


OCCASIONAL PAPERS/ REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES

NUMBER 7 — 1980 (36)

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: SELECTED STUDIES

**Edited by F. Gilbert
Chan & Ka-che Yip,
with contributions by
June T. Dreyer,
Robert G. Sutter,
Robert L. Worden and
Byron S. J. Weng**

**School of LAW
UNIVERSITY
of
MARYLAND**



Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

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All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to

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500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

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Subscription is US \$10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and Canada and \$12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu.

Price for single copy of this issue: US \$3.00

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TO:

Rosalind and Ruth

With Love

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CDSP	<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i>
CKTC	<i>Chung-kuo tsa-chih</i> [China Magazine], Taipei
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CQ	<i>China Quarterly</i>
CSNT	<i>Ch'i-shih nien-tai</i> [The Seventies], Hong Kong
ETR	East Turkistan Republic
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GLF	Great Leap Forward
IOC	International Olympic Committee
JMJP	<i>Jen-min jih-pao</i> [People's Daily]
KMT	Kuomintang
MPR	Mongolian People's Republic
MPYK	<i>Ming-pao yueh-k'an</i> [Ming-pao Monthly], Hong Kong
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCNA	New China News Agency
NPC	National People's Congress
NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PQLI	Physical Quality of Life Index
PR	<i>Peking Review</i> (<i>Beijing Review</i> since January 1979)
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SCMP	<i>Survey of the China Mainland Press</i>
SUAR	Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While preparing for this volume, we have benefited from the invaluable assistance of O. Edmund Clubb and Te-kong Tong, our former professors at Columbia University. We are also thankful for the support of Leonard H. D. Gordon of Purdue University, George P. Jan of University of Toledo, Sheldon W. Simon of Arizona State University, and Shirin Tahir-Kheli of Temple University. No expression of appreciation is adequate for the generous help given to us by Hungdah Chiu of the University of Maryland. We are indebted, in particular, to our inspiring teacher, C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University, for his guidance and instruction. His dedication to teaching and historical research, his impeccable scholarship, and his selfless devotion to his students have always fascinated us. We are indeed privileged to have studied at Columbia under his supervision.

It seems customary for either an author or an editor of a book to acknowledge the support of his spouse. We owe our wives, Rosalind and Ruth, much more than we can possibly express with such a mere token of appreciation. Their understanding, their sympathy, and their affection have sustained us through the long hours of research. To them, we dedicate this book with all our love.

INTRODUCTION

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS

F. Gilbert Chan & Ka-che Yip

This book is not a comprehensive study of China's foreign policy; it offers instead a selective treatment of China's relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States (US), and Taiwan. With the possible exception of June Dreyer's chapter, which chronicles the rivalries between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR along the Sinkiang border, the book concentrates on the developments of the 1970s.

The contributors of this volume have come from different backgrounds, although all of them received their graduate training from major American universities. Bryon Weng, now teaching at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, is a Taiwanese, while Gilbert Chan and Ka-che Yip were brought up in the British colony of Hong Kong. To them, the Taiwan problem may be more than an academic issue, and their analyses of the subject often reflect the emotional dilemma of many Chinese intellectuals who have no political connection with either the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The views expressed by these three contributors on the question of Taiwan obviously do not represent the opinions of either the editors of the Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies or the School of Law at the University of Maryland.

From 1968 through February 1977, Robert Sutter was a Chinese foreign policy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He and Robert Worden are now associated with the Library of Congress. June Dreyer worked in the same library before she started to teach at the University of Miami. While their experiences in these government agencies have brought a new dimension to their studies, their interpretations of China's foreign relations do not reflect the views of the US government.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

China's decision against renewing the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which expired in 1980, was not unexpected. The hostility and suspicion which marked the

relations of the two Communist powers for the last twenty years had rendered the treaty virtually meaningless. Indeed, as Harry Schwartz noted in the mid-1960s, the alliance was "unnatural" because of the "conflicting . . . national interests of these two great nations."¹ In 1969, Harrison Salisbury of the *New York Times* openly discussed "the coming war between Russia and China."²

The causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute are complicated and fundamental, and Franz Michael is incorrect to dismiss it as simply "a power struggle for the leadership of the Communist bloc."³ The peoples of the PRC and the USSR have been shaped by different histories and traditions. They are further separated by the wide gap in their economic and technological developments. Thanks to the dissimilar revolutionary realities in China and Russia, the leaders of the two Communist parties have pursued different national goals through different political strategies. Moreover, even prior to Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin in 1956, the USSR had not been overly generous toward China. The credit of 300 million dollars which Stalin extended to the PRC in the 1950 treaty compared poorly with the loan of 450 million dollars granted to Poland two years earlier.⁴

The Sino-Soviet dispute along the Sinkiang border, as described by June Dreyer in the second chapter of this volume, clearly illustrates some of the differences which have brought about the

1. Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations* (revised edition; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1973), p.3.

2. Salisbury, *The Coming War Between Russia and China* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1969).

3. See Michael's statement in *Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications*, submitted by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 8. For further discussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*; C. P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 44-68; G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The "Great Game"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963); Sidney Klein, *The Road Divides: Economic Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (Hong Kong: International Studies Group, 1966); David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure* (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1971); and O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, *Sino-Soviet Relations* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).

4. Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*, p. 158.

confrontation between the two Communist parties. China's interests in the "Western Regions" can be dated back to the glorious era of the Han dynasty, although this vast territory did not become a Chinese province until 1884. Conflicts with Russia over this borderland, however, had started before the close of the seventeenth century. Negotiations between the Manchu dynasty and the czarist government at Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, in 1689 and 1727 respectively, resulted in the loss of Chinese territory in these "Western Regions." Russian aggression intensified in the nineteenth century as the Manchus declined in power.⁵

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, as June Dreyer suggests, the USSR "proved even more interested" in Sinkiang than its czarist predecessor. Indeed, at times, Stalin was willing to hurt the Chinese Communist movement in order to protect the Soviet influence in this province. In 1937, for example, when Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai proposed to Ch'en Shao-yu and K'ang Sheng that he would become a CCP member, Stalin pressured the Chinese Communists to reject Sheng's application. Nonetheless, in the following year, the Soviet leader persuaded Sheng to join the Russian Communist Party, thereby extending Soviet control over Sinkiang.⁶ In view of these earlier developments along China's northwestern frontier, one may argue that the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in the post-1956 years was inevitable.

The Chinese Communist leaders disagreed with Khrushchev, and later with Brezhnev in the 1960s, over their different policies toward Washington. They denounced Khrushchev's pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the US as "revisionistic," while condemning Moscow's reluctance to support their attempt to "liberate" Taiwan in 1958. Sino-Soviet relations were further strained when the US stepped up its involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. According to Harold Hinton, Chinese and Soviet policies toward the war were "competitive and almost hostile."⁷ As the PRC became increasingly concerned with the possibility of Russian invasion, its leaders

5. Clubb, *China and Russia*, pp. 30-132; and Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis; A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1878-1881* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).

6. F. Gilbert Chan, "Regionalism and Central Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang, 1933-1944," in F. Gilbert Chan (ed.), *China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 1927-1949* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 139-40; and Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), pp. 53-57.

7. Harold C. Hinton, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future* (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Ltd., 1976), p. 8.

abandoned the strategy of struggling simultaneously against Moscow and Washington. Henceforth, they treated the USSR as China's principal enemy. In an interview on August 21-23, 1980 with Oriana Fallaci, a noted Italian journalist, Teng Hsiao-p'ing warned the Western powers about "the inevitability of the third world war."⁸

In the third chapter of this volume, Robert Sutter discusses China's endeavors to improve its relations with the Nixon administration. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the main architects of this policy, were determined to "broaden Peking's leverage against the USSR," and the US "seemed to have sufficient strength to serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet pressure." Nevertheless, as "antihegemonism" constituted the core of China's foreign policy in the 1970s, the Chinese leaders were evidently troubled by Washington's "weakness," especially after the collapse of the US position in Indochina during the spring of 1975. In the 1980 interview, Teng Hsiao-p'ing bluntly told Oriana Fallaci that "America fears the Soviet Union."⁹

In addition to normalizing its relations with the US, the PRC also tried to win the support of Japan, as well as countries in both Southeast Asia and Western Europe, in order to counteract the Soviet military threat. After long and difficult negotiations, Peking concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tokyo on August 12, 1978. The Chinese leaders succeeded in including in this document the provision of "antihegemonism" which, though somewhat modified to accommodate Japanese sensitivities, was clearly directed against the USSR. Significantly, when Hua Kuo-feng visited Japan in May 1980, he stated that it would be "a matter of course" for the Japanese government to increase its military spending.¹⁰ Preoccupied with the threat of Soviet aggression, the Chinese leadership had obviously overcome its earlier fear of the "revival of Japanese militarism."

China's "punitive" expedition against Hanoi in early 1979 was indicative of its apprehension of Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement. Hanoi's military raids into Thailand in June 1980 reinforced Peking's suspicion that Vietnam's aggressive activities in Southeast Asia represented an extension of Soviet influence in that region. Teng Hsiao-p'ing therefore characterized Hanoi as "the Cuba of the East," charging that "the Vietnamese are following the footsteps of the Soviet Union."¹¹

8. *Washington Post*, September 1, 1980, p. A10.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, May 29, 1980, p. A17.

11. See Fallaci's interview with Teng, in *ibid.*, September 1, 1980, p. A10.

In spite of the many differences between the PRC and the USSR, however, it seems unlikely that polemics will, in the near future, give way to a war of weapons. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has apparently dragged the USSR into such a political quagmire that it may discourage this Communist power from taking military actions in other parts of the world. Moreover, many of the Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, are advanced in years, and some are in very poor health. It is doubtful that they will risk a major confrontation with the PRC. Similarly, the post-Mao leadership in China is, at present, busily involved in the task of modernization, and Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing simply cannot afford to waste their limited resources on a military adventure against the USSR. Yet, these encouraging factors notwithstanding, few observers have, so far, suggested that the two Communist rivals will soon settle their differences in a peaceful fashion. In fact, the roots of their dispute are so deeply grounded that the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement seems extremely remote.

SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHMENT AND THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN

On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that the US would establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC at the beginning of the following year. The Americans would henceforth terminate their official ties with the Republic of China (ROC), while maintaining their economic and cultural connections. The security treaty of 1954 would be abrogated a year afterward. These executive actions completed the process of normalization started by Richard Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy of 1971.¹²

Carter's "China decision" did not represent an "about face" of Washington's policy toward the PRC. The process of normalization was initiated by a Republican president, and the diplomatic goal was finally achieved under a Democratic administration almost seven years after the promulgation of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972. The delay was caused by the Watergate scandal and Gerald Ford's preoccupation with the 1976 presidential campaign against a conservative challenger within his own party.

12. On President Carter's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, see Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds.), *The Chinese Connection and Normalization* (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1980), esp. 107-15; and John Tierney, Jr. (ed.), *About Face: The China Decision and Its Consequences* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1979).

In the Shanghai Communiqué, the American government did not challenge the "one China" policy pursued by both Peking and Taipei. According to Ralph Clough, this policy was "firmly grounded in historical precedent."¹³ Indeed, as Robert Worden points out in the fourth chapter of this book, the Chinese government described the Taiwan problem in February 1972 as "the crucial question" in Sino-American relations.

Carter's recognition of the PRC was intended to serve US interests. He hoped to use the "China card" to strengthen Washington's position vis-à-vis Moscow. During his visit to Peking in May 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant to the president on national security matters, assured his hosts at a banquet:

As reflected in the Shanghai Communiqué, our commitment to friendship with China is based on shared concerns and is derived from a long-term strategic view. . . . We recognize — and share — China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks to establish global or regional hegemony.¹⁴

He further entertained the Chinese with his anti-Soviet jokes, earning the nickname of "polar-bear tamer" for himself.¹⁵

Taiwan has not fared poorly after severing its diplomatic connections with Washington. Under the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US will continue to supply the ROC with "arms of a defensive character." Moreover, Washington will henceforth "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States."¹⁶ As Byron Weng elaborates in the last chapter of this volume, Peking has likewise initiated a new conciliatory policy toward the ROC. In the summer of 1980,

13. Clough, *Island China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 123. For the text of the Shanghai Communiqué, see Gene T. Hsiao (ed.), *Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 298-301.

14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, People's Republic of China* (hereinafter FBIS-CHI), May 22, 1978, p. A3.

15. *Newsweek*, June 5, 1978, p. 61.

16. The text of the Taiwan Relations Act is included in Chiu and Murphy (eds.), *The Chinese Connection and Normalization*, pp. 116-23. The quotations appear in p. 116.

Ambassador Leonard Woodcock observed that tensions across the Taiwan Strait were "at their lowest level in thirty years."¹⁷

In spite of the shock of diplomatic isolation, Taiwan's economy has continued to prosper. On September 19, 1980, Premier Sun Yun-suan reported to the Legislative Yuan in Taipei that the island's foreign trade in the first eight months of the year had shown an increase of 31.2 percent when compared with the same period in 1979.¹⁸ Through its "dummy corporations" in Hong Kong, Taiwan has also begun to trade with the Chinese Communists on the mainland. Yet, because of many fundamental differences between Taipei and Peking, the process of rapprochement is going to be slow and difficult. It will require, according to Ambassador Woodcock, "delicacy, delicacy, and more delicacy."¹⁹

In his chapter, Byron Weng emphasizes the economic successes of the Chinese people on Taiwan. He suggests that the developmental experience of the island can be valuable to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's program of "Four Modernizations." This should, in his opinion, form the basis of peaceful negotiations between Peking and Taipei. It is unlikely, however, that this will happen in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there is no easy solution for the Taiwan problem. The leaders of both governments must bear the awesome responsibility of formulating a bold and imaginative policy to meet the new challenges of the 1980s.

17. Quoted in James P. Sterba, "China Opens Trade Doors to Taiwan — Delicately," *New York Times*, August 31, 1980, p.E2.

18. *Free China Weekly* (Taipei), September 21, 1980, p. 4. Cf. *U.S. News and World Report*, July 23, 1979, p. 37.

19. Quoted in Sterba, "China Opens Trade Door," p. E2.

Chapter One

THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

June T. Dreyer

THE PROTAGONISTS

The Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia is an artificial boundary which divides several minority groups. This chapter will focus on two of these groups, the Kazakhs and the Uighurs, and their relations with their fellow Turkic Muslim peoples and with the Soviet and Chinese governments.

There are approximately five million Uighurs and 700,000 Kazakhs in China, most of them living in Sinkiang province,¹ which is contiguous to the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. According to the 1970 Soviet census, there are 173,000 Uighurs and nearly 5.3 million Kazakhs in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Both Soviet and Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs are minority groups not only in relation to the populations of their own countries (China has an estimated 950 million people and the Soviet Union, according to its 1970 census, has 241,720,000), but even in the provinces in which they live. Sinkiang has a population of approximately eleven million persons and Kazakhstan, 12.13 million. The importance of the Uighurs and Kazakhs, however, lies not in their numbers but in their interactions with the other minority peoples of the area, and in the strategic positions of these groups with regard to the Soviet and Chinese leaderships. The position of these minority peoples becomes much more impressive if viewed in this light. The combined minority people of the four Soviet Central Asian republics account for 59 percent of the total population, and those of China's Sinkiang province, more than 60 percent.

The ethnic mosaic of Central Asia is complex, formed over many centuries of nomadic migration and the rise and fall of invading

1. *Peking Review* (hereinafter PR), XIX, No. 22 (May 28, 1976), p. 28. Other Chinese population figures are, unless otherwise specified, drawn from John S. Aird, *Population Estimates for the Provinces of the People's Republic of China: 1953 to 1974*, International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 73, United States Department of Commerce, 1974. The population of Sinkiang was given as eleven million in a broadcast by Urumchi Radio, November 1, 1976. Soviet population data are, unless otherwise specified, drawn from the 1974 census as reported in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereinafter CDSP), XXIII, No. 16 (May 18, 1971), pp. 14-18.

warrior tribes. The emergent picture is one of constant reshuffling of alignments and of a steppe constantly in flux. Both Uighurs and Kazakhs are Turkic Muslim peoples, though the modern-day Uighurs are predominantly sedentary agriculturalists while the Kazakhs are nomadic herders. The Uighurs first appeared as a clearly separate people in records dating from the fourth century A.D. By the eighth century, they had created a large empire in what is now the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), but were themselves conquered by another tribe, the Kirghiz, during the following century. Many of the defeated Uighurs dispersed throughout Central Asia; some intermarried and intermingled with other steppe peoples. A large number entered what is now Sinkiang province in 840 A.D., and soon established their dominance of the oasis areas characteristic of southern Sinkiang.

The word Kazakh first appeared during the fifteenth century. Of Turkish origin, it derives from a term meaning a masterless person or freebooter, and comes by extension to refer to nomads as well. The Kazakhs are closely related to other Central Asian Muslim peoples, particularly to the Kirghiz and Uzbeks. The traditional nobilities of the Kazakhs and these other groups trace their origins to Genghis Khan, a Mongol. While the accuracy of historical records, and particularly of genealogical tables, from this period is often diluted by fanciful embellishment, the Mongol conquests of the twelfth century apparently effected a fundamental redistribution of the various nomadic groups of the Central Asian steppes. In the following centuries, the culture of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks was formed. Because of this, different ethnic groups may, indeed, have the same ancestor. Whether the presence of the ancestor in several different genealogical tables is genuine or fictitious is often less important than the fact that these tables are taken seriously by the groups involved. Normally these kinship groups were loosely organized and spread over extensive areas. Unless united under a single leader, such as Genghis Khan, they did not pose a large-scale threat to more centralized governmental systems. Nevertheless, kinship, real or imaginary, often manifested itself in cooperation in time of hostilities, and even resulted in a certain amount of crossing of ethnic lines.² In addition to the potential binding force of kinship, coopera-

2. Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p. 193. See also Alfred E. Hudson, *Kazakh Social Structure*, Yale University Publications in Anthropology No. 20, 1938 (reprinted; New York: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1964).

tion has also been facilitated by the Muslim faith common to most of these groups. The Islamic admonition to join together in time of holy war was generally enthusiastically accepted by most members of the group, even when the cause might appear to outsiders as rather tenuously related to religious matters. The circumstance of finding themselves in the paths of two expanding empires was to provide the peoples of the steppes with many causes for uprising.

THE COURSE OF THE CZARIST EMPIRE IN CENTRAL ASIA

Imperial China had traditionally claimed jurisdiction over Central Asia, but rarely exercised it in fact. Chinese civilization was based on sedentary agriculture, and the mountainous, arid cold of much of Central Asia did not attract Han Chinese settlers. Save for a small area in which moderate climatic conditions prevailed, the territory referred to rather vaguely in Chinese sources as "the Western Regions" could not be considered part of either the Chinese cultural or administrative sphere. A few caravan routes traversed the area from earliest times, allowing trade between Han China³ and imperial Rome, but the hazards of the route combined with the anti-commercial bias of official Confucian philosophy to limit the effects of this contact. It would be difficult to consider Central Asia an integral part of the Chinese economic unit. Culturally, since the inhabitants of these lands did not partake of Han civilization, they were regarded by the Han Chinese as barbarians. The expert horsemanship and martial skills which characterized their life-styles were frequently threats to Han culture.

