinese economic model; (b) the analysis at regional level (at this level the Chinese
economic model is compared with the regional East Asian model); (c) the analysis at the global
level that relies on the modified world-system approach that allows to answer the question
whether China will replace the USA as the global leader. It is important that the analysis is
conducted simultaneously in economic, social, demographic, and political dimensions.
As regards the analysis of specific features of the Chinese model as an especial type of the East
Asian model (that is based on the export orientation, capital & technology importation, as well
as cheap labor force), we note as organic features of the Chinese model the totalitarian power
of the Communist Party and the immenseness of resources. As regards special features of the
Chinese model, we note (in addition to βcheap ecologyβ and cheap labor force) and emphasize
that China has a multilevel (in a way unique) system of growth driving forces, where, as
opposed to developed states, the dominant role belongs not to native private capital, but to
state corporations, local authorities and foreign business. This explains the peculiarities of the
Chinese investment (or rather overinvestment), which determines high growth rate up to a
very significant degree. A unique feature of the Chinese model is the competition of provinces
and territories for investments and high growth indicators.
As regards perspectives of the global hegemony of China, we intend to demonstrate that, on
the one hand, economic and political positions of China will strengthen in the forthcoming
decades, but, on the other hand, China, assuming all possible future success, will be unable to
take the USA position in the World System. We believe that in a direct connection with the
development of globalization processes the hegemony cycle pattern is likely to come to its end,
which will lead to the World System reconfiguration and the emergence of its new structure
that will allow the World System to continue its further development without a hegemon.
Finally, the article describes some possible scenarios of the development of China. We
demonstrate that China could hardly avoid serious difficulties and critical situations (including
those connected with demographic problems); however, there could be different scenarios of
how China will deal with the forthcoming crisis. We also come to the conclusion that it would
be better for China to achieve a slowdown to moderate growth rates (that would allow China to go through the forthcoming complex transition period with less losses) than to try to return
at any cost to explosive growth rates attested in the 2000s
ΠΡ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΈΡ ΠΊ ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠ½Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²Ρ: ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ° ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΊΠΈΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠΊΠΎ-ΡΠ°ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΊΠΈΡ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ
The article analyzes the role of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East policy of China. The authors describe the development of bilateral relations in the second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries as well as the factors that determine the main directions and dynamics of cooperation between the two countries. Particular attention is paid to the methods of realizing China's national interests in the Middle East, as well as analyzing the position of Beijing on a number of key regional issues. The authors come to the conclusion that pragmatism and flexibility inherent in China's foreign policy allow Beijing to balance on the conflicting interests of key participants in Middle East politics. Due to this factor China gets the access to the region's energy resources to meet the needs of the dynamically developing Chinese economy. The work was carried out within the framework of a system approach using methods of political and historical research.Key words: China, Saudi Arabia, Middle East, strategic partnership, foreign policy.Π‘ΡΠ°ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ²ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π° Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Ρ ΡΠΎΠ»ΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡΠ° Π‘Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΠΈ Π² Π±Π»ΠΈΠΆΠ½Π΅Π²ΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΠΠ . ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΡΡ ΡΠ°ΡΠΊΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΡ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π²ΡΡΡΠΎΡΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΈΡ
ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ Π²ΠΎ Π²ΡΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠ½Π΅Β Π₯Π₯ β Π½Π°ΡΠ°Π»Π΅ XXI Π²., Π²ΡΡΠ²Π»ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, ΠΎΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»ΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΠ΅ Π½Π°ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΠΊΡ ΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ΄Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° Π΄Π²ΡΡ
ΡΡΡΠ°Π½. ΠΡΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠ΅ Π²Π½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Π°ΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΠΠ Π½Π° ΠΠ»ΠΈΠΆΠ½Π΅ΠΌ ΠΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΊΠ΅, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ·ΠΈΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΠ΅ΠΊΠΈΠ½Π° ΠΏΠΎ ΡΡΠ΄Ρ ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΠ±Π»Π΅ΠΌ. ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡ ΠΊ Π²ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄Ρ ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠΌ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½Π΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ ΠΠΠ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌ ΠΈ Π³ΠΈΠ±ΠΊΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡ ΠΠ΅ΠΊΠΈΠ½Ρ Π±Π°Π»Π°Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ²ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠ°Ρ
ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π±Π»ΠΈΠΆΠ½Π΅Π²ΠΎΡΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΡΡ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΡΠΏ ΠΊ ΡΠ½Π΅ΡΠ³Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌ ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡΡΠ°ΠΌ ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΠΎΠ½Π° Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π±Π½ΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΠ΅ΠΉΡΡ ΠΊΠΈΡΠ°ΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠΌΠΈΠΊΠΈ. Π Π°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π²ΡΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½Π΅Π½Π° Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π° Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΈ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠΉ.ΠΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π²ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²Π°: ΠΠΠ , Π‘Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΎΠ²ΡΠΊΠ°Ρ ΠΡΠ°Π²ΠΈΡ, ΠΠ»ΠΈΠΆΠ½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΊ, ΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ΅ ΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠ½Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΎ, Π²Π½Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°
- β¦