These peoples could be, and several times were, conquered by Chinese armies, yet even garrisoning such far-flung areas was difficult and expensive. One solution devised to alleviate the problem of maintaining armed forces in distant areas was the military agricultural colony; soldiers were charged with raising their own food and were expected to form self-sufficient outposts of the empire. The plan, though ingenious, had several drawbacks. For example, soldiers tended to marry local women and eventually became assimilated to the very people they had been sent to subdue. In general, Chinese policy toward these and other border peoples aimed at control rather

3. The Han dynasty, commonly divided into Former or Western Han (206 B.C. — 23 A.D.) and Later or Eastern Han (25 — 220 A.D.), is regarded as one of China's most glorious periods, giving its name to the majority (94 per cent of the present-day population) ethnic group of the country.

than absorption; the inhabitants were permitted to maintain their traditional life-styles and cultures so long as they did not disturb the order and peace of empire.

Meanwhile, shortly after the Kazakhs began to appear as a separate people, the Russian empire started to expand eastward. In 1689, China ceded 93,000 square miles of its Central Asian domains to the czar's government, and in 1727 the Treaty of Kiakhta gave Russia an additional 40,000 square miles. In the following years, the once-powerful Ch'ing dynasty became increasingly enfeebled and unable to repel the demands of foreign powers. By the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, the land on the left bank of the Amur River down to the Ussuri became Russian territory and in 1860, the Treaty of Peking enabled Russia to annex 133,000 square miles of land east of the Ussuri to the Pacific.⁴ The Ch'ing government resented these cessions, which, together with other concessions to various foreign countries, came to be known as the "unequal treaties." Since these settlements were forced on an unwilling government, China today claims sovereign rights over large portions of Kazakhstan and other parts of Soviet Central Asia.

One result of czarist expansion was the colonization of Kazakhstan by peasants from European Russia. The Russian government had originally restricted migration but, on realizing its value, began to offer attractive inducements to settlers. Their arrival aroused considerable resentment among the Kazakhs, whose numbers were then estimated at three million.⁵ The nomads had pastured their herds over large portions of the steppes. Russian colonization took land away from grazing, and denied many Kazakhs the use of their traditional winter camps. Many of them fled south, to land still held by China.

The increasing weakness of the Ch'ing dynasty had other repercussions besides the cession of territory to Russia. The efficient and relatively honest governors and officials the Chinese government sent to the "Western Regions" soon after it had reconquered the area in 1759 were gradually replaced with less competent and greedy types who oppressed the peoples under their charge and aroused their hostility. Both this and the arrival of the Kazakhs, whom the Russian government could claim were subjects of the czar, played into Russian hands.

4. W. A. Douglas Jackson, *The Russo-Chinese Borderlands* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 112-13, 116.

5. George J. Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp.121-22.

Accumulated grievances against the Ch'ing government flared into a Muslim rebellion in 1862, which eventually encompassed the entire Chinese northwest. In 1865 a Turkic Muslim named Yakub Beg took advantage of the rebellion to set up an independent state in Sinkiang; tacit support from Russia helped Yakub Beg to maintain his position.⁶ In the attendant chaos, however, Russia's trade was disrupted and its consulates burned. There was also a substantial exodus of refugees into Russia. Seeing a territorial opportunity in this as well as a way to reassert its trading position, Russia moved into the rich Ili Valley, in Kazakh territory, and annexed it. The enfeebled Ch'ing dynasty, in a costly campaign which it could ill afford, defeated the northwest Muslim rebellion and destroyed Yakub Beg's state. The subsequent Chinese demand that Russia withdraw from Ili led to a major diplomatic confrontation between the two countries. Eventually, an agreement was signed providing for Russian withdrawal in return for China's cession of some territory west of Ili, the granting of special trading concessions to Russia in nearby areas, and the payment of a nine million ruble indemnity to cover Russia's expenses in "administering" Ili.⁷

Fearful of further Russian moves, the Ch'ing government decided to incorporate what had been the "Western Regions" into the regular administrative system of China. In 1884 the area was transformed into a province with the name Sinkiang, or "New Territory."

In the following years, the czarist government attempted to cope with mounting domestic problems, a costly and ultimately humiliating war with Japan, and international intrigues on its European borders. But the colonization of Kazakhstan continued. Between 1896 and 1916, more than 1.4 million new settlers poured into Kazakhstan and implanted a strong Russian presence there. Its economy became firmly tied to that of European Russia, supplying it with meat, hides, and dairy products.⁸

Further escalation of tensions between China and Russia over Central Asia was limited by domestic difficulties which prevented them from further consolidating their hold over their Central Asian

6. Yuan Tsing, "Yakub Beg and the Moselm Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan," *Central Asiatic Journal*, IV, No. 2 (June 1962), p. 154.

7. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 186-87.

8. Demko, *Russian Colonization*, p. 182.

9. Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 116-17; and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p.83.

domains. In 1911, the Ch'ing dynasty fell, being replaced by a series of warlord governments that were preoccupied with quarrels with other warlords; even Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) government, which assumed power in 1928, was unable to exercise more than nominal control over Sinkiang. In Russia, a 1916 decree ordered Kazakhs, who were traditionally exempt from military service, to be drafted to help fight in World War I, and this caused a bloody rebellion which further weakened the faltering czarist government. During the ensuing disruptions on the steppe, additional numbers of Kazakhs fled to China.⁹

THE 1917 REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON CENTRAL ASIA

The success of the Bolshevik Revolution that began in Russia in 1917 changed the power equation in Central Asia in favor of the newly established Soviet Union. The new government's success did not come easily, and its relations with the non-Russian peoples of the former czarist empire were among its more difficult problems. In an earlier bid for the support of these peoples, called minority nationalities in Marxist parlance, it had promised self-determination to all who wanted it. Nonetheless, when the Communist party's struggle against the czarist government actually came to fruition, the party came to view self-determination as "profoundly counterrevolutionary" and ruthlessly suppressed such movements. The Kazakhs' Alash-Orda provisional government was one of the victims. A bitter anti-Bolshevik struggle took place, and many Kazakhs joined the White Army of Admiral A. V. Kolchak.¹⁰ The economy of the area was badly affected. In the Kazakh province of Semirechie, for instance, livestock dropped by 51.67 percent between 1917 and 1920.¹¹ In 1920 and 1921, moreover, the Kazakh areas were hit by famine. The Kazakhs were more seriously affected than the Russian colonists; their herds had been depleted in the fighting and they did not receive their fair share of the emergency food supplies sent in by the new government. An estimated one million persons died of hunger and related diseases in 1921 alone, and a necessary preoccupation with sheer survival reduced the Kazakhs' organized resistance to the Bolshevik government.¹²

10. Pipes, *Formation*, pp. 108, 172-73.

11. Bacon, *Central Asians*, p. 117.

12. Pipes, *Formation*, p. 174.

In contrast to the czarist government's relatively cautious attitude toward altering the traditional life-styles of its Central Asian subjects, the Soviet government promoted rapid change. Although Kazakhstan was designated an "autonomous" socialist republic in 1920 and given the constitutional right to secede from the USSR, its non-Russian inhabitants actually had very little to say about the governance of their areas, and any attempts to exercise the right to secede would be regarded as counterrevolutionary. Measures were introduced to force the nomads to settle down, to destroy tribal and kinship ties which might facilitate resistance to the new government, to promote agriculture as an alternative to pastoralism, and to introduce the Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples to the Russian language and Marxist culture. While motivated by a desire to improve the lives of Central Asian peoples as well as to facilitate the new government's control of the areas, the reforms were not perceived as improvements by many of those affected. The fictional nature of autonomy was patently obvious to all. The Turkic Muslim intelligentsia, influential despite its small numbers, was irked by the introduction of a new Cyrillic-based language which the government alleged would suit the nationality's needs better than the traditional Arabic script. The intelligentsia would have preferred a system devised by Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), which would have been suitable for all Turkic peoples, and viewed the Soviet government's choice of a Cyrillic script as an attempt to separate the Kazakhs from these other peoples.¹³

In addition, there was a cultural contradiction between the Soviet leadership's implicit belief that agriculture was a more desirable way of life and the nomads' attachment to their animals and to a peripatetic mode of existence. A collectivization program, begun in 1928, was carried out without adequate planning, and it was far in advance of collectivization in Russian areas. Forced into collectives where grazing was often insufficient, thousands of Kazakhs watched their herds starve. Others killed their animals and tried to escape. Some of these fled to Afghanistan, others to China. The Kazakh population of the USSR fell by almost 900,000 between 1926 and 1939, and there was a sharp drop in numbers of animals as well.¹⁴ Soviet policies were administered through the local Russian-colonist elite, with damaging effect on the Turkic Muslim peoples. As

13. Bacon, *Central Asians*, p. 114.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

Richard Pipes notes, the elite "utilized the Soviet government and party machines to intensify the economic and political exploitation of the native population." The Bolshevik Revolution brought to the Muslim areas "not an abolition of colonialism, but colonialism in a new and much more oppressive form."¹⁵

The situation of the Kazakhs and Uighurs, like those of other Soviet nationalities, has been better since the death of Stalin, though not so much so as to eliminate discontent. Khrushchev's reforms in higher education allowed higher percentages of Kazakhs, Uighurs, and most other nationalities to attend universities and to take advantage of better job opportunities. Standards of living in Central Asia have improved markedly. Locally situated factories turn out desired consumer goods. The infamous Soviet housing shortage is significantly less serious in Central Asia than in European Russia, as in the supply of fresh meat, milk, and vegetables. There is a Kazakh member of the Politburo.¹⁶

Still, the results of raised living standards and two generations of pressure have not made significant numbers of Turkic Muslims into either committed Soviet citizens or assimilated Russians. Nomadism has survived, albeit in a modified form. Although Soviet propaganda describes nomads as "roving" (*otgonnyi*), rather than nomadic (*kochevoi*), herders as "specialists skilled in the care of livestock," and the nomadic family as a "brigade" with each member holding an official title, pastoral nomads continue to move seasonally in family groups to find grazing for their animals.¹⁷

A recent study maintains that the Turkic Muslim peoples have been extraordinarily resistant to assimilation. This is true even of persons who have been exposed to Russians for long periods of time. Using linguistic identification as an index of assimilation, the study concludes that the russification level of urbanized Kazakh communities who have had more than two centuries of extensive contact with Russians is only 3.2 percent; that for rural Kazakhs is even lower, 2.7 percent.¹⁸ Interestingly, the 1970 Soviet census listed a slightly higher percentage of Uighurs reporting Uighur as their native language than in the previous census of 1959 (88.5 percent versus 85

15. Pipes, *Formation*, p. 191.

16. Ann Sheehy, "The Central Asian Republics," *Conflict Studies*, No. 30 (December 1972), pp. 13-27.

17. Bacon, *Central Asians*, pp. 119-20.

18. Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *American Political Science Review*, LXVIII, No. 1 (March 1974), p. 63.

percent). The percentage of Kazakhs remained almost exactly the same as in 1959.¹⁹ Similar figures are reported for other Central Asian minorities, tending to support the conclusion that the effect of exposure to Russians on the russification of Muslims is "exceedingly small."²⁰ An American student in Tashkent in 1970 was told by a Russian that it was hard for him to believe at first that Russian rule had extended to Central Asia.²¹

A Western social scientist, analyzing the significantly higher rates of population increase among Central Asian minorities than among Russians, describes these peoples as pursuing *la vengeance des berceaux*, getting even through the cradle, or compensation for heavy in-migration to their homelands and some assimilation losses through a high birth rate. In the Central Asian republics, the Muslim school-age population is much higher than the Muslim percentage in the total population of the province, even though children of the Muslim minorities, particularly female children, are more likely to drop out of school than Russian children. The fact that available labor now seems to be directed at Siberia rather than Central Asia makes russification still less likely.²² Nonetheless, as Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov points out, Soviet prisons are filled with ethnic dissidents.²³

ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SINKIANG

While the Soviet government was extending and consolidating its power over the former czarist domains in Central Asia, it did not lose interest in those Central Asian territories still nominally under Chinese control. When the Bolshevik government assumed power in Russia, it issued a declaration abrogating the unequal treaties concluded during the czarist era. None of the land obtained thereunder, however, was returned to China, and the Soviet Union proved even more interested in Sinkiang than had czarist Russia. The warlord of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, was concerned with maintaining his independence from the government of China, then

19. CDSP, XXI, No. 16, p. 16.

20. Silver, "Social Mobilization," p. 62.

21. David C. Montgomery, "An American Student in Tashkent," *Asian Affairs*, February 1972, p. 37; quoted in Sheehy, "Central Asian Republics," p. 19.

22. Rein Taagepera, "National Differences Within Soviet Demographic Trends," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), XX, No. 4 (April 1969), pp. 478, 481, and 489.

23. Andrei Sakharov, *Sakharov Speaks* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p. 43.

headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Soviet Union provided financial assistance which helped Sheng in this endeavor. In return, the USSR received a privileged position in Sinkiang. Soviet geologists explored the province's rich natural resources, Soviet engineers surveyed railways and Soviet pilots manned Sinkiang's air routes.

The Russians also promoted propaganda activities aimed at forming a pro-Soviet Communist party; the atmosphere in Sinkiang was for the most part distinctly unfriendly to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1934, when the beleaguered CCP fled its Kiangsi Soviet base to escape annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, it wandered about for many months in search of a reasonably safe haven. The USSR, ostensibly its fraternal socialist ally and adviser, never told the CCP of its favorable position in Sinkiang. According to an ex-CCP leader, this was because Stalin had designs on Sinkiang and wished to exclude Chinese influence of any sort from the province.²⁴

In 1938, Sheng, seemingly attempting to gain some degree of independence from the USSR by playing off the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties against one another, welcomed several CCP advisers into his government and even announced his intention to join the CCP. Nevertheless, a few years later, he accused them of being involved in a plot against him, and had them arrested and executed. Mao Tse-tung's brother, Tse-min, was one of the victims.

In the early 1940s, owing to its involvement in World War II, the USSR could no longer sustain its aid to Sinkiang. In fact, it looked to Sheng Shih-ts'ai as if the Soviet Union might be losing the war. He thereupon turned toward mending fences with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government. Accepting a cabinet-level position in Chungking, Sheng left Sinkiang in 1944, and the KMT was able to choose its first governor of the province. Sinkiang's non-Han groups were not pleased by the reassertion of Chinese control, and the new provincial administration proved neither tactful nor honest. Han settlers were arriving and would presumably occupy minorities' lands. A Han army stationed there had to be provisioned and paid, and the province's economy was deteriorating.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had taken the offensive in World War II and was able to reassert its interest in Sinkiang. The previous government-to-province special relationship having failed, the USSR

24. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 54.

began to work through Sinkiang's aggrieved non-Han groups. Sympathetic Soviet agents provided dissident ethnic group leaders with financial aid and advice. A major rebellion ensued, and a multi-ethnic alliance representing Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, White Russians and others established an independent state — the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) with its capital at Ining — in the predominantly Kazakh territory bordering Soviet Kazakhstan. Its leader, Akhmedjan, was a Uighur, and the ETR's mainstay was its Kazakh cavalry, commanded by Osman Bator. At one point the rebel cavalry threatened the provincial capital of Urumchi.²⁵ They pulled back only when the Soviet Union, having offered its services as mediator, advised them to do so; this seems to indicate the movement's dependence on the USSR. Yet, in view of the abundant evidence of KMT mismanagement, the Soviet Union was clearly exploiting existing grievances rather than creating them.

Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government was amenable to compromise, especially since the Sinkiang rebellion was tying down troops and material Chiang could have put to better use in the battle with the CCP. Eventually a compromise was worked out, providing for increased minority representation in government and a greater degree of autonomy for the province. Burhan, a Tartar who had managed to create a certain amount of rapport with all sides, was made governor. As a partial guarantee that the KMT would observe its part of the bargain, the ETR troops would not be dispersed, while a KMT garrison also remained in Sinkiang.

Meanwhile, however, Chiang Kai-shek was losing his battle with the CCP. The Soviet Union not only did not aid the CCP in this effort, but actually entered into publicly announced negotiations with the KMT. Although the exact bargaining terms were not revealed, the Soviet Union was clearly offering Chiang Kai-shek's government arms — which would surely be used against the CCP — in return for some form of USSR control over Sinkiang.²⁶ Eventually, the CCP's military success foreclosed this option. By the late summer of 1949 their armies had been victorious in most of the rest of China and were pressing hard on Sinkiang. At this point virtually the entire provincial government of Sinkiang, from Governor Burhan on down, and including most of those who had been leaders of the ETR, defected to the CCP en masse.

25. Excellent accounts of this period may be found in Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*; and Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1950).

26. *New York Times*, (hereinafter NYT), February 1, 1949, p. 1; February 2, 1949, p. 18; February 6, 1949, Section 4, p. 1; and March 22, 1949, p. 22.

Thus Sinkiang, with its large Turkic Muslim majority (estimated at 75 percent Uighur, 10 percent Kazakh, and less than 6 percent Han Chinese at this time) formally became part of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Exactly how the province's leadership had been persuaded to defect is not known. But, in addition to the certainty of CCP takeover regardless of their wishes, the provincial leaders were surely influenced by promises that Sinkiang would receive autonomous status (the content of this autonomy probably being somewhat ambiguous), that there would be concessions to the ethnic groups and their cultures, and that the leadership role of the present elite would continue. This last promise the CCP did not have to keep in several significant cases. The plane carrying most of the high-ranking ETR leaders, including Akhmedjan, crashed mysteriously en route to a conference in Peking. The Chinese did not release news of the disaster until many months later, thus fanning speculation that the crash might not have been accidental.²⁷ The only remaining ETR leader of note was Salfudin, a young Moscow-trained Uighur who spoke Chinese rather poorly at this time. He had been engaged in fomenting anti-Han Chinese riots in Sinkiang during the early 1940s, had been minister of education in the ETR government, and was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Salfudin was not the only reminder of the Soviet Union's privileged position in Sinkiang. The new PRC began its political career as an international outcast, and was forced to turn to the USSR for help. Negotiations over a treaty dragged on for nine weeks, leading observers to conclude that the Soviet Union was driving a hard bargain. The full provisions of what would become the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 were not announced by either side, but are known to have included a special consular position for the USSR in Sinkiang, in addition to joint exploitation of Sinkiang's resources and the creation of joint stock companies to exploit those resources.²⁸

The Chinese did not send People's Liberation Army (PLA) work teams to the three predominantly Kazakh districts in December 1949, when such teams were sent to the rest of Sinkiang, explaining that "conditions were as yet unsettled" in those areas.²⁹ The work

27. Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*, pp. 142-43.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

29. K. F. Kotov, *Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic* (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1956), trans. in United States Department of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 3547, p. 56.

teams did not appear in the three districts until the latter half of 1950, after the Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed. One may speculate that the "unsettled conditions" may have included the unsettled question of who should administer the three districts with the USSR arguing for jurisdiction over them. Though the Soviet Union did not get them, it retained an influential position in these areas. When the organs of local power in Ili, Tacheng, and Tarbagatai were "reorganized" toward the end of 1950, the Administrative Control Boards which replaced them included many Kazakhs and Uighurs who had been members of, or sympathetic to, the ETR government, though a Han Chinese generally held the final decision-making power. In urban areas of the three districts, the pro-Soviet minority intelligentsia remained in power and was not generally compelled to undergo intensive ideological remolding or reform. The local clan headman structure was left largely unaltered as well, save for those headmen who overtly resisted the new government. Osman Bator, whose Kazakh cavalry had been so important to the success of the ETR, was one such holdout. He fled south, where he was eventually captured and executed. As for Salfudin, while he was in Moscow helping to negotiate the 1950 treaty, it was announced from Peking that he had become a member of the CCP, having meanwhile resigned from the CPSU.

In 1951, a purge was undertaken, probably in connection with the "three-anti" campaign then being conducted in other parts of China. It reportedly removed pro-Soviet figures in the minority areas, and a large-scale pacification and reeducation campaign was conducted in 1953. As the official New China News Agency (NCNA) explained, "it was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the ancestral land."³⁰

In general, however, strenuous efforts were made to conceal any differences between the Chinese and Soviet governments over minority lands. The national boundary was referred to as "Friendship Border," and Kazakhs and Uighurs of both nations, who were virtually indistinguishable without reference to passports, crossed it frequently to trade, graze their herds, and visit kinfolk. Soviet technicians were lavishly praised in the Chinese press for the selfless way in which they were helping their socialist neighbor to develop its resources, and Soviet ethnographers worked with the Han Chinese

30. NCNA, Lanchow, May 6, 1954; quoted in Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*, p. 144.

among Sinkiang minorities.³¹ Soviet aid helped build a railroad connecting Lanchow, capital of China's Kansu province, with Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang. It was planned to continue the line through Ili, where it would ultimately reach the Soviet border. Meanwhile, the USSR would extend the terminus of its Turk-Sib railroad from Aktogal to the border; the two lines would connect at a new town, Druzhba (Friendship).

Wishing to avoid antagonizing the minorities and risk the reinforcement of any pro-Soviet tendencies they might have, Chinese policy was cautious and followed a modified Soviet plan. "Land" reform was carried out under slogans such as "herdowners and [poorer] herders both profit" and "no struggle, no liquidation, no division of property." Chinese state trading organs offered relatively high prices for herders' products. While presented as evidence of the PRC's high regard for its minority nationalities and its desire to insure their prosperity, this was also a way for the new government to gain control in the herding areas by linking them with the Chinese market system, and to redirect trade away from the USSR as well. Lenient attitudes were also taken toward most religious practices, even toward polygamy.

In 1954, Khrushchev visited Peking, hoping to obtain Chinese support in his bid to succeed Stalin. This he did, but not before the Chinese exacted a quid pro quo. Khrushchev agreed, among other things, to terminate the joint stock companies in Sinkiang. Soviet influence, however, remained in the form of advisers and technicians, and Sinkiang needed to order equipment and spare parts from the USSR. The Chinese also announced that Uighur, Kazakh, and other Turkic Muslim languages would henceforth be written with the Cyrillic script. This was understandable, as the intelligentsia of these minorities had often been educated in the Soviet Union and many in this group were already acquainted with Cyrillic. Yet, the use of such script in writing Uighur and Kazakh also created a bond between these Chinese minorities and their fellow Uighurs and Kazakhs in the USSR, while creating a linguistic distance between the Chinese minorities and the Han majority in China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, from his vantage point in Taiwan, later recalled his own misgivings when his Soviet advisers repeatedly declared that "the peoples along the Sino-Soviet frontier are all brethren. The racially related peoples will

31. See, for example, Kotov's report as cited in *n.* 29 above; and S. I. Bruk, "Ethnic Composition and Distribution of the Population in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China," *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 2 (1956).

one day be united as citizens of the same nation."³² It is, therefore, inconceivable that the leaders of the PRC would not have seen the implication of allowing Cyrillic to replace Arabic in Sinkiang, and the fact that this decision was announced at all is indicative of the degree to which the Chinese government felt it necessary to placate the Soviet Union at this time.³³

A month after Khrushchev's visit to China, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou* was created, encompassing the three predominantly Kazakh districts of the former ETR and, like the ETR, having its capital at Ining. The chairperson was a Kazakh, and there were Uighur and Kazakh vice-chairpersons, but there was also significant (and presumably more powerful) representation from regular units of the PLA and from the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps. The latter, with its motto "on the one shoulder a rifle, on the other a hoe," was intended to garrison the area while helping local people to develop their economy. The possibility of American and other imperialist intervention always existed, and there were surely ways in which the local economy could be improved. But it was also possible for the Soviet leaders to view the Production and Construction Corps as guarding the border against the USSR. And the local people, noting the large number of persons in the corps and their preoccupation with agricultural, as opposed to animal husbandry, could see the corps as yet another Han Chinese plan to usurp their lands, turn the nomads into sedentary agriculturalists and assimilate them. The corps also bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the military agricultural colonies of imperial China, whose policies toward minorities were regularly and vehemently denounced by Mao Tse-tung. In 1956, there began a large-scale transfer of Han Chinese into Sinkiang, with many of them being absorbed either into the corps or onto newly created state farms.

Curiously, and very much at variance with the practice elsewhere in China, the Ili Kazakh's creation in 1954 and Sinkiang's reconstitution as the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR) during the following year, occurred although elections in fourteen counties of Ili *chou* could not be held until 1956. Normally, such elections would precede the founding of the administrative areas.

32. Whiting and Sheng, *Sinkiang*, p. 168.

33. There is no evidence that the decision to use Cyrillic was actually implemented on a significant scale, though the break with the USSR and China's development of its own Latin-based *pin-yin* system as a standard orthography for all the PRC's linguistic groups occurred too soon after the above mentioned decision to draw any meaningful conclusion from this.

In 1956, moreover, the CCP began a major investigation of its policies toward minority nationalities; this was carried on at the same time as persons throughout China were encouraged to voice their opinions of socialism in a campaign to "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." The results, as they became known in 1957, were profoundly disquieting to CCP leaders. As they pertained to the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities of Sinkiang, the campaign revealed lurking preferences for the Soviet Union over China, often strongly voiced preferences for an independent Kazakh, Uighur, or Turkic state, and the conviction that were ETR leader Akhmedjan still alive, he would be most dissatisfied with what had become of the autonomy he thought he had been promised. There were also charges that the Han Chinese were exploiting the minorities, and demands that they leave Sinkiang en masse.

Salfudin, who had been made governor of the SUAR in 1955, attempted to refute these charges in the expected ways. According to him, Sinkiang had "always" been part of China, the Han Chinese were sacrificing themselves to build a better Sinkiang, and there was sufficient wealth in the province for all. Those who thought otherwise were either counterrevolutionaries or had been duped by counterrevolutionaries.³⁴ As might be anticipated, many of the hundred flowers were found to be poisonous weeds; some Uighurs and Kazakhs who had voiced their opinions were removed from the socialist Garden of Eden and sent for "reform through labor." These included, among others, the talented young poet Kazhykumar Shabdanov; Jahoda, the head of the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou*; the vice-director of the *chou's* Propaganda Department; and the president of its People's Court.³⁵ Significantly, Zunin Taipov, a Uighur and former leader of the ETR army had been absorbed into the Chinese military, was removed as well.

Public mention of the pro-Soviet predilections of those purged was necessarily muted, in order to avoid creating a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet component of the anti-rightist campaign is sworn to by later refugees into the Soviet Union and can

34. Salfudin's speech to the party committee of the SUAR, December 16, 1957, as reported by Peking Radio, December 25, 1957.

35. Li Hui-yu, "The Ili Autonomous *Chou* Has Very Extensive Power; Why Do the Local Nationalists Say It Has No Powers?" in *I-li jih-pao* [Ili Daily], August 30, 1958; quoted in George Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1966), p. 68.

be read into the Chinese criticisms of local nationalism in Sinkiang. While pro-Uighur, pro-Kazakh, and pan-Turkic sentiments are not the same as pro-Soviet sentiments, the role of the Soviet Union in supporting such separatist movements must be kept in mind. Thus every nostalgic recollection of Akhmedjan, Osman Bator, or the ETR inevitably reminded the Chinese leadership of Soviet machinations in Sinkiang. Also very much on the minds of Chinese leaders was the example of Mongolia, where the USSR had successfully encouraged "local nationalists" to set up a state allegedly "independent" of China when, in fact, it was almost completely dependent on Soviet aid and trade. Hence local nationalism in Sinkiang, while not the same as pro-Sovietism, is perceived by the Chinese leadership as largely overlapping with it.

SINKIANG MINORITIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 1958-1976

In 1958 China began the Great Leap Forward (GLF), which sharply departed from the social, economic, and ideological policies the PRC had pursued during the previous nine years. There were many reasons behind the launching of the GLF, and why it was begun at this particular time. Among the more important were the growing conviction among an influential segment of the Chinese leadership that continued adherence to the Soviet model would be detrimental to China's development, and the feeling that the Soviet Union had abandoned its commitment to true Marxism. Communes encompassing tens of thousands of persons were created, the use of material incentives in production was drastically curtailed, and there was large-scale confiscation of private property. The relative tolerance accorded to minority nationalities' languages, customs, and life-styles under the influence of the Soviet model was also ended.

The minorities of Sinkiang were expected, among other things, to contribute their animals to the communes, learn Han Chinese, adopt Han cultural forms, and give up various "decadent" customs including polygamy. Communes were not generally established in Uighur and Kazakh areas until several months after they had been set up in much of the rest of China, and by that time their major deficiencies had become known. Although there is some evidence that these communes were created in a somewhat modified form, their effects were as dysfunctional as in other areas of China. Production fell sharply, and there was widespread hunger and dissatisfaction with

the economic and social policies of the GLF. There were rumors of small-scale uprisings in Sinkiang in 1958 and 1959.³⁶

The Soviet leadership was contemptuous of the Chinese policies and annoyed at the repudiation of the USSR's model which the GLF represented. Khrushchev was publicly critical of the communes; the Soviet press treated China's ensuing economic difficulties with smug "concern." In 1960, all Soviet technicians still remaining in China were abruptly withdrawn. The strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship became increasingly evident to outside observers. A combination of intense minority dissatisfaction with Chinese rule in Sinkiang and growing hostility between Soviet and Chinese leaderships provided the backdrop for conflict in border areas.

The first public manifestation of this internationalization (or, perhaps more accurately, reinternationalization) of the Sinkiang border land question occurred during the spring of 1962, though its direct antecedents can be traced back to 1958. The culturally repressive social policies introduced during the GLF and the critical economic situation which followed this movement strained Sinkiang's minority groups' tenuous allegiance to Han China. The belief that Han residents received preferential treatment in the allocation of food and other rationed commodities exacerbated these strains.

On the southeast coast of China, authorities were allowing those citizens who wished to leave for Hong Kong to do so. Those who left presumably included a high percentage of the malcontents; their departure thus reduced the task of enforcing social order. In addition, whatever their political beliefs, the emigration of these persons would certainly ease pressure on China's scarce food resources. Apparently, the authorities in Sinkiang were initially similarly disposed toward allowing Uighurs and Kazakhs to leave for the Soviet Union. Subsequently, however, they began to worry over the large size of the migrant population, the fact that they were taking their herds with them, and the uses to which the now openly hostile Soviet Union could put the refugees. Chinese officials also discovered that Soviet consular authorities had been issuing thousands of false Soviet passports to those who wished to have them.³⁷

The exodus was ordered halted, to the annoyance of many would-be emigrants. There seems to have been a demonstration of

36. Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier*, pp. 107-10.

37. "China Said To Send Troops to Sinkiang," *NYT*, April 16, 1964, quoting a White Russian refugee interviewed in Hong Kong (p. 6). See also Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier*, p. 108.

some size in front of CCP headquarters in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous *Chou*, during which the demonstrators were fired upon. Several dozen Uighurs and Kazakhs were killed. News of the massacre spread quickly, resulting in rioting and disorder in other parts of Sinkiang. The Chinese suspected the Soviet Union of having fomented the incident, which indeed resembled the incidents preceding the formation of the ETR two decades before. The Russians, on the other hand, used the incident to "prove" the repressive, racist nature of Chinese policy toward non-Han peoples.

The Chinese have said virtually nothing publicly about these events. More than two and half years after the incident, Chou En-lai reported to the Third National People's Congress:

In 1962, under the instigation and direct direction of external forces, a group of the most reactionary protagonists of local nationalism staged a traitorous counterrevolutionary rebellion in Ining, Sinkiang, and incited and organized the flight to foreign territory of a large number of people near the frontier.³⁸

The Soviets claimed to present an eyewitness account, which was somewhat more graphic. According to their report, "bursts of machine-gun fire from the windows lashed the crowd . . . shooting people in the back." There were "several dozen bodies of men, women, old men and children," which served, the Soviets insisted, "as testimony to the bankruptcy of the nationalities policy pursued by the Chinese leaders, as a reproach to their unclean conscience."³⁹

However different their emphases, the official Chinese and Soviet accounts agree on the essence of the story. The incident touched off an ongoing public confrontation between China and the Soviet Union which has been carried out through overt military means, clandestine infiltration, and propaganda channels. This confrontation has had important repercussions for the political, economic, and cultural lives of the minority peoples of both sides of the border.

38. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," speech to the First Session of the Third National People's Congress, December 30, 1964; trans. in United States Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, (hereinafter SCMP), No. 3370, p. 12.

39. Zunin Taipov, "Eyewitness Account: On the other Side of the Barricade," *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* (hereinafter KP), September 29, 1963, in CDSP, XV, No. 38, p. 16. See also A. Mirov, "Sinkiang Tragedy," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, May 7, 1969, in CDSP, XXI, No. 19, pp. 5-6.

Militarily, both sides complain of border incursions by planes, troops, and ostensibly private citizens.⁴⁰ Only once has fighting on any significant scale been reported from the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan area; in August 1969, there were clashes involving several hundred Chinese and Soviet troops, with casualties on both sides. The Chinese accused the Soviet Union of sending helicopters, tanks, armored vehicles, and several hundred troops two kilometers into the Chinese side of the border, where they were repelled. The Chinese Foreign Ministry charged that larger numbers of troops and vehicles were being assembled to provoke even larger conflicts in the future.⁴¹ The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the Chinese authorities had been "deliberately exacerbating" the border situation for several months, and had purposely provoked both this and a previous clash in the Ussuri River area. The fact that the Chinese soldiers were equipped with movie cameras was held indicative of the planned nature of the Chinese attacks, and captured documents were released purportedly to prove Chinese guilt in the Ussuri clashes.⁴² In 1976, however, an analyst of the United States Central Intelligence Agency maintained that while the Chinese did indeed provoke the Amur-Ussuri confrontation, the one in Sinkiang-Kazakhstan was perpetrated by the Soviets.⁴³

A smaller-scale confrontation on the Sinkiang border occurred in March 1974, when a Soviet helicopter landed inside Chinese territory at Altai and was seized by the Chinese. According to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the vehicle had been sent to pick up a seriously ill serviceman who urgently needed hospitalization. It had lost its bearings and made a forced landing in China, when its fuel supply ran out.⁴⁴ In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the USSR of cooking up "a bunch of lies to cover the crime," noting that the helicopter carried neither medical personnel nor medical equipment, while possessing arms, ammunition, and reconnaissance equipment. Documents on board indicated that the crew was on a

40. See, for example, protest of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the USSR, in NCNA, September 17, 1968; and the Soviet Union's reply, "Provocative Fabrication of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Izvestia*, November 2, 1968, in CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 42.

41. PR, XII, No. 33 (August 15, 1969), p. 3.

42. S. Borzenko *et al.*, "On Stony Hill," *Pravda*, August 16, 1969, in CDSP, XXI, No. 33, p. 4.

43. Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, No. 23 (Summer 1976), pp. 3-23.

44. *Pravda*, March 21, 1974, p. 9; CDSP, XXVI, No. 12, p. 4.

"special mission;" moreover, this intrusion was not an isolated incident.⁴⁵

Mass rallies were held throughout Sinkiang, in which the participants accused the Soviet Union of carrying out provocations, planning a large-scale invasion and wishing to add to the 560,000 square kilometers they had already "stolen" from Sinkiang (a reference to the treaty of 1881).⁴⁶ Despite the Soviet Union's threat of "serious consequences," the helicopter and its crew were not returned until more than two and a half years later. As the PRC explained, "investigation has established the veracity of the Soviet crew's contention that they crossed into Chinese territory unintentionally."⁴⁷

In both Soviet and Chinese accounts of the 1969 and 1974 incidents, indigenous ethnic names are conspicuously lacking among the personnel mentioned. The two governments clearly believed that border defense in this area was too important to be left to the natives. The Chinese belatedly noted that "people of all nationalities" had helped in apprehending the Soviet helicopter crew and paraded one of them at National Day rallies in Peking several months later, where he declared that "the militia and people of various nationalities . . . are not to be bullied."⁴⁸

Although the physical presence of the minority peoples is scarcely noticeable in the post-1962 confrontations, propaganda channels for both parties of the dispute have sought to fill in the gaps with lengthy discussions of the feelings of Kazakhs and Uighurs on each side of the border. The 1962 incident touched off a major media "war," with both China and the Soviet Union increasing their minority language broadcasting to areas where trans-border reception was possible. The Soviets were aided in this by the reemergence in the USSR of leading Kazakhs and Uighurs who had been imprisoned or purged by the Chinese government, mostly during the anti-rightist campaign. Just how they made their escape has never been clarified, but it is plain that they are of great value to the Soviet Union as propagandists.

Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz programs beamed from Tashkent, Alma Ata, and Frunze were instituted in 1964 and expanded in 1967.

45. NCNA (Peking), March 23, 1974; SCMP, No. 3585, p. 66.

46. See, for example, Urumchi Radio (Sinkiang), March 28, 1974, in United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, (hereinafter FBIS-CHI), No. 62, 1974, pp. A1-A3.

47. TASS, December 27, 1976; CDSP, XXVII, No. 52, p. 14.

48. Peking Radio, October 1, 1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 192, 1974, p. D6; October 17, 1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. A4.

Special correspondents from TASS and *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, among others, joined the refugee newscasters, who claimed to have seen both sides of the border. Most of the programs seem to present an accurate description of the situation in Sinkiang, presumably in order to establish the credibility of the broadcasts. Other themes, however, include the material advantages of life for Kazakhs, Uighurs, and others in the USSR, the availability of higher level of labor-saving technology, and the greater cultural freedom and diversity allowed there. The broadcasts frequently hark back to the Ili revolt of 1944, the founding of the ETR, the historical independence of the Turkic Muslim peoples and their praiseworthy struggle to maintain this independence, the 1962 incident, and other items with similarly subversive content. Sympathy is expressed for those who are being persecuted by the Chinese authorities for having relatives in the Soviet Union or who are suspected of pro-autonomy or pro-Soviet feelings.⁴⁹

In many Soviet propaganda releases, there is a clear implication that the minorities' sympathetic kin, backed by the Soviet government, are ready to welcome their Chinese relatives to the Soviet Union. A Western journalist who visited Alma Ata in 1976 noted the publication there of a thrice-weekly paper called *Yeni Khayat*, or New Life, for the refugees. It employed Arabic script, according to its editor, because the Soviet authorities discovered that the refugees had difficulty adjusting to the Cyrillic-based script used by other Turkic-Muslim language newspapers published in the USSR. Yet, the Soviets probably had other reasons for not using the Latin-based alphabet which the Chinese introduced in 1960 after their break with the USSR.

Yeni Khayat's editor claimed that more than 100,000 persons had crossed the border. They had been provided with food, clothing, and medical attention and eventually settled on collective farms; most have apparently continued as sheep herders.⁵⁰ To enhance the contrast between the picture of the cultural genocide of minorities in China and their happy life in the USSR, the Soviet Union has also

49. Gretchen S. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda to Moslem Nationalities in China," Radio Liberty dispatch (Munich), February 14, 1972, pp. 1-4. For some examples of the Soviet reports, see Taipov, "Eyewitness Account," CDSF, XXI, No. 19, p.5; and O. Matskevich, "Along the Border," KP, September 24, 1963, p. 3, in CDSF, XV, No. 38, pp. 17-18.

50. Christopher S. Wren, "Kazakhstan Beckons Refugees from China," NYT, April 24, 1976, p. 8. Chinese sources give a lower figure of 60,000.

allocated funds to refurbish Islamic monuments, including Tamerlane's tomb,⁵¹ and has published multi-volume compendia on Uighur, Kazakh, and other nationality heritages.

The Chinese Communists have countered by accusing the USSR of being a "big prison for nationalities," of forcing the nationalities to learn Russian (this last juxtaposed with a quotation from Lenin on linguistic diversity), and of exploiting its nationality republics.⁵² As Chinese analysts noted, a 1974 edition of the book, *Problems of the CPSU Economic Policy and Reclamation of Virgin Lands in Kazakhstan*, had quoted Leonid Brezhnev as saying: "We must spare no expenditure to carry out material encouragement, for such expenditure will bring returns a hundredfold." But the 1976 reprint deleted these words. This showed, according to these analysts, the deliberately "exploitative nature of the Brezhnev government."⁵³

Just how seriously each party takes the propaganda efforts of the other is unclear, though neither has exerted much effort to jam its antagonist's broadcasts. In 1964, seemingly concerned with the Soviet propaganda, Salfudin publicly accused the USSR of using radio transmission to "spread lies and slander attacking the leadership of the CCP and to distort the history of Sinkiang in an effort to undermine the unity of the Chinese people of all nationalities."⁵⁴

In 1967, Ivan Spivanhov, deputy chief editor of *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, reportedly stated that Chinese broadcasts "beam in hot and strong." Yet "few people take any notice. It is so rude and clumsy."⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the efforts to answer Chinese charges may, indeed, indicate a somewhat less nonchalant attitude. China's claim to much of Soviet Central Asia, as *Pravda* suggested, was based on the grounds that "many hundreds of years ago, Chinese troops came to these parts and the Chinese emperor once used to collect tribute from the local inhabitants." This was "childish," because "one could [also] say that . . . the boundary of the PRC passes only along the line of the Great Wall, less than 100 kilometers from Peking: the boundary of China did once pass there, the wall being evidence of this."⁵⁶

51. Hedrick Smith, "Tamerlane Stirs Soviet Controversy," NYT, June 2, 1974, p.2.

52. "Soviet People's Struggle Against New Tsars," PR, XIX, No. 46 (November 12, 1976), pp. 21-22; and "Analysis of Soviet Revisionists' Policy of 'National Rapprochement,'" PR, XVII, No. 29 (July 19, 1974), pp. 18-20.

53. "Soviet Social Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression," PR, XIX, No. 22 (May 28, 1976), pp. 19-23.

54. NCNA (Urumchi), April 28, 1964.

55. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda," p.2.

56. September 2, 1964, in CDSP, XVI, No. 34, pp. 4-5.

The USSR also reacted sharply to evidences of collaboration between the PRC and Ukrainian separatists, and refuted Chinese charges that Kazakhstan was being exploited.⁵⁷ In 1972, moreover, *Izvestia* announced plans to publish a ten-volume dictionary of the Kazakh language and a multi-volume Kazakh Soviet encyclopedia.⁵⁸ There was renewed evidence of concern with civil defense in Kazakhstan, and Brezhnev personally made highly touted visits to the republic in 1970 and 1972.⁵⁹

Chinese media have attempted to refute Soviet charges of cultural repression with lengthy articles discussing the exact numbers of pamphlets, books, and texts printed in Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Kirghiz, and Sibo. These publications, according to a Chinese newspaper, have "had considerable use in developing the languages and literatures of the various nationalities, enriching their culture and accelerating the progress of the socialist revolution and reconstruction in Sinkiang."⁶⁰ A post-Cultural Revolution attempt to renew pressure on these minorities to use the Latin alphabet was made at the same time as many of China's non-Sinkiang minority groups were being urged to study Han Chinese;⁶¹ apparently it was considered sufficient to separate Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs from their Soviet counterparts on the basis of script.

The death of Mao's then heir-apparent, Lin Biao, coincided with a further liberalization of attitudes toward minorities. Uighurs and Kazakhs were reportedly adapting the new revolutionary operas

57. M. Panchuk, "The Chinese Splitters and the Ukrainian Nationalists," *Rabochaya gazeta*, February 27, 1972; CDSP, XXIX, No. 8, pp. 13-14. For a representative sample of Chinese propaganda in favor of the Ukrainian nationalists, see NCNA (Peking), October 15, 1974; FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. A1. For an example of Soviet refutation of Chinese charges of USSR exploitation of Kazakhstan, see E. Bagramov, "The Drawing Together of Nationalities Is a Law of Communist Construction," *Pravda*, June 22, 1972; CDSP, XXIV, No. 25, pp. 10-11.

58. *Izvestia*, November 23, 1972, p. 5, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 47, p. 23; and May 12, 1972, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 19, p. 26. The effect of showing the Soviet Union's encouragement of nationality cultures may have been somewhat diluted by the newspaper's observation that the encyclopedia's first entry was that of Abas, "the great Kazakh poet and educator, whose ardent dream was to educate his people and bring them closer to Russian culture."

59. V. Titov, "Our Common Duty," *Pravda*, August 14, 1972; CDSP, XXI, No. 33, pp. 6-7. For accounts of Brezhnev's visits, see CDSP, XXII, No. 35, pp. 1-8; and XXIV, No. 35, pp. 6-7.

60. *Kuang-ming jih-pao* [Bright Daily], October 23, 1963.

61. Contrast *Jen-min jih-pao* [People's Daily], August 22, 1971, with Urumchi Radio, December 10, 1970.

introduced under the aegis of Mao's wife to their own languages and art forms, and were receiving more consumer goods manufactured to the specifications of their customs and traditions.⁶² A protégé of Lin Piao, who had become first party secretary of the SUAR after the Cultural Revolution, was removed from office and replaced by Salfudin, thus placing a minority group member in charge of the SUAR for the first time since 1949. Other Uighurs and Kazakhs were given prestigious, although not necessarily influential, positions in government and party, and a campaign was initiated to recruit more of them into leadership positions at lower levels of society.⁶³

Chinese propagandists insisted that the 1962 incident had been instigated by the Soviet Union; it constituted one more sad proof that the USSR was following in the footsteps of its czarist predecessors. They flatly rejected Russia's explanation of the nineteenth-century territorial cessions. As they argued, the lands obtained thereunder should have been returned, presumably with their inhabitants as well. A news report supposedly emanating from NCNA, which circulated in the capitals of several African states, implied that the peoples of Soviet Central Asia desired to "enter into a close union with China."⁶⁴

Thus, while the Soviets have been less overtly fearful of the effect of Chinese propaganda than the Chinese have seemed of Soviet propaganda, both parties have attempted to answer each other's charges, and have accompanied these refutations by actions significantly liberalizing policies toward minorities.

Nonetheless, neither side remains certain of the loyalties of its minorities. Within a few years of one another, two books were published in the Soviet Union to disprove "falsifiers of history who claimed that Soviet rule was established artificially and against the wishes of the population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan."⁶⁵ A few

62. Urumchi Radio, October 9, 1974.

63. NCNA (Urumchi), May 17, 1972; SCMP. No. 5143, pp. 22-23.

64. TASS, April 21, 1969; CDSP, XXI, No. 34, p. 17. TASS's evident anger at this, and Russian fears of the potentially subversive effects of such statements, make it unlikely that the NCNA report was a Soviet fabrication. Nonetheless, information available to the author indicates that the report may well have been fabricated by United States' intelligence sources.

65. Khamid Inoyatov, *Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October Revolution* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966); and I. I. Mint, *The Triumph of Soviet Rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan* (Tashkent: USSR Academy of Sciences' Branch Publishing House, 1967). The latter was reviewed in *Pravda*, No. 22, 1967, p. 3, in CDSP, XIX, No. 47, p. 22. Cf. L. M. Drobizheva, "On the Social Homogeneity of the Republics and the Development of National Relations in the USSR," *Istoria SSR*, No. 1 (January 1967), in CDSP, XIX, No. 18, pp. 28-29.

years later, several Kirghiz scholars were severely criticized for various "errors," including their assertion that even if a nationality's demands for separation and political self-determination should conflict with the interests of the nation, no one had the right to intervene forcibly in the nation's internal life and "correct" its errors.

In China, the media have reacted with almost frenetic joy at each new archaeological find in Sinkiang which links that province with China proper. For example, a rally was held in 1975, with banners and headlines proclaiming that "T'ang [Dynasty] Relics Prove Sinkiang Historically Part of China." Rally leaders dutifully reiterated the most recent twist in the party line, and explained that these latest discoveries would give the lie to nationalistically minded internal splittists and to the Soviet revisionist new czars who wished to separate Sinkiang from the ancestral land.⁶⁶

The group accompanying James Schlesinger to China in 1976 testified to their Chinese hosts' extreme nervousness while guiding the American guests through Sinkiang. In a newspaper account admittedly modified for diplomatic reasons, Robert L. Bartley reported on the crowds in Ining, less than fifty miles from the Soviet border:

As our caravan goes from stop to stop, the crowds on the streets grow, until at last the local citizens virtually climb into the cars. The crowds are nearly all Kazakh and Uighur, though the town is supposed to be half Chinese. They break into almost joyous applause at every wave. Our hosts from Peking grow testier than at any other point in the trip.⁶⁷

In 1976, a West German magazine published the story of the arrest of two recent refugees from China to the Soviet Union: one a Kazakh and the other a Kirghiz. After being apprehended, both were placed in a Soviet prison where a fellow prisoner, an ethnic Russian hostile to the Soviet government and familiar with the cruelties of the Gulag Archipelago, was amazed to learn that the two refugees were happy with their new lot. He quoted one as saying, "I have a bunk, a light bulb in the cell, we get food every day, even fish. What

66. Urumchi Radio, March 16, 1975; FBIS-CHI, No. 54, 1975, p. E5.

67. Bartley, "In China, Trust What You Feel," *Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 1976, p. 10.

else do I need?"⁶⁸ Members of the Schlesinger party confided that their Chinese hosts seemed taken aback by the relatively low standards of living in Sinkiang, speculating that the Chinese guides were shocked by the discrepancy between reality and what their own propaganda had led them to believe.⁶⁹

CONCLUSION

It has been noted that the principal factors in the internationalization of the Turkic Muslim question were the hostilities between the two host countries and the deteriorating economic conditions in China during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The many references in Chinese media to the existence of local nationalism over the entire decade of the 1950s make it clear that Kazakh and Uighur dissatisfaction with Chinese Communist rule existed prior to the catalyzing incident of May 1962. Nonetheless, owing to the appearance of Sino-Soviet friendship, the public manifestation of their dissatisfaction was muted.

The exact nature of Kazakh and Uighur demands on the Chinese government has never been made clear. There are references to separatism, implying an independent Sinkiang; some prefer to join together with other Turkic Muslims (some of whom would undoubtedly come from Soviet Kazakhstan) in a larger separate state, while others demand greater autonomy of Sinkiang within the Chinese state. There are, moreover, demands for the Han Chinese to leave Sinkiang; others simply ask that they relinquish their commanding positions in the province's economic and administrative infrastructure.

Whether or not Soviet intrigues were behind the May 1962 incident, as the Chinese charge, the Soviets hastened to make use of Kazakh and Uighur dissatisfaction thereafter. The USSR, championing the cause of China's Turkic Muslim peoples, sought to contrast the economic hardship and cultural repression on the Chinese side of the border with the allegedly improved situation on the Soviet side. The Soviet Kazakhs and other Central Asian minorities seem to have profited as a result. In an effort to provide suitable anti-Chinese propaganda, the Soviets granted them various cultural and material benefits. Chinese Kazakhs and Uighurs have benefited as well, since the PRC has perceived it as necessary to refute Soviet charges.

68. A. Uchitel, "Escape to an Adjacent Cell," *Possev*, No. 2 (February 1976), in *Freedom at Issue*, September-October 1976, p. 10.

69. Information available to the author.

Compilations have been made of folk-songs, and resources have been transferred to Sinkiang via a preferential revenue redistribution plan which returns more money to the province than is collected there. This has allowed the construction of mining and other industries and aided in raising living standards. There has also been an increase in the number of Uighurs and Kazakhs in leadership positions in the SUAR.

While Chinese and Soviet Kazakhs and Uighurs have gained leverage over their respective governments as a result of the Sino-Soviet situation, there are limits as to how far either government can be manipulated. Past experience has shown that overzealous catering to minority cultures generally reinforces the continued perception of ethnic separatism and prevents the drawing together of the minority peoples which the two countries desire. The granting of more autonomy may also lead to subsequent demands for separatism. Moreover, the more liberal policies of China and the USSR are doubtless looked upon with justifiable skepticism by minorities on both sides of the border. In some instances, the liberality of a pronouncement may be tempered by other words spoken in a different context; in other instances, the policies are known to be subject to rapid reversal.

With the higher degree of ideological orthodoxy demanded and lower living standards prevailing on the Chinese side, the Soviet Union would probably enjoy an advantage in any contest between the two states for the loyalties of the Central Asian peoples. Still, for reasons discussed earlier, the USSR cannot be fully certain of the loyalties of its own minorities. Furthermore, the PRC has recently endeavored to raise living standards in Sinkiang, to coopt more Uighurs and Kazakhs into the province's elite, and to relax some of the more culturally repressive aspects of the past. It is therefore unlikely that the Soviet Union will decide to employ the incitement of China's Kazakhs and Uighurs in any large-scale way. Anti-Chinese propaganda and infiltration directed toward Sinkiang will probably continue on a small scale, in an attempt to impress the Chinese with the potentially damaging effects of a larger-scale effort. Since the Soviet Union does not intend to support Chinese Kazakh separatism or autonomy in any meaningful way, and because of the ever larger Han Chinese presence in Sinkiang, the Turkic Muslims in Central Asia who desire a separate state will not likely see their wish fulfilled.

The most feasible scenario for the creation of such a separate state would entail a major destabilization of the present equilibrium

on the border, such as a Sino-Soviet war. Given the unlikely eventuality of a war between the two states and the resurfacing of autonomy demands, there is a high probability that the Soviet Union would win and, as part of the settlement, might detach Sinkiang from China and establish it as an autonomous state, albeit one dependent on the USSR for its continued existence. At first glance, the effort might not seem worth the potential gains, in view of the Soviet Union's not wholly successful record of relations with its own Central Asian minorities. On the other hand, the example of the MPR may indicate that the venture is indeed worthwhile. The MPR is, and Sinkiang could be, a buffer state between the Soviet Union and China. The MPR is rich in minerals and has been usefully integrated into the Soviet economy; Sinkiang could be as well. Moreover, though Mongolians would probably, under other circumstances, wish a higher degree of international maneuverability, their actions indicate their strong preference for an independence circumscribed by the Soviet Union to the risk of inclusion within the Chinese state. Thus, there are very real prospects for gain for the Soviet Union in such a situation.

Chinese foreign policymakers have demonstrated themselves to be highly skilled and fully cognizant of the realities of, and limitations on, Chinese power. The existence of the MPR is a constant reminder of what may happen in Sinkiang. It is therefore probable that they will do their utmost to prevent an escalation of Sino-Soviet violence. The influx of Han Chinese to Sinkiang will likely continue insofar as the local economy can absorb the immigrants. Sinkiang's minorities will be carefully treated in such a way as to diffuse resentment. While granting them some privileges, the PRC will not court the minorities to such a degree that further demands for separatism will be encouraged.

The best laid plans of government policymakers have gone astray before, and it is not beyond the realm of possibility that this may happen again. History is replete with wars which began accidentally, and a Sino-Soviet armed struggle is but one of several possible scenarios which may rekindle hopes for separatism in Sinkiang and/or Soviet Central Asia. It is conceivable, for example, that such a minority group uprising may occur independent of any impetus from Peking or Moscow. Here the social mobilization phenomenon may be of crucial importance. In destroying the traditionally loose-knit kinship groups of Central Asian peoples and in giving them a common written language, making them literate, and drawing them into factories and mass organizations, the Chinese and Soviet

governments may inadvertently be creating the preconditions for large-scale well-organized resistance to their respective rule, rather than the small-scale and loosely organized hostilities they have successfully coped with so far.

It is difficult to determine how much genuine feeling Chinese Kazakhs and Uighurs have for their kinfolk across the border, and vice versa. The constant propaganda of both sides, particularly that of the Soviet Union, suggests that they are indeed one people. This would surely reinforce such feeling as do exist, and may even create them where they do not exist. This may spark desires for irredentism which operate independently of official Chinese or Soviet wishes.

At present, however, these possibilities remain remote and the outlook seems to portend a continuation of low-level resistance which may occasionally be exacerbated by local economic shortages or a misguided or misinterpreted order from Peking or Moscow. There seems little probability of either escalating or solving the Turkic Muslim problem.

Chapter Two

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

*Robert G. Sutter**

THE ORIGINS OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE SUPERPOWERS¹

The rapprochement of the United States (US) with the People's Republic of China (PRC), achieved during President Richard M. Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, marked the most important breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy. Peking's normalization of relations with Washington was especially useful in fostering China's vital interests in the Asian balance of power. In the late 1960s, the PRC leadership became increasingly aware of China's vulnerable strategic position. That vulnerability stemmed in part from disruptions of China's military preparedness during the Cultural Revolution, and it was increased by significantly larger Soviet military power deployed along the Chinese frontier. But at its heart lay Peking's strident opposition to both superpowers.

The August 1968 Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and Moscow's concurrent formulation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty demonstrated to the Chinese that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) might be prepared to use overwhelming military superiority to pressure, and even to invade, the PRC. At the same time, Peking voiced growing concern over alleged Soviet efforts to gain influence in countries along China's periphery in order to "contain" the PRC. The Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 increased Peking's concern over the Soviet "threat." In response, Chinese officials, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, began a major effort in 1969 to broaden Peking's leverage against the USSR by ending China's international isolation. In this pursuit they used conventional diplomacy and played down the ideological shrillness characteristic of Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution.

Because of Moscow's massive power, Peking realized that improving diplomatic relations with most foreign countries would not

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent the views of any US government agency.

be significantly helpful to China's pressing need to offset the USSR. In Asia, only the US, the other superpower, seemed to have sufficient strength to serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet pressure. Moscow had previously shown uneasiness over signs of possible reconciliation between China and the US. Thus, the Chinese leaders were well aware that they held an important option. They could move closer to the US in order to readjust Sino-Soviet relations and form a new balance of power in Asia favorable to the PRC.

While the Chinese faced increasingly strong Soviet pressure in 1969, the newly installed Nixon administration was beginning policy initiatives designed to pull back American military forces from Asia and reduce US commitments along the periphery of China. It was soon apparent that the so-called Nixon Doctrine of gradual troop withdrawal was perceived favorably by Peking, at least after the brief US incursion into Cambodia. The Chinese leaders treated the American pullback as solid evidence of the Nixon administration's avowed interest in improving relations with China. They also viewed it as a major opportunity for the PRC to free itself from the burdensome task of maintaining an extensive defense network along China's southern and eastern borders against possible US-backed armed incursions. Moreover, Peking hoped to spread its own influence to neighboring Asian areas as the US gradually reduced its military presence in those regions.

Thanks to these considerations, the PRC agreed to invite President Nixon to China and to begin the process of normalization of Sino-American relations. Though the joint communiqué signed by Nixon and Chou En-lai in Shanghai in February 1972 acknowledged major differences between the two nations over ideology, Taiwan, and several foreign policy issues, the document showed that the two leaders had reached an important agreement on the principles which would govern the future international order in Asia. While agreeing that they would not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, both sides promised to oppose efforts by any other nation to establish hegemony there.

This accord served China's interests well. For the previous two decades, Peking had existed within a generally hostile Asian environment and had periodically faced threats to its national security. The Sino-American rapprochement offered the PRC an opportunity to adopt a more relaxed stance on its eastern and southern flanks. It also provided major support for China against Soviet pressure. US support for the antihegemony clause in the Shanghai Communiqué represented for China an important strategic

guarantee. It put Washington on record as opposing any effort by Moscow to dominate China.

The Sino-US relationship remained the centerpiece of PRC strategy in the Asia-Pacific region following the promulgation of the Shanghai Communiqué. In accord with Peking's interests, Washington continued to implement the Nixon Doctrine, gradually withdrawing from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. At the same time, the US repeatedly insisted that its withdrawal should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness, since Washington remained firmly opposed to any other power's attempts to gain a dominant position in Asia. The Nixon administration kept sufficient force on hand to back up its stance, thereby reassuring Peking that the US would honor the Shanghai Communiqué's provisions against "hegemony" in East Asia.

A milestone in the development of Peking's new relationship with the US and the USSR was reached at the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973. In his August 24 report to the congress, Chou En-lai showed increased confidence over China's strategic position, portraying the Soviet Union as principally threatening the West in Europe rather than threatening China. He offered a lengthy rationale for China's rapprochement with the US and its continued opposition to the USSR. He implied that Peking was, in 1973, secure in international affairs; the PRC would focus its attention and resources on dealing with internal questions.²

Chou's report pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest united front" against the "hegemonism of the two superpowers," but

1. For useful overviews of recent Chinese foreign policy, see Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949* (new and enlarged edition; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972); and A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977). See also Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); and Robert G. Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia Following the US Defeat in Indochina" (paper presented at the Seventh Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, June 1978). Background information on China's foreign policy is available in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS), *Trends in Communist Media*, a weekly publication analyzing the media comments of China and other Communist countries. This is particularly useful in documenting the changes in Chinese foreign policy during this time.

2. For an analysis of Chou's report, see FBIS, *Trends in Communist Media*, September 6, 1973. The report appears in *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Documents) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 1-37.

it did so in a way that clearly sanctioned the move toward Sino-US détente as a means to counterbalance Soviet influence. Chou sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that had served as the major premise of Peking's differentiated approach to the superpowers in recent years. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well as collude" with each other, he maintained that "their collusion serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and temporary." In the context of superpower contention, Chou cited Europe as "strategically the key point" in their rivalry. According to his analysis, the West always sought to divert the Soviet "peril" toward China, and the Soviets for their part were, in 1973, feinting to the East while thrusting toward the West.

Chou's report pulled few punches in its attack on the Soviets, likening Brezhnev to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany of charges, accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a Fascist dictatorship at home and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He reiterated Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of principle" should not hinder normalization of state relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, and he urged that the border question should be settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any threat." This formulation, however, merely reflected Peking's consistent demand for a mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed regions along the frontier. Indeed, it seems likely that he was making these points only for the record, for he raised in his report a sarcastic rhetorical question: "Must China give away all the territory north of the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists" in order to demonstrate a willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations?

Chou made a passing reference to Soviet troops stationed along the Chinese border. His most direct portrayal of a threat to China's security appeared in the course of an appeal for vigilance against "any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social imperialism." This warning against surprise attack was a new element in Chinese rhetoric, and it also appeared in the congress communiqué. Taken as a whole, however, the discussion of foreign affairs in the congress did not evoke a sense of imminent threat. In reference to Mao Tse-tung's May 20, 1970 statement on the danger of a new world war, Chou was confident that it was possible to "prevent such a war."

In contrast to its attack on Moscow, Chou's report contained a positive assessment of the Sino-US rapprochement. When he was listing Peking's successes in foreign affairs, Chou observed that "Sino-US relations have been improved to some extent." He justified Peking's move to improve Sino-US relations while denigrating Soviet-US détente. He distinguished "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries" from "collusion and compromise" between Moscow and Washington. He cited a Leninist scripture for the observation that "there are compromises and compromises," and he drove his point home by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, contrasting it with "the doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev," who were "betrayers of Lenin."

In another justification of the Sino-American détente, Chou claimed that the US had "openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline," and he argued that the Nixon administration "could not but pull out of Vietnam." This portrayal of receding US power contrasted with Chou's description of the "evil and foul things" perpetrated by the expansionist Soviet Union.

COMPLICATIONS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN APPROACH, 1974-1976

By the end of 1973, it was clear that Peking's more pragmatic approach toward foreign affairs in general, and toward the two superpowers in particular, had greatly enhanced China's international position. In the course of little more than four years since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Peking had marked four major achievements: First, the PRC had managed, in some measure through Sino-Soviet border talks, to stay the Soviet threat against China. Moreover, it had used its active international diplomacy to block suspected Soviet efforts to keep China isolated in Asia and elsewhere. Second, Peking had gained entry into the United Nations, normalized diplomatic relations with such major capitalist powers as West Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, and reestablished its traditionally favorable position among the independent Communist-ruled states of North Vietnam, North Korea, and Rumania. The Chinese had also begun what promised to be a fruitful reconciliation with the US. Third, the PRC had put aside its past ideological bias against increasing trade with capitalist states and had started to open more of its markets to the advanced technology and resources available in the West, hoping thereby to build China's strength with equipment purchased abroad. Fourth, Peking was

pursuing programs of cultural exchange with an increasingly large number of foreign countries, thereby significantly enhancing China's appeal internationally.

The new program in foreign affairs was not without its critics within the Chinese leadership, however. Chou En-lai's efforts were particularly vulnerable to charges from "leftist" ideological spokesmen in the Chinese hierarchy, who attacked the "expediency" of Chou's pragmatic initiatives and bemoaned the loss of Maoist "principle" in the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs. These spokesmen were particularly critical of Chou's foreign policy during massive political campaigns in China in 1974 and again in 1976, producing serious disruptions in the development of Chinese foreign affairs.

Furthermore, the success of the new program was largely dependent on the superpower relationship in Asia and elsewhere. Whenever the superpower balance changed substantially (or at least was thought to have changed substantially), Peking felt compelled to make corresponding shifts in its own foreign approach in order to adjust to the new situation. In particular, the PRC was relying heavily on the US and its Asian allies to maintain in the region a balance of influence that would preclude gains by the USSR. As a result, the Chinese were seriously concerned about increasing US "weakness" following American setbacks in Asia during 1975, and it responded with significant alterations in China's foreign approach.

Impact of the Anti-Confucius Campaign, 1974³

The development of strong leadership conflicts in China during 1974 interfered with the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. The conflicts were apparently prompted by Chou En-lai's declining health. Since Mao was not expected to live much longer, party leaders in Peking began to jockey for positions of power. "Moderate" leaders, guided by the ailing Chou and his protégé, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, relied on their control of much of the state and party bureaucracies. Their opponents were headed by a group of "leftist" Politburo members known later as the "Gang of Four" (Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan). They had no firm base of power. Although they were influential in propaganda, educational, and cultural organizations, their basic support seemed to rest on Mao's personal sanction of their activities.

3. For a more detailed analysis of China's foreign policy during this time, see Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, pp. 33-38.

The leftists strove to build up their own prestige within the leadership while tearing down the prestige of the moderates. In 1974, they exploited the massive political campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Piao as a means to attack the moderates' management of Chinese affairs. Through their use of propaganda during the campaign, the leftists sniped at moderate policies on education, rehabilitation of veteran cadres who had been criticized during the Cultural Revolution, and China's domestic economic development.

The leftist-inspired anti-Confucius campaign also had a significant impact on the conduct of foreign affairs. First, it led to an outpouring of harsh criticism of foreign music, films, and other cultural works. This helped to curb what had been an active Chinese interest in developing cultural exchange with foreign countries. Second, the campaign criticized Chinese trade with capitalist countries. The propaganda claimed that such trade would render China dependent on "imperialism," a line which dampened Peking's interest in increasing trade with the West. Third, the campaign intensified Sino-Soviet hostility. Not only did the Peking media expand harsh polemics against the USSR, but the Chinese, for the first time since the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, published the arrests of alleged Soviet "spies" in the PRC.⁴ Fourth, Chinese relations with the US fell prey to the anti-Confucius campaign. Peking became less interested in cultural exchange and trade with Washington, and Chinese media criticism of the US increased sharply. At the same time, the PRC adopted an unusually strong, militant stance on the sensitive Taiwan issue, warning that China was prepared to launch a military strike across the Taiwan Strait.

Chou En-lai and the moderate leaders managed to weather the impact of the leftist challenge during the anti-Confucius campaign. In his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) on January 13, 1975, Chou reaffirmed Peking's commitment to a pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the PRC leadership disputes over power in China remained unresolved. For

4. For example, the PRC publicized the arrest in January 1974 of Soviet diplomats in Peking and the arrest in March of the same year of a Soviet helicopter crew which had landed in Sinkiang near the Sino-Soviet border. The diplomats were promptly expelled from China, leading to a quick end of the incident. Nevertheless, Peking decided to detain the Soviet helicopter and its crew, and this resulted in a sharp exchange of Sino-Soviet protests, marking a downturn in the already poor relationship between the two nations. For a detailed discussion of the Sinkiang incident, see Chapter Two of this book, "The Role of Ethnicity in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," pp. 27-28.

example, prior to the convention of the NPC, Chou's protégé, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, received a boost in his career when he was designated vice chairman of the party in the CCP plenum of January 8-10, 1975. Yet, soon afterward, leftist standard bearer, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, was appointed vice premier at the NPC and began to take a more active role in the management of Chinese foreign policy.

Concern over US "Weakness," 1975⁵

During the next year, Chinese foreign policy was dominated by Peking's concern over what it perceived to be a major shift in the international balance of power, especially in East Asia. Although Chinese leftist leaders continued to snipe at the implementation of moderate policies, their influence on PRC foreign policy was not strong. Strategic concerns stemming particularly from the rapid collapse of the US position in Indochina in the spring of 1975 prompted increased Chinese efforts in pragmatic, conventional diplomacy designed to stabilize the East Asian balance of power and to prevent further Soviet expansion. The Chinese response represented graphic evidence of how far China had come to rely on the US to maintain an active posture in Asian and world affairs that would preclude a major expansion of Soviet influence.

The fall of US-backed governments in Cambodia and South Vietnam in 1975 upset the steady development of an East Asian balance of power favorable to Chinese interests. From Peking's perspective, the stability of the newly emerging diplomatic equilibrium had met with a significant setback. While the PRC had expected Washington to withdraw eventually from Indochina, the precipitous US decline held serious implications for China's interests. Washington suffered a serious defeat at a time when US leadership and resolve abroad, especially in East Asia, had already been called into question as a result of the Watergate scandal and the 1974-1975 economic recession.

Against this backdrop, the US defeats in Indochina cast doubt on a key premise in Peking's plan to foster a new East Asian order favorable to Chinese interests. Was the US strong enough and, more important, was it resolute enough to continue to serve as the main strategic block against Soviet encroachment and advances in East Asia? According to the PRC's judgment, the US had indeed been weakened by the Indochina developments, and its strength and

5. For further information on this issue, see Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia."

resolve in East Asia had been similarly affected. To the Chinese, the US had become less influential in Asia; its utility as a bulwark against future Soviet expansion was therefore compromised.

To respond to its perception of an altered East Asian situation, Peking was determined to continue to adhere to the Sino-US plan for a new East Asian order as articulated in the Shanghai Communiqué. But, whereas the PRC had previously relied mainly on US strength to sustain the favorable balance, it began to take on a greater responsibility for shoring up East Asian positions against Soviet expansion. For example, Peking moved adroitly to solidify its relations with, and to cement anti-Soviet feelings in, the Philippines and Thailand, the two non-Communist states in East Asia most affected by the collapse of the US position in Indochina. Peking's establishment of diplomatic relations with these states — with a joint communiqué in each instance testifying to their opposition to international "hegemony" — was intended to reassure Manila and Bangkok of their security and stability in the wake of the US defeat. By doing so, the PRC hoped to prevent the two states from moving into a one-sided relationship with the USSR, in their hasty search for big power support in the new Southeast Asian situation.

In Peking's opinion, the US had been "beaten black and blue" in Indochina, and the Asian people, especially those in Southeast Asia, were increasingly successful in their efforts to drive the "wolf" — the US — from the "front gate." Nonetheless, the Chinese made plain that they were opposed to any unilateral US withdrawal from international involvement after this setback. They wanted the US to remain heavily involved abroad, and strategically vigilant against the USSR in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. They argued that the US defeats in Indochina had actually presented Washington with an "opportunity" to pull back from "secondary" areas where it had overextended itself, in order to serve more effectively as a strategic bulwark against Soviet expansion in more "vital" areas abroad. In this vein, the PRC reduced its criticism of US military presence and political influence in Asia, while giving unusually favorable play to US statements of resolve to retain strong ties with Japan and selected non-Communist Asian states, and to maintain a strong naval presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Peking viewed the USSR as a more immediate and serious threat to China's aspirations in East and Southeast Asia than it had in the early 1970s. Accordingly, the PRC adopted a more active policy against the USSR, aimed at blocking Moscow's attempts to advance along China's flanks as the US withdrew. It also launched a major

propaganda campaign to warn other Asian states of the danger posed by the ravenous "tiger" (the USSR), which lurked at the rear door as the Asian people pushed the "wolf" through the front gate. Peking, too, charged that Moscow's plan for a collective security system in Asia was actually a thinly veiled effort to achieve political "hegemony;" it was the antithesis of the "antihegemony front" fostered by China and its friends. Because of their high profile against the USSR, the Chinese viewed with increased suspicion those Asian states which maintained cordial relations with Moscow, notably Communist Vietnam.

By late 1975, Peking began to see the situation in East Asia in a more optimistic light. Although US power and influence in the region had weakened, Washington continued to be interested in sustaining an East Asian balance of power that would preclude Soviet expansion. This was underlined by President Gerald R. Ford's announcement of the Pacific Doctrine in late 1975. It was based on continuing strong US air and naval power in the region, on close US relations with Japan and other traditional allies, and on developing ties with the PRC. Significantly, it did not envision any major role for the USSR to play in the area.

Meanwhile, Peking had achieved considerable success in broadening its influence among non-Communist Southeast Asian states. Its warning against the danger of Soviet expansion was winning new adherents in Southeast Asia. At the end of 1975, the only areas in East and Southeast Asia where the USSR maintained considerable influence were Vietnam and Laos.

The PRC, however, still could not afford to be overly optimistic about the broad international trend of East-West relations. While feeling more secure in East Asia, the Chinese were alarmed in late 1975 by what they considered to be a less resolute Western posture vis-à-vis the USSR. They viewed the summit meeting in Helsinki earlier in August as evidence of a growing trend in the US and other Western nations to "appease" Moscow in order to direct the Soviet menace "eastward," away from Europe. Peking warned against "appeasement" of Soviet "expansionism" under the cover of détente. It emphasized the danger of a "new world war" which, it charged, would be started by the Soviet Union.

Chinese criticism of Western "appeasement" intensified when US Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was dismissed by President Ford. On November 7, 1975, for example, the New China News Agency (NCNA) departed from its past circumspect treatment of the US administration, and replayed in one dispatch some critical

comments made by foreign leaders on Schlesinger's dismissal. Nevertheless, it carefully refrained from attributing any of the criticisms to the agency itself. The PRC clearly regarded the incident as illustrative of the Ford administration's determination to speed up détente with the USSR, a decision which the Chinese believed was detrimental to US national security.⁶

On the same day when the NCNA reported Schlesinger's dismissal, its dispatch carried two "international reference material" articles, explaining to the Chinese people the significance of the 1938 Munich agreement and the 1940 Dunkirk evacuation. The articles focused on the disastrous results of the Munich "policy of appeasement" adopted by the British and French leaders to connive "with the aggressive acts" of the Fascists in order to "divert" the "spearhead of aggression toward the East." The implications of the Peking media were obvious. According to the Chinese, the Ford administration's dismissal of Schlesinger was an attempt to ease US-Soviet tensions, and it was comparable to Neville Chamberlain's earlier efforts to appease Hitler at Munich.

POST-MAO DEVELOPMENTS

In 1976, Chinese foreign policies were dominated by the impact of major internal leadership changes. Premier Chou En-lai, NPC Chairman Chu Teh, and CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung died in January, June, and September, respectively. Moreover, Teng Hsiao-p'ing was removed from his posts in April, and the four leftist Politburo members (known since then as the "Gang of Four") were arrested in October. Hua Kuo-feng was named to the positions of acting premier in February, premier in April, and CCP chairman in October. Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien, Politburo members who had dropped from public view along with Teng Hsiao-p'ing after Chou's death in January, received unusual prominence in Chinese media following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in October.

Apparently in reaction to these major leadership shifts, Chinese spokesmen cautioned repeatedly throughout the year that the basic orientation of PRC foreign policy would not change. And, in fact, it did not change, although there were signs that leaders in Peking disagreed among themselves on how foreign policy should be carried out. Leftist leaders headed by the "Gang of Four" tried to reverse several aspects of Chinese policy previously carried out by such

6. For an analysis of the dispatch, see FBIS, *Trends in Communist Media*, November 12, 1975.

moderate leaders as Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. These leftist leaders were particularly prominent during the massive domestic campaign against Teng in mid-1976, and they used their influence in propaganda circles to push their radical policies. They criticized Teng's advocacy of increased foreign trade, especially with the West; they adopted a harder line than the moderates on the Taiwan issue; and they were more critical of Washington.

Following the removal of the "Gang of Four," Chinese officials were preoccupied with conventional diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to protect China's security interests in world affairs, especially against the perceived threats from the Soviet Union. The PRC tried to foster an "antihegemony united front" with other developing Third World countries, as well as the US and other developed Western nations whose interests were seen as directly threatened by Soviet "hegemonism."

In its bilateral relations with the USSR, Peking worked to maintain a state of controlled hostility in order to avoid direct military confrontation with the vastly superior Soviet forces along the contested Sino-Soviet border. The PRC rebuffed Moscow's public gestures to revive the stalled border talks, and Sino-Soviet polemics continued to underline a solid impasse.

In its broader foreign policy, Peking viewed the Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in world affairs as a zero-sum game, in which a gain for Moscow was equivalent to a loss for China. Thus, the PRC befriended not only those states which had adopted a pro-Peking orientation, but also those nations which did not cooperate closely with the USSR. Moreover, the Chinese leaders supported the continued presence in East and Southeast Asia of strong US naval and air forces as an effective deterrent to the spread of Soviet military power along China's periphery. They warned that a precipitous American withdrawal could create a power vacuum which would likely be filled by the USSR.⁷

The PRC put aside its previous fears of Japanese militarism, and strongly urged Japan to strengthen its ties with the US, as well as to

7. For background information on this policy and comments by Chinese officials, see *A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 1978*, a report submitted by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978); and *China and Asia: An Analysis of China's Recent Policy Toward Neighboring States*, a report submitted by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979).

expand its defense capabilities in order to guard against the "threat from the north." At the same time, Peking supported the Indonesian government's close ties with the US and applauded Jakarta's cool response to various Soviet blandishments, although Indonesia had often been suspicious of the PRC's intentions.

The Chinese, too, were increasingly supportive of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); they wanted the organization to become an effective instrument to block Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia. In contrast, they opposed Hanoi's call for greater Southeast Asian cooperation, because they considered Hanoi a Soviet surrogate, and the Vietnamese proposal a thinly disguised effort to spread Soviet influence in the region. In South Asia, Peking had likewise been suspicious of India's proposals for regional cooperation in the early 1970s, when New Delhi was, in Peking's opinion, assisting Soviet expansion. Yet as India demonstrated greater independence vis-à-vis the USSR later in the decade, the Chinese responded more positively to New Delhi's calls for regional cooperation.

Indeed, concern over Sino-Soviet rivalry was not the sole factor governing China's foreign behavior. For example, domestic politics, Maoist ideology, Peking's territorial claims, as well as its support for overseas Chinese, for Communism in Korea, and for insurgencies in Southeast Asia, all served to complicate the PRC's policy from time to time. Most important for Washington, the Chinese demanded the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea even though they supported continued US military presence in Asia in order to offset the USSR. At the same time, although Peking wanted to develop friendly relations with Japan and the non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia, its leaders did not stop to quarrel with these governments about conflicting territorial claims; neither did they refrain from supporting insurgent movements which were directed against some of these administrations. Nonetheless, these many considerations largely remained in the background as the PRC devoted primary attention to fostering an Asian balance of influence favorable to China and unfavorable to the USSR.

NORMALIZATION WITH THE US⁸

The Chinese preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet rivalry clearly benefited the US. While China had previously been the major opponent to American involvement in world affairs, especially in Asia, Peking became one of the most vocal supporters of a strong US military, political, and economic presence. From the PRC's perspective, American interests in Asian and world affairs coincided with Chinese interests, insofar as they served to preclude the growth of Soviet influence, particularly along China's frontiers. Significantly, this support from the PRC did not cost the US much in terms of material outlays and political prestige. In fact, it allowed Washington to reduce its costly military presence in Asia without dramatically upsetting the balance of power there. Peking's positive appraisal of the US also reduced the possibility of a major Sino-American conflict in Asia; it became less likely that the Chinese would disrupt the political order and economic stability of the non-Communist Asian states for fear that turmoil would open opportunities for Soviet expansionism.

Meanwhile, Peking encouraged Washington to adopt policies with respect to Europe, the Middle East, and US-Soviet arms control, which would compel Moscow to maintain a high level of military vigilance along its western frontier and thereby reduce its pressure on China. From time to time, the PRC warned the US against trying to use cooperation with the USSR in arms control, or in Europe and the Middle East, as a means to divert the "threat" of Soviet expansionism eastward, toward China.

The normalization of US-PRC diplomatic relations, announced on December 15, 1978, was seen by Peking as strengthening its position in Asia against both the long-standing "threat" from the USSR and the recently intensified pressures from Soviet-aligned Vietnam. As in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of August 1978, Peking again emphasized its stance on "antihegemonism" in the US-PRC communiqué. On later occasions, its leaders likewise expressed strong anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese sentiments.

In the wake of Sino-American normalization, Chinese media soft-pedaled past complaints about progress in US-Soviet détente.

8. Information for this section is taken in part from Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "US-China Relations," Issue Brief 76053 (periodically updated); and "US-China-Soviet Relations," Issue Brief 79115 (periodically updated). See also Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds), *The Chinese Connection and Normalization* (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland 1980).

Presumably reassured about Washington's intentions with regard to the US-USSR-PRC triangular relationship, Chinese commentators did not view the possible conclusion of the SALT II agreement as evidence of US "appeasement." Instead, they argued that the SALT accord would not make any substantial difference in the Soviet-American arms race. This new approach suggested that Peking was less worried toward the end of 1978 about the US lowering its military guard against Moscow, and thereby allowing the USSR to put greater military pressure on China.

Over the next year, the PRC made rapid progress in its economic relations with the US as the two governments agreed on their disputed financial claims, and concluded a major trade accord granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Chinese imports to the US. Washington also pledged to provide China with two billion dollars in Export-Import Bank loans on a case-by-case basis over a five-year period. Moreover, the US began a major effort to extend to the PRC reimbursable technical assistance, and promised to provide government investment guarantees to American businesses interested in trading in China.

Similarly, bilateral strategic cooperation between the two nations also increased. A month before the announcement of normalization of their relations, the US disclosed that it had dropped its past policy of blocking West European arms sales to China. Washington had also eased its control over the export to Peking of certain types of technology which might be useful for civilian and military purposes. None of the above-mentioned economic and strategic benefits was promised to the USSR. To many American observers, the Carter administration's heretofore avowed policy of "even-handedness" in dealing with Peking and Moscow was, by late 1979, being replaced by a clear American "tilt" in favor of China.

Peking appreciated, and was indeed reassured by, this growing shift in US policy. During the Chinese incursion into Vietnam in early 1979, however, the PRC officials had shown some signs of disappointment with the less than enthusiastic American position on China's action. Their dissatisfaction with the US coincided with, and was probably related to, a Chinese initiative in early April to start talks to improve relations with the USSR. Indeed, by proposing to negotiate with the USSR without preconditions, Peking made its most serious diplomatic overture to Moscow in a decade.

Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 destroyed the atmosphere for the talks and drove the PRC and the US into an even closer strategic relationship vis-à-vis the USSR. Peking

reacted strongly to the Soviet move. Its officials charged that the invasion had posed a direct threat to China's security, marking the most serious escalation of Soviet "expansionism" in more than ten years. The PRC hoped that the US would adopt a more active approach to the Middle East-South Asian region in order to counteract the Soviet "threat." It signaled, to some observers, an even keener interests in pursuing closer strategic cooperation with Washington than in the past, an interest reflected during the PRC's discussions with US Defense Secretary Harold Brown in Peking in January 1980. Thanks to the development in Afghanistan, the Chinese became more suspicious of Soviet motives in international affairs, and this resulted in the suspension on January 20, 1980 of the Sino-Soviet talks which had begun a year earlier.

The Soviet action in Afghanistan and the resulting furor in the US undercut the arguments of those American policymakers who had favored an even-handed approach toward Moscow and Peking. China's strongly anti-Soviet reaction also weakened the contentions of many Americans who had feared that the PRC could not be trusted to maintain an anti-Soviet posture in coordination with Washington.

With the apparent demise of the former even-handed strategy, a new American approach to China and the Soviet Union emerged during Secretary Brown's visit to the PRC in January 1980. Although the full details of the visit are not yet readily available, several of its announced results clearly suggested that the US would side with China to resist Soviet expansion in Asia. According to various press accounts, the US agreed to sell a ground station to China, enabling the PRC to receive data of possible military use from American satellites. Washington also expressed its willingness to sell to Peking an array of non-lethal military equipment, which could be expanded in the future. Moreover, the two nations coordinated their strategies to support Pakistan and other unspecified efforts (perhaps including anti-Soviet Afghan forces) to thwart Soviet expansion in southwest Asia. Finally, the US informed China that it would welcome Chinese military help against Vietnam in whatever form Peking might choose, if Vietnam should cross from Cambodian territory into Thailand.

PROSPECTS

While the PRC will likely continue its current policy toward the US and the USSR in the near future, longer term prospects remain unclear. For example, Moscow's fears of Sino-American "collusion"

can build to such a point that the USSR may decide to attack China, the weakest link in the US-PRC encirclement effort, in the hope of discrediting Peking's anti-Soviet posture and of disrupting its relationship with Washington.

Furthermore, Peking's current emphasis on economic development and foreign trade can lead to serious disagreement with some Asian countries and perhaps even with the developed nations of the West. For instance, as the PRC increases its export of textiles, electronics, and other consumer goods in order to pay for the recent large increases in foreign imports, it may come into conflict with other developing countries in Asia which are also increasing their export of similar goods in order to pay their growing import bills. This problem can become particularly acute if Japan and the major developed nations of the West should decide to protect their indigenous manufacturers of consumer products by limiting the influx of such goods from overseas.

The unity of the Chinese leadership remains uncertain, and this constitutes an unpredictable element in China's foreign policy. A major political purge, similar to those which occurred during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, after the mysterious demise of Lin Biao in 1971, and following Mao Tse-tung's death in 1976, can bring about a significant reorientation in Peking's approach to foreign affairs. Chinese leaders who are less favorable toward the US and more flexible toward the USSR may gain power, and they may either treat the superpowers more even-handedly or seek a guarded rapprochement with Moscow. A reconciliation of Sino-Soviet relations will probably not serve American interests. It can enhance Soviet influence in Asia, and it may prompt the USSR to divert a large part of its armed forces along the Chinese border to Europe and the Middle East, thereby increasing pressure on the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The policies of the USSR and the US will also have an important bearing on the future Chinese policy. The Brezhnev leadership has, in recent years, apparently resigned itself to a continuing state of controlled hostility in its relations with China, and has seemingly concluded that it is impossible to reach significant compromise with Peking over the border problem and other issues. After the death of Brezhnev, however, Moscow may initiate policies which are more forthcoming toward China, and it may also begin to reduce its forces along the Chinese frontier. Since the PRC has long regarded the withdrawal of Soviet troops as the necessary first step for a settlement of the border dispute, its leaders may view such a move as

a sign of Soviet goodwill. This can provide a basis for talks leading to a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders of the post-Brezhnev era may increase their pressure on China. They may, for example, encourage the Vietnamese to resist the PRC with force or attempt to improve relations with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Such developments, if coupled with an expansion of Soviet naval and air power along China's eastern and southern frontiers, may cause Peking to react by attacking Vietnam and/or Taiwan. In accord with its recently concluded "friendship" treaty with Vietnam, Moscow may then respond with military pressure along the PRC's northern border. This can lead to a major Sino-Soviet conflict.

The Soviet leaders may also use their military forces along the northern border to occupy one of the more weakly defended frontier regions, such as sections of Sinkiang. Such a move may start a protracted war with the PRC, thus seriously discrediting the hard line anti-Soviet policy currently followed by China. It may thereby compel Peking to adopt a more accommodating stance. Any Sino-Soviet armed conflict will certainly alarm neighboring states, reduce economic development and stability in Asia, and confront the US with the difficult task of deciding whether it should support China against Soviet "hegemony" in Asia.

Similarly, any substantial shift in US foreign policy can lead to important changes in China's behavior. For instance, Washington may decide to continue to withdraw militarily from East Asia, to pull back from bases in Korea and the Philippines, and to reduce the size of both the US fleet in the western Pacific and the American forces in Japan. Such actions will almost certainly change China's evaluation of the US as a strategic counterweight to the USSR, especially if Moscow should continue its steady military buildup in Asia. In response, the Chinese may feel compelled to realign their policy toward a reconciliation with the USSR, or they may rapidly increase their air and naval power in order to "fill the vacuum" as the US pulls back, a development which will probably alarm Japan, South Korea, and other non-Communist states.

American usefulness to China may also be called into question if Washington should again adopt policies with respect to Europe, the Middle East, or US-Soviet arms control which would allow Moscow to relax its military vigilance along the western front, while substantially increasing pressure on China. The PRC may then either resist such pressure with force or seek reconciliation with the USSR.

In sum, Peking will probably be encouraged to continue the conventional policy it has generally pursued toward neighboring countries over the past decade, and this policy will likely be highly compatible with American interests in foreign affairs in the near future, while unfavorable to the USSR. Changes in Peking's policy will probably be caused either by changes in the PRC leadership (stemming from the passing of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a major setback in China's ambitious economic programs, or some other domestic difficulties), or by substantial shifts in the policies of the powerful nations in the region, especially the US and the USSR. The various scenarios explored above suggest that American interests may well suffer if the PRC significantly alters its current foreign approach. They also indicate that Sino-US bilateral relations may not serve as an important source of leverage for Washington to prevent a major change in China's foreign policy, a change which will likely be damaging to the US position in East Asia.

Chapter Three

TAIWAN: A CRUCIAL QUESTION IN UNITED STATES- CHINA RELATIONS

Robert L. Worden

The words "crucial question" were used by the Chinese in describing their position on Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué signed by Premier Chou En-lai and President Richard M. Nixon on February 28, 1972. According to this important document, the Taiwan issue "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US).¹

In announcing the impending January 1, 1979 establishment of diplomatic relations with the US, the PRC stated on December 15, 1979:

The question of Taiwan *was* the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué and through their joint efforts.²

Thus, after nearly three decades of dispute, the Taiwan question in US-China relations was finally settled. This chapter will discuss the history of the dispute primarily from the PRC's viewpoint. It will analyze the efforts of the two nations to resolve the issue, and then raise questions as to whether normalization did, in fact, solve the long-standing Taiwan problem.

THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN RETROSPECT, 1950-1971

Sovereignty over Taiwan (previously known as Formosa) has been a critical concern of various Chinese governments since at least the seventeenth century. After facing Dutch, French, and British threats, China lost the island to Japan under the Treaty of

1. "Joint Communiqué," *Peking Review* (*Beijing Review* since January 1979) (hereinafter PR), No. 9 (March 3, 1972), pp. 4-5; emphasis added by author.

2. "Statement of the Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), pp. 8-9; emphasis added by author.

Shimonoseki of 1895. Taiwan was restored to China after Japan's defeat in 1945.

The policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) toward the island had gone through several changes. In 1928, its leaders accepted Taiwan's future political autonomy, while in 1943 they allegedly supported an independence movement in the island.³ Both the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 called for the restoration of Taiwan to the Chinese after Japan's defeat in World War II. In the post-1943 years and, in particular, after the Liberation of 1949, the CCP policy shifted toward the reintegration of the island with mainland China.

The role of the US in Taiwan began at least as early as the Cairo and Potsdam accords. Its involvement intensified after 1945 as Washington sided with Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war. Nonetheless, when the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan after the founding of the PRC in October 1949, President Harry Truman decided against further involvement in China's domestic affairs. He declared, in January 1950, that the US would not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Taiwan; his administration would not, moreover, seek to establish military bases on the island "at this time." A corollary statement was issued several days later by Secretary of State Dean Acheson who delineated the first line of defense of the US in the West Pacific, a line which was drawn to the east of (and therefore excluding) Taiwan.⁴

Meanwhile, the defeated Nationalist forces consolidated their control over the island and announced that they were ready to recapture the mainland. The victorious Communist government, on the other hand, became committed to the goal of liberating Taiwan.

3. Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), LII, No. 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 447, 464.

4. "United States Policy Toward Formosa, Statement by President Truman, January 5, 1950," in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, *Remaking China Policy: US-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), Document 3, pp. 93-94. See also Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement of January 12, 1950, partially quoted in Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (2nd edition; New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 929. William M. Bueler claims that the US, even after the outbreak of the Korean War, considered its relations with the PRC to be more important than the interests of both the Nationalist government on Taiwan and the native Taiwanese. See Bueler, *US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971), p. 20.

The Korean War (1950-1953) precipitated new conditions for US involvement in the Chinese civil war and, in effect, insured the long-range maintenance of a Nationalist status quo on Taiwan. For the next twenty-nine years, the US upheld a defensive arrangement with Taipei that was anathema to Peking. Washington's recognition of Taiwan as the sole government of China, as well as the stationing of American military forces in and near the island, provided powerful constraints on any solution to US-PRC problems.

Peking considered Washington's presence in Taiwan as an aggressive violation of China's territorial integrity and an interference in its internal affairs. The US commitment to the Nationalist government, coupled with the war in Korea, prompted the PRC to reassess its plans for Taiwan's liberation. At the same time, political debates in the US over the "loss" of China led Washington to continue its generous support of Chiang Kai-shek.

The PRC increased its pressure against the Nationalist-held coastal islands after the Korean armistice in 1953. As tension mounted, Washington and Taipei moved to insure the security of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands by concluding the Mutual Defense Treaty on December 2, 1954.⁵ Ostensibly, the treaty affirmed both nations' desire for peace in the West Pacific. In practice, it aimed at preventing the PRC from using military forces against any Chinese territories, except the coastal islands, held by the Nationalists. It increased American involvement in Taiwan to a significant extent. This dramatic development could not have been anticipated in 1949 when the Taiwan-related chain of events began.

Despite the enmity between Peking and Washington over the Taiwan question, the two nations did attempt to resolve their problems. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai insisted that the PRC did not want a war with the US, and he expressed his willingness to discuss with Washington for the purpose of relaxing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and, especially, the Taiwan area.⁶ Similarly, in his report to the Second Session of the First National People's Congress (NPC) on July 20, 1955, Chou emphasized that the Chinese people "were ready to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means," maintaining that "there was no lack of precedents for peaceful liberation." He noted, however,

5. For the full text of the treaty, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz, *Remaking China Policy*, Document 5, pp. 96-99.

6. "Premier Chou En-lai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Area, April 23, 1955," Moorsteen and Abramowitz, *Remaking China Policy*, Document 7, p. 103.

that the possibility of "peaceful liberation" depended on Washington's noninterference in China's internal affairs.⁷

Indeed, prior to Chou's statements, the two nations had already started to make serious efforts to defuse the hostile situation. Beginning in 1954, bilateral talks were held in Geneva at the consular and ambassadorial levels. They served to keep the two governments in official contact while establishing their long-term negotiating positions. The US tried to ask the PRC to promise not to use force against the Nationalists, whereas Peking demanded the withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan area. After 1956, the talks were shifted to Warsaw where PRC representatives maintained a firm line. According to Peking, Taiwan was a part of China, and the US military presence on the island was undesirable; it contributed to tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the PRC did signal a certain "willingness to adopt a flexible position over fundamental Chinese national interests, including the recovery of Taiwan," cold war politics on both sides prevented any conclusive results from the talks.⁸

The Indochina War in the 1960s and 1970s, as had the Korean War before it, created additional tension which further delayed the resolution of the Taiwan question. China's concern over encirclement by its enemies became more apparent in the 1960s with alleged threats not only from the US, but also from India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The formerly bipolar world had, by the late 1960s, become sufficiently complex as to make both Washington and Peking appreciate better the need for some form of reconciliation. But the Taiwan issue remained, as always, a crucial question for the two nations.

China's preoccupation with its domestic turmoil during the activist phases of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) was greatly altered by the increasing Soviet threat. Moscow's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted Peking to start a new diplomatic initiative. Ambassadorial relations were gradually resumed with socialist countries, while overtures were made to neutral and nonaligned nations. A new balance was sought between "politics of

7. *Ibid.*, Document 8, p. 104.

8. Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), p. 47. For a detailed analysis of the talks, see pp. 47-62. For the texts of proposals and counterproposals, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz, *Remaking China Policy*, Document 9, pp. 105-109.

Maoist insurrection and conventional diplomacy," as the PRC adopted an increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign affairs.⁹

In November 1968, Peking proposed to resume the US-China Warsaw talks which had been suspended since the previous January. The PRC's continued insistence on a Taiwan settlement, however, made it politically difficult for the new Nixon administration to move propitiously toward Peking.¹⁰ It was therefore not until January 1970 that the Warsaw talks were finally resumed.

The extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, as well as the US maneuverings in the United Nations (UN) on behalf of the Republic of China (ROC), provided continued hindrances to any accord. Despite the "ping-pong" diplomacy, the relaxation of China trade barriers, and Nixon's surprise announcement that he would visit the PRC, the US maintained what Peking perceived as a "two-China" policy. The UN vote in October 1971, which resulted in the admission of the PRC into the organization, relieved a significant pressure point in US-China relations. Although Washington had opposed Taiwan's expulsion to the last hour, the seating of Peking was a necessary step toward any kind of US-PRC rapprochement.

SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ RELATIONS, 1972-1978¹¹

It took a long period (from February 28, 1972, when the Shanghai Communiqué was promulgated, to December 15, 1978, when the establishment of diplomatic relations was announced) for Washington and Peking to find a mutually satisfactory formula for normalization. While most countries breaking relations with Taipei and establishing relations with Peking had to resolve the problem from their own perspective, none, including Japan, had the same connection with Taiwan as had the US.¹² During this era of "Shanghai Communiqué relations," there were many global and bilateral developments which, eventually leading to normalization,

9. Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1971* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 7, 14.

10. For an analysis of the PRC overtures to the early Nixon administration, see Sutter, *China-Watch*, pp. 63-82.

11. This section is based partially on a paper, "A perspective on US-China Relations since the Shanghai Communiqué," presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies on March 31, 1978, and on a revision of that paper later published in *Asian Profile* (Hong Kong), VII, No. 1 (February 1979), pp. 1-16.

12. See US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Recognizing the People's Republic of China: The Experiences of Japan, Australia, France, and West Germany* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979).

confirmed the unique nature of US-China ties. The Shanghai Communiqué was an important document because it allowed the two sides to defer, somewhat ambiguously, the Taiwan issue while pursuing their strategic relations. This was a compromise not attainable in the seventeen years of Geneva and Warsaw talks.¹³

President Nixon's visit to China and the promulgation of the Shanghai Communiqué were significant first steps toward the evolution of a new US-PRC relationship. Many American officials and observers of the Chinese scene argued that friendly relations between the two nations could be developed and maintained without achieving normalization. Indeed, public opinion polls in the US in 1972-1978 favored a "two-China" policy, improving relations with Peking without "abandoning" Taipei. The leadership on both sides of the Pacific, however, persistently pressed forward on the issue of normalization.

The years of 1972-1973, representing the early stage of the era of "Shanghai Communiqué relations," were marked by such events as the Nixon and Kissinger visits to China, the end of US military involvement in Vietnam, the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, and the establishment of liaison offices in Peking and Washington. These years witnessed real progress in the normalization process and were characterized by an initial enthusiasm in both nations. Many American delegations and individuals visited China, while reciprocal visits to the US by PRC officials were restrained owing to the presence of ROC representatives in Washington and other American cities.

Chinese leadership and media hailed the new friendly contacts although differences in principle continued to exist between the two nations.¹⁴ The deferment of the Taiwan question was emphasized in November 1972 when Chou En-lai conceded that Taiwan was not the foremost issue in US-China relations; he named Indochina as the "key area" of difference.¹⁵ Thus, after Washington signed the

13. For the complete text, see "Joint Communiqué," PR, No. 9 (March 3, 1972), pp. 4-5.

14. See, for example, "Strive for New Victories," the National Day joint editorial in *Jen-min jih-pao* (hereinafter JMJP), *Hung-ch'i* [Red Flag], and *Chief-fang chun pao* [Liberation Army Daily], October 1, 1972, as translated in PR, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), p. 9; and Ch'iao Kuan-hua's October 1972 speech to the UN General Assembly, English text in PR, No. 41 (October 13, 1972), p. 4.

15. Interview with Australian journalists, Vienna Domestic Service, November 7, 1972, as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, People's Republic of China* (hereinafter FBIS-CHI), November 10, 1972, p. All.

"Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" on January 27, 1973, further progress was made in normalizing US-PRC relations. Peking commended the peace in Vietnam for having "a positive influence on reducing tension in Asia and the world."¹⁶ Shortly afterward, the process of normalization accelerated and an agreement was reached to establish liaison offices in Peking and Washington. Significantly, Taiwan was not mentioned in this agreement.¹⁷

In 1973, China commemorated the February 28 Taiwan Uprising of 1947. At a meeting in the Taiwan Hall of Peking's Great Hall of the People, speakers stressed that it was the "common desire and sacred duty" of the Chinese people, "including Taiwan compatriots," to liberate the island and unify China. For example, Liao Ch'eng-chih, an official responsible for Taiwan affairs in the PRC, claimed that "the domestic and international situations are now . . . very favorable to the . . . struggle to liberate Taiwan." He cited the Shanghai Communiqué and the talks between leaders of the US and China as some of the "important victories" in foreign affairs, which improved the situation for Taiwan's liberation. Fu Tso-yi, NPC vice chairman and former Nationalist military leader, charged that "by erroneously relying on the US, my former colleagues in Taiwan have delayed the unification of the motherland for more than twenty years." He also quoted the Shanghai Communiqué, arguing that Washington had indeed "recognized" Taiwan as a part of China's territory. According to Fu, Henry A. Kissinger had indicated during his February 1973 visit that the US favored "the peaceful resolution of the disagreements between the mainland and Taiwan." Fu interpreted this as a sign that Washington would no longer defend Taiwan. As he argued, since the US had committed itself to peace in the Asia-Pacific region, it would be "impossible" for Washington to damage its process of normalizing relations with the PRC by maintaining its existing ties with Taiwan for an extensive period of time. Fu believed that the US valued its peaceful coexistence with China more than its relations with the Nationalists. In an acknowledgment of Taipei's "Soviet card," Fu warned that the US would not "allow Taiwan to 'cooperate' with anyone else to disrupt peace in

16. "Welcome the Signing of the Agreement on Vietnam," JMJP editorial, January 28, 1973, English text in PR, No. 5 (February 2, 1973), pp. 6-7.

17. "Communiqué, February 22, 1973," PR, No. 8 (February 23, 1973), p. 4.

the Asia and Pacific region." He offered to meet either formally or secretly with the Nationalist authorities for reunification talks.¹⁸

In the speeches made later by Chou En-lai at the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973 and by Ch'iao Kuan-hua at the UN General Assembly in October, they did not mention the Taiwan issue, although Chou did imply that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was ready to liberate the island. Nonetheless, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing told a visiting Japanese delegation in October that the settlement of the Taiwan question was a prerequisite for the normalization of US-PRC relations.¹⁹ This was his first public statement on the subject, and he gradually emerged as China's principal actor in the Washington-Peking negotiations.

In November 1973, Kissinger made a high-key visit to Peking which belied the intensity of the debate among Chinese leaders over Taiwan and US policies. The November communiqué, unlike the one signed during Kissinger's February visit, made specific reference to Taiwan. As Washington reaffirmed, "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China;" the US also reiterated its intention not to challenge this position. The Chinese again insisted that relations with Washington could only be normalized in accordance with "the principle of one China."²⁰

The year 1974 was a difficult one in US-PRC relations. Disagreements in Peking over Taiwan and US policies came to the fore. The annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising displayed a more militant tone than in 1973. Fu Tso-yi, for instance, called for the liberation of Taiwan "at an early date," emphasizing that the "choice of means" (by peaceful methods or by force) was China's internal affair. He warned the Nationalist military personnel that the Taiwan Strait was "no longer an obstacle" to the liberation process.²¹

In April, Chiang Ch'ing's "Chu Lan" writing group issued a scathing criticism of the "bourgeois" music that the Philadelphia Orchestra had played in Peking eight months earlier. In the same

18. "February 28' Uprising in Taiwan Province Marked," PR, No. 10 (March 9, 1973), pp. 10-11, 21.

19. Quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 16, 1973, p. A.15.

20. "Secretary of State Kissinger in Peking," PR, No. 46 (November 16, 1973), pp. 6-7; and "Communiqué," PR, No. 46, p. 10.

21. "Peking Meeting Commemorates 27th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising in Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 8, 1974), pp. 18-20.

month, Teng Hsiao-p'ing appeared at the UN Special Session on Raw Materials and Development. He announced Peking's new foreign policy on the "three worlds," with explicit attacks on the two superpowers.²²

Other setbacks in the normalization process included Chou En-lai's hospitalization with a terminal illness and Richard Nixon's resignation from the US presidency. To provide additional ammunition to those in Peking who were opposed to the US-China initiative, Washington appointed a new ambassador to Taipei. It also allowed two new ROC consulates to open in the US, thus bringing to a total of five such openings since the promulgation of the Shanghai Communiqué

In October 1974, Teng attracted attention on the Taiwan issue during a reception for overseas Chinese, including some overseas Taiwanese. He stated that the US recognition of the island as an inseparable part of PRC territory had been a prerequisite for the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué and the exchange of liaison offices. He expressed his hope for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, but he insisted that such a settlement was not feasible while Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Ching-kuo, remained in power; a "non-peaceful" method should not, therefore, be excluded from consideration. He called for further "development of patriotic forces" in Taiwan, since they could play an important role in the island's liberation. He compared the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands issue in Japan-China relations with the Taiwan issue in US-PRC rapprochement. In 1972, Peking had put aside the differences on the Tiaoyu Islands when diplomatic relations were established with Tokyo.²³ Teng's implication on the subject of Taiwan was subtle but apparent.

A late 1974 visit to China by Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield shed new light on the state of US-PRC relations. After meeting with Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua, he returned to Washington to write a glowing tribute to Mao Tse-tung's China. Nevertheless, he also noted that US-China relations had reached a "plateau," with the Taiwan issue blocking further progress toward normalization. According to Mansfield, in order for the US to follow the "Japanese formula" in its relations with the PRC

22. "Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of China Teng Hsiao-p'ing's Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly," Supplement to PR, No. 15 (April 12, 1974).

23. *Ch'i-shih nien-t'ai* [The Seventies] (Hong Kong), December 1974, pp. 15-17, as translated in FBIS-CHI, December 10, 1974, p. E1-7.

and Taiwan, Washington would have to fulfill Peking's "three preconditions" by terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, withdrawing all US troops from the island, and severing diplomatic relations with the ROC.²⁴

In this report to the Fourth NPC in January 1975, Chou noted the continuation of "fundamental differences" between China and the US, and he emphasized the need to carry out "in earnest" the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué. In his brief comments on Taiwan, he reiterated the PRC's determination to liberate the island, and he maintained that Peking was militarily ready for this endeavor.²⁵

When the commemorative meeting of the February 28 Uprising was held in 1975, Fu Tso-yi had died. Liao Ch'eng-chih became the keynote speaker, and he hailed the "revolutionary spirit" of the Taiwanese people.²⁶ For the first time, a significant number of military leaders were present in the meeting. Among the notable examples were Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and Yang Ch'eng-wu.

There were relatively minor problems in the US-China-ROC relations. Peking was angered, for example, when the Department of State cancelled the scheduled Chinese Performing Arts Troupe tour of the US. Washington had objected to the inclusion of the song, "People of Taiwan, Our Own Brothers," in the program, yet China argued that the US position was unwarranted and in contravention of the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. As the PRC pointed out, both nations had agreed that the Taiwan question was an internal

24. For the "three preconditions," see Mike Mansfield, *China: A Quarter Century After the Founding of the People's Republic* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 23. These "preconditions" can be dated back at least to 1955 when they were stated in the following form: withdrawal of all US troops and bases from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and; the establishment of a relationship based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In Peking's viewpoint, US respect for the principles of territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs implied that Washington recognized Taiwan as a part of the PRC, thus precluding any possible US diplomatic or defense ties with Taipei. See Seymour Topping's interview with Chou En-lai, June 21, 1971, in Topping, *Journey Between Two Chinas* (New York: Harper &

25. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," in *Documents of the First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 58.

26. "28th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 7, 1975), pp. 14-17.

affair in which no foreign country had the right to interfere. Washington was accused of "retreating" from its commitment to the Shanghai Communiqué, as well as violating its principles.²⁷

The year 1975 drew to a close with a spectacular show of American visitors to Peking. A "World Affairs" delegation was headed by Cyrus Vance, chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, who would later become secretary of state in the Carter administration. He met with Teng Hsiao-p'ing on October 11, 1975, and they debated about China's US policy. The delegation also raised the issue of the song about Taiwan. Teng expressed the hope that American behavior in the incident did not reflect a "retreat" from the normalization process.²⁸

Before the year's end, Henry Kissinger made two visits to China, the latter one with President Gerald Ford. The Chinese were obviously unhappy with Ford's reluctance to act on the Taiwan issue before the 1976 election. Ford had found it politically difficult to break with the Nationalists in the same year as the collapse of US-supported regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As a result, no communiqué was issued at the end of the negotiations, and no significant progress was made.²⁹

China's displeasure with the Ford administration was emphasized in a well-publicized reception by Mao Tse-tung of Julie Nixon Eisenhower on New Year's Eve. To demonstrate his appreciation for Richard Nixon's initiative toward normalizing relations with the PRC, Mao invited the former president to visit China again. This action had considerable effect on American politics in an election year. At one point, Ford feared that this might cost him his victory in an early primary race.

In general, 1976 constituted a vacuum in US-China relations. The deaths of Chou En-lai in January, Chu Teh in July, and Mao Tse-tung in September were accompanied by the second dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April, the ascendancy of Hua Kuo-Feng in the same month, and the political demise of the so-called "Gang of Four" in October. These tumultuous events provided too many uncertainties for any progress to be made in the faltering normalization process.

27. "US Unreasonably Cancels Chinese Performing Arts Troupe's Tour," PR, No. 15 (April 11, 1975), pp. 10, 21. The song about Taiwan was not part of its repertoire when the PRC troupe toured the US in 1978.

28. John H. Knowles, *China Diary* (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1976), pp. 78-79.

29. Sutter, *China-Watch*, p. 112.

Visits to China by ex-President Nixon and ex-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger were played up for their pro-Shanghai Communiqué and anti-Soviet symbolisms.

The Taiwan factor in this chaotic year was high-lighted on at least two occasions. At the commemorative meeting of the February 28 Uprising, Liao Ch'eng-chih stressed the "contradictions" among the Taiwan authorities and the general "state of unrest" in the island. Although Peking claimed to continue its liberation policy, the meeting clearly emphasized, instead, the importance of the Taiwan people to liberate themselves. Moreover, despite the presence of such PLA leaders as Ch'en Hsi-lien and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, military participation in this meeting was much more subdued than in 1975.³⁰

In an alleged August 24 speech to graduates of the Institute of Diplomacy in Peking, Keng Piao, director of the CCP International Liaison Department, contradicted earlier PRC statements on US-Taiwan policy. He reportedly insisted that the US had not yet accepted the principle of "one China" as a major premise for normalization. Although he believed that Taiwan was still the "greatest obstacle" to US-PRC relations, he conceded, in an allusion to the Soviet threat, that it was not the most important issue of mutual concern.³¹

The year 1977 saw a resurgence of normalization activity. Peking's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that post-Mao China's openings to the US were "important strategic policy decisions," and it cited the Shanghai Communiqué as the basis for all future relations. It argued, however, that Washington was still "forcibly occupying Taiwan," thereby creating a continually abnormal situation.³² On a later occasion, a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the hope that the new Carter administration would respect the Shanghai Communiqué and fulfill the "three preconditions" for normalization.³³

30. "29th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 5, 1976), pp. 12-13.

31. "Keng Piao's Talks on 'A Turning Point in China-US Diplomatic Relations' (Excerpts)," *Chinese Law & Government*, X, No. 1 (Spring 1977). The original source was identified as *Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao* [Bandit Affairs Monthly] (Taipei), XIX, No. 7 (January 1977), pp. 105-106.

32. "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs," PR, No. 5 (January 28, 1977), pp. 11-12.

33. See the interview which Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan had with the managing editor of *Mainichi shimbun* on February 5, 1977, as reported by Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong, February 6, 1977; quoted in FBIS-CHI, February 7, 1977, p. All.

The thirtieth anniversary of the February 28 Uprising brought forth a number of anti-US criticisms. Liao Ch'eng-chih, for instance, condemned the formulas of "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," and the "independence on Taiwan." The 1976 theme of self-liberation continued; many expressed the attitude of "let bygones be bygones" toward those Taiwan residents "wishing to take the patriotic road."³⁴

According to interviews with key Chinese leaders before the arrival in Peking of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the PRC insisted that Taiwan was a "remaining question" in US-China relations. Vice Premier Chi Teng-k'uei dismissed Washington's desire for a "peaceful solution" as an interference in China's internal affairs, and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan charged that Taiwan was a stumbling block to normalization.³⁵ The pressure on Washington increased in July 1977, when Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien told former US Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt that the "three preconditions" could not be dispensed with in the US-PRC negotiations for normalization.³⁶ This was the first time that the Chinese press attributed to a specific PRC leader the demand for the fulfillment of the "three preconditions," and it was indicative of Peking's determination to exert its will. Li later argued that the US had already accepted in the Shanghai Communiqué the "one China" concept; in spite of this, however, Taiwan continued to be the "focus of our differences."³⁷

Shortly before Vance's visit to China in late August, Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua expressed his dissatisfaction with

34. "Peking Marks 30th Anniversary of 'February 28' Uprising by People of Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 4, 1977), pp. 4-6. Another article in the same issue expressed similar sentiments on the subject of self-liberation. See "Preparing for the Liberation of Taiwan," pp. 7-8.

35. See Chi Teng-k'uei's interview on May 15, 1977, with a *Yomiuri* delegation, as reported in *Ta-kung pao* [L'impartial] (Hong Kong), May 17, 1977, p. 1; quoted in FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1977, p. N1. Chi also demanded, in a meeting with a delegation of the US Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC in mid-June, that the US carry out the "three preconditions." See Fox Butterfield, "China Rebuffs US Aid to Widen Scholarly and Scientific Visits," *New York Times*, June 29, 1977, p. A6. For Yu Chan's interview with Swedish military commentator Stig Lofgren in early June, see *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), August 12, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August 25, 1977, p. A2.

36. "Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Sino-American Relations," PR, No. 29 (July 15, 1977), p. 3.

37. *Svenska Dagbladet*, August 14, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August 18, 1977, p. E1-5. The interview took place on July 25 with *Gnistan* editor Stefan Lindgren.

Washington's normalization efforts, and he stated that he did not expect any meaningful progress toward that end in the next one or two years. He suggested that the major problem between the two nations was not the Taiwan issue, but rather the US attitude toward the USSR.³⁸ Nevertheless, in his report to the Eleventh CCP Congress, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng stressed the importance of the "three preconditions," and he expressed the PRC's determination to liberate Taiwan. He argued that this was an internal affair in which China would not tolerate any US interference.³⁹

The Vance visit reaffirmed the status of the "Shanghai Communiqué relations." Washington's optimism, however, was dispelled in early September when Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had been reinstated in July, told Associated Press and Japanese Diet delegations that the visit had actually been a retrogression. According to him, Gerald Ford had promised to break diplomatic relations with Taipei if he would be reelected. Moreover, Teng revealed that he had earlier rejected Washington's proposal to establish a US liaison office in Taipei, while sending a full diplomatic mission to Peking. He condemned this suggestion as an attempt to play "two cards," with the PRC against Taiwan.⁴⁰ Yet, he was clearly willing to compromise. As he had told Vance in their talks, although Taiwan was an internal issue, the PRC would consider the special conditions on the island and try to solve the problem with the US.

Peking's displeasure with President Carter's seeming weakness vis-à-vis the USSR continued to be tied to the normalization issue. In October, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan told the editors of *Wall Street Journal* and *Asian Wall Street Journal* that the Soviet threat was more important to China than the Taiwan question, although he insisted that the PRC would not compromise its basic stand on the island.⁴¹ In the same month, Teng asked all countries, including the US, to unit against Moscow.⁴² Shortly afterward, a

38. See report of Huang Hua's speech to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in late July, Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong, October 17, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 18, 1977, p. A1.

39. Hua Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977," PR, No. 35 (August 26, 1977), p. 42.

40. Louis Boccardi, "Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties," *New York Times*, September 7, 1977, pp. A1, A2.

41. Warren H. Phillips, "Peking's Posture," *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), October 20, 1977, pp. 1, 6.

42. Interview by Claude Roussel, chairman and managing director of Agence France-Presse, October 20, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 21, 1977, pp. A1-4.

lengthy *Jen-min jih-pao* [People's Daily] (JMJP) article likewise called for the creation of a broad united front. It quoted Mao Tse-tung's 1970 statement that he had placed "great hopes" on the American people. Interestingly, the article compared the US "invasion and occupation" of Taiwan with the Soviet occupation of China's northeastern and northwestern borderland; both threatened the PRC's territorial integrity and national security.⁴³

The year 1978 started with several positive moves toward normalization. Senators Edward Kennedy and Henry Jackson, both in favor of the process, visited China in January and February, respectively. They met with Teng, Huang Hua, and other Chinese leaders.

At the Fifth NPC, which began in February, Premier Hua Kuo-feng emphasized his government's resolute opposition to the concept of "two Chinas." He declared that the PRC had placed its hopes on the people of Taiwan who struggled against Chiang Ching-kuo. He remained firm, however, on China's right to use force to support Taiwan's liberation. The new PRC constitution echoed the general policies on national reunification.⁴⁴

Peking used the annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising as a forum to delineate further what the CCP leaders perceived as the instability of the Nationalist authorities and to hail the "glorious revolutionary tradition" of the compatriots on the island. The PRC encouraged military and administrative personnel in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu to "take the patriotic road," while urging the US to accept the "three preconditions" and to give up any "two China" illusions.⁴⁵

In May, President Carter's anti-Soviet national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited China. Both governments agreed on the strategic aspects of the US-China relationship, but neither brought up the Taiwan issue in subsequent public statements. The way was apparently cleared for final normalization talks. Privately, Brzezinski told Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing that Leonard Woodcock,

43. "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," PR, No. 45 (November 4, 1977), pp. 10-41.

44. Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern Powerful Socialist Country! Report on the Work of the Government, February 26, 1978," PR, No. 10 (March 10, 1978), p. 35; and "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, March 5, 1978," PR, No. 11 (March 17, 1978), p. 6.

45. "CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] Meeting Marks 31st Anniversary of Taiwan Uprising," New China News Agency (hereinafter NCNA), Peking, February 28, 1978, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1978, pp. D9-15.

who headed the US liaison Office, was prepared to begin "serious negotiations" on the process of normalization. He also assured that the Carter administration would not object to the antihegemony clause in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was about to be concluded by the PRC and Japan.⁴⁶

NORMALIZATION AND THE FUTURE

The final normalization talks were highly secretive, with their share of reversals. The determination of Jimmy Carter and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to accomplish the task with a specific deadline in mind kept the momentum going. The Chinese insisted on their "three preconditions," while the US offered three "preconditions" of its own: (1) continuation of commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan; (2) a statement on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question; and (3) the right to sell arms to the Nationalists after the completion of the normalization process.

In late October, according to Teng, normalization negotiations were in progress, and the Taiwan issue remained the "only hindrance."⁴⁷ The Chinese urged that Washington should not allow its desire to maintain good relations with Moscow to be an impediment to US-China relations.

On December 15, 1978, China and the US simultaneously announced their decision to normalize relations on January 1, 1979. In a joint communiqué, the two nations reaffirmed the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, including the antihegemony clause, and they stressed that normalization not only served the interests of the Chinese and American peoples, but was also conducive to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The Taiwan question was addressed in two separate parts of the communiqué. Washington noted its recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and stated that "within this context, the people of the US will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." Washington also acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."⁴⁸

46. "Dr. Brzezinski in Peking," PR, No. 21 (May 26, 1978), pp.4-6; and Martin Tolchin, "How China and the US Toppled Barrier to Normalized Relations," *New York Times*, December 18, 1978, pp. A1, A12.

47. "Vice Premier Teng at Tokyo Press Conference: New Upsurge in Friendly Relations Between China and Japan," PR, No. 44 (November 3, 1978), pp. 14-15.

48. "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between PRC and USA," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), p. 8.

The communiqué did not explicitly address any of the Chinese "preconditions," although they were implicitly conceded in the US recognition of the PRC and its acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan. The document also accepted the US "precondition" of continuing cultural, commercial, and other "unofficial relations" with Taiwan. Despite a unilateral declaration in President Carter's announcement, many American critics regarded the want of a clause in the joint communiqué on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue as a major mistake on the part of Washington.

The two governments attempted to clarify the nature of their new relationship. Carter announced that the US would continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and he maintained that normalization would not jeopardize the wellbeing of the island. Simultaneously, the Department of State declared that the US would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan a year later in accordance with Article 10 and would withdraw its remaining military personnel in four months. Washington would henceforth have no "official government representation" in Taiwan; neither would it have "diplomatic relations with" the Nationalist government. The US would, however, adjust its laws and regulations in order to maintain its commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships with the people of the island.⁴⁹ Moreover, despite Peking's opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan, Washington announced its decision to continue to supply "carefully chosen defensive military equipment" to Taiwan after the termination of the defense treaty on December 31, 1979.⁵⁰

On the other hand, the PRC noted in an official statement that the "crucial issue" of Taiwan had been resolved between China and the US. "As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and unifying the country," Peking insisted, "it is entirely China's internal affair." Apparently, Washington had been able to persuade the PRC to drop the term "liberation" from its rhetoric in favor of a less aggressive phrase.⁵¹

In an unprecedented press conference, Hua Kuo-feng provided further clues to Peking's Taiwan policy in the post-normalization era. He reiterated the PRC stand that Taiwan was a part of Chinese territory, stressed the theme of reunification, and acknowledged that

49. "Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," *Department of State News Release*, December 15, 1978.

50. "US Arms Sales to Taiwan," *GIST: Department of State*, January 1979.

51. "Statement of Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), pp. 8-9.

the US would only be allowed under the new diplomatic arrangement to have unofficial relations with the people of the island. Hua also revealed that the two nations had disagreed over the US decision to continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization; according to Peking, such sales would "not conform to the principles of normalization, would be detrimental to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and would exercise an unfavorable influence on the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region." Hua maintained that the PRC "absolutely would not agree" to the sales.⁵²

During the first year or so after normalization, both the US and the PRC were determined to have their own way on the Taiwan question, even though the issue had been declared "resolved" in their public statements. Chinese leaders announced that the return of Taiwan was "now on the agenda," and they hoped that the task would be accomplished "at an early date."⁵³ This was a somewhat surprising statement, since the island's reunification with the mainland had been a general policy of the PRC since 1949. The NPC maintained that Peking would "take present realities" into account during the process of political reunification. The PRC would, for example, respect the status quo in Taiwan, achieve reunification without loss to the people of the island, establish transportation and postal services between Taiwan and the mainland at an early date, and develop trade relations. The NPC also applauded the Nationalist authorities for their "firm stand" on the concept of "one China," as well as for their opposition to an independent Taiwan.⁵⁴ As a gesture toward the US and as an affirmation of the belief that normalization had lessened tensions in the area, the defense minister of the PRC ordered the termination of the shelling of the offshore islands.⁵⁵ In

52. "Chairman Hua Gives Press Conference," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), pp. 9-11. For the full texts of Carter's announcement and the US government statement, see pp. 11-12.

53. "An Unusual New Year's Day: Three Salient Points," PR, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), p. 4, quoting a speech by Teng as chairman of the CPPCC; and "NPC Standing Committee: Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," pp. 16-17.

54. "NPC Standing Committee," pp. 16-17; and NCNA (Peking), February 28, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1979, p. C1.

55. "Shelling of Jinmen [Quemoy] and Other Islands Stopped," PR, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), p. 4. See also Ralph N. Clough, "The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Relations," in William J. Barns (ed.), *China and America: The Search for a New Relationship* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), with regard to the need for the PRC to induce and pressure the US, Japan, and Taiwan in order to bring Taiwan back under mainland control. According to Clough, such inducements and pressures were necessary because Peking was afraid of both an independent Taiwan and Soviet support of the Nationalists on the island (p. 157).

domestic politics in Peking, the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang and the Taiwan Self-Government League gained new prominence in 1979 and 1980.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the US in January and February 1979 marked the real beginning of the normalization period, with both governments emphasizing their mutual concern for global affairs. In the Teng-Carter joint communiqué of February 1, the two leaders noted their areas of "common interest" and "differing perspectives" in the international situation, and they made no mention of Taiwan.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, in an interview with four American television network commentators, Teng stated that his government would "try our very best by peaceful means" to bring about a reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. While recognizing the US determination to resist any PRC use of force against Taiwan, Teng insisted that non-peaceful actions would result only if the Nationalist authorities should refuse to negotiate with Peking for a peaceful reunification.⁵⁷ He rejected any suggestion that China should renounce its right to use force. He must have reiterated these points in his private talks with US officials, although there was no reference to Taiwan in the joint communiqué

In March 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which formalized the US stand, as enunciated by the Department of State in mid-December 1978, that Taiwan's future should be determined by peaceful means. This new act further declared that a threat to the island would be considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific; it would also be of "grave concern" to the US. In an appropriate application of the "Japanese formula," the act, too, provided for the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan, which would henceforth be responsible for the "non-government" affairs of the American people on the island. Taipei created the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to serve similar purposes for its people in the US.

The PRC regarded the act as interference in its internal affairs, and it was particularly piqued by the provision that Washington

56. "Joint Sino-US Press Communiqué," NCNA (Peking), February 1, 1979, as reported in FBIS-CHI, February 2, 1979, pp. A3-4. As Ralph Clough argues, even after normalization, there would be "little room to expect that this act would lead to the early peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." See Clough, "Taiwan Issue," p. 150; and his book, *Island China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 202ff.

57. "In Washington: Interview with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiao-p'ing] by US TV Commentators," PR, No. 7 (February 16, 1979), pp. 19-20.

would continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan despite the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.⁵⁸ Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua informed US Ambassador Leonard Woodcock that Carter's support of the Congress on this issue would cause "great harm" to the new relationship between Peking and Washington. The Chinese media likewise charged that the act was "tantamount to saying the US will continue to regard Taiwan as a 'country' and the Taiwan authorities as a 'government.'" ⁵⁹

Chinese criticism of the act, however, diminished after the initial flurry. Peking's attention was somewhat diverted by two Taiwan-related court cases in the US. The first involved a suit filed to allow Taiwan's athletes to participate in the US 1980 Olympic Games, using the ROC flag and anthem. In Peking's opinion, a decision in Taipei's favor would result in a "serious political problem," but, as it turned out, the athletes were barred from the games. The second case, which went as far as the US Supreme Court, involved President Carter's authority to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. In spite of reversals in lower courts, the Supreme Court ruled in mid-December 1979 that the President had the authority to terminate the treaty on December 31, 1979.

Vice President Walter Mondale's visit to China in August 1979 evoked expressions of satisfaction with the progress in US-PRC relations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing continued to be disturbed by Washington's Taiwan policies and demanded that the US act in strict accordance with the principles of the bilateral agreement on establishing diplomatic relations. In an apparent return to the pre-normalization line, Li Hsien-nien later told an American interviewer that complete agreement on the Taiwan question had not yet been reached.⁶⁰

When Peking announced its long-range goals for the 1980s as the new decade began, they included the following three major points: (1) opposition to the Soviet Union; (2) modernization in China; and (3) reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Although there is

58. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Hungdah Chiu (ed.), *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), Document 35, pp. 266-75. Vice Minister of National Defense Su Yu called the act a "breach of trust" on the part of the US; see his interview with Japanese defense instructors, March 13, 1980, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, March 14, 1980, p. D2.

59. NCNA (Peking), March 23, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 26, 1979, pp. K1-2.

60. Interview with *New York Times* managing editor, Seymour Topping, cited by NCNA (Peking), September 27, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, October 5, 1979, p. B5.

sufficient support in Mao Tse-tung's teachings to postpone the solution of the Taiwan problem for some years, there are limits to Peking's flexibility on the issue.⁶¹

As more conciliatory policies gained influence in the PRC, the annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising was not held in 1980. Peking was perhaps afraid that such an uprising in the future might lead to an independent Taiwan, thereby creating problems for political reunification. Though seldom publicly expressed, the CCP leaders have also entertained the concern of possible Soviet involvement in the island. Such situations will likely drive Peking to act cautiously to protect its short-term interests. The PRC will tolerate the continued US presence in Taiwan, as long as it does not contribute to either independence or Soviet involvement, and as long as the Washington-Peking strategic relationship will remain beneficial to China.

Peking has vital interests in the stability of Taiwan's economy because of its future potential benefit to China after some form of reunification has taken place. The US influence on the island's stability and its resolve to take a firm stand against the Soviet Union's strategic maneuverings are both sensitive factors in Peking's policy toward Washington. The latter is the more critical issue in post-normalization US-China relations. Should the US resolve against Soviet threats weaken, the Washington-Peking entente will be affected, and the PRC will probably readjust its timetable for action on Taiwan reunification. Conversely, should the US remain an influential force both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan's status quo will likely be maintained in the near future. Hence, the "crucial question" of Taiwan remains to be settled, and it will continue to affect the relations between Washington and Peking in the coming years.

61. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in Chiu (ed.), *China and the Taiwan Issue*, pp. 192-93. For discussions of post-normalization US-Taiwan relations and Taiwan's international status after normalization, see *ibid.*, pp. 186-88; and Chiu's articles, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China," in *Journal of International Law*, II, No. 2 (spring 1979), pp. 404-16; and "The Outlook for Taiwan," *Asian Affairs*, VII, No. 3 (January-February 1980), pp. 137-48; as well as William R. Kinter and John F. Copper, *A Matter of Two Chinas: The China-Taiwan Issue in US Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979).

Chapter Four

UNIFICATION AND MODERNIZATION: TWO DIMENSIONS OF CHINA'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY

Byron S. J. Weng

In a speech to the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on January 1, 1979, Teng Hsiao-p'ing claimed that the New Year's Day of 1979 was unique, since it was marked by the following three salient points: (1) the focusing of the nation's work on the "Four Modernizations;" (2) the normalization of relations between China and the United States (US) and; (3) the presence on the agenda of the return of Taiwan to the motherland and the reunification of the country.¹ On the same day, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NCP) issued a "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," launching a new "soft offensive." It called for an end to military confrontation on the Taiwan Strait, the establishment of links in transportation and postal services, the development of economic ties and trade relations, and the initiation of academic, cultural, technological, and sports exchanges.² Thereafter, in a series of overtures, Peking moderated its conditions for reunification negotiations with Taipei. Apparently, Taiwan could maintain its status quo if it would only abandon its official name, lower its flag, and recognize Peking as the national capital.

Taipei's official response was negative. Premier Sun Yun-suan maintained that the Republic of China (ROC) would never engage in

1. See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, January-March 1979," *China Quarterly* (hereinafter CQ), No. 78 (June 1979), pp. 400-403; *Beijing Review* (known as *Peking Review* until December 1978) (hereinafter PR), XXII, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), p. 4.

2. This message appeared in *Jen-min jih-pao* [People's Daily] (hereinafter JMJP), on New Year's Day under the leading headline on the front page. For the English text, see PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 16-17.

a negotiation to surrender. Instead, he challenged the Peking government to give up Communism.³

On the New Year's Day of 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke again to the same CPPCC group, this time on China's three major tasks for the 1980s. His speech was expanded and repeated on January 16 to a gathering of more than 10,000 cadres of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Great Hall in Peking. He identified the tasks as opposing hegemonism and maintaining world peace in international affairs; working for Taiwan's return to the mainland and realizing national unification; and accelerating the construction of the "Four Modernizations."⁴

Peking's new conciliatory Taiwan policy raises a number of questions that cannot be easily answered. Teng's three tasks for the 1980s are essentially the same as the three silent points of 1979, except that antihegemonism has replaced normalization of relations with the US as the focal point in international affairs. In both cases, modernization is China's principal concern. In January 1979, a press editorial likewise described this concern as "the central task" of the CCP.⁵ As Teng affirmed in 1980, the core of Peking's three major tasks was modernization; this was the key to solving China's domestic and international problems.

According to Teng, "a scholar of Chinese descent" expressed to him strong reservations about emulating Taiwan in Peking's drive toward modernization, because the island's economy "is actually under American control." Yet, the task of national reunification seems closely related to that of modernization. As Teng conceded, "unification with Taiwan cannot be accomplished unless our political and economic systems, as well as our economic development, are superior to Taiwan's to a certain extent." Nonetheless, economic development on the island is so far ahead of the People's Republic of China (PRC) that it is doubtful whether Peking can catch up with Taipei by the end of the twentieth century. Teng himself dared only hope that China's per capita GNP would by then have increased to US \$1,000, a figure already exceeded by Taiwan in 1977 (Table I).

3. *Central Daily News* (International Edition), November 7, 1979, p. 1.

4. The full text appears in *Cheng-ming* [To Compete in Expression] (Hong Kong), No. 29 (March 1980), pp. 11-23.

5. "Historical Shift: All-Out Effort for Modernization," PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 7-8.

How can national reunification be accomplished in the 1980s under these circumstances? Is Teng serious about this political objective?⁶ Indeed, do the Peking leaders have an accurate and up-to-date understanding of Taiwan and its people? Is the advice of Teng's "scholar of Chinese descent" regarding Taiwan a wise one? Should the PRC dismiss Taiwan's modernization experience so cavalierly without examining the facts? This chapter attempts to answer some of these questions, while explaining the meaning of Peking's new Taiwan policy and exploring the island's potential contributions to China's modernization efforts.

THE PRC'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY

The new Taiwan policy launched on the New Year's Day of 1979 had apparently been planned and approved at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee and related working meetings of the CCP leadership during December 1978. Indeed, during the latter half of the month, Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ambassador Fu Hao in Tokyo, and other officials had clearly indicated that a new policy on Taiwan was evolving.⁷

The tone of this new policy is conciliatory, and the terms for reunification seem, at first glance, to be almost too generous. PRC officials now speak of "the return of Taiwan to the motherland," and the term used in the 1978 constitution, "liberation" of the island, has been dropped. The government in Taipei is, at present, referred to as "the Taiwan authorities," instead of the "Chiang gang" or "Chiang clique."

More important, instead of calling for the overthrow of the Taiwan government as it had done before 1976, the PRC now offers to

6. Lu K'eng is a noted Hong Kong journalist with high-level connections in both Peking and Taipei. In 1979, he learned from some senior PRC officials that Peking did not really expect the unification with Taiwan to materialize for decades. For complicated reasons, the CCP leaders felt it necessary to maintain the present stance. Lu's information was included in a speech at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in March 1980.

7. Reports of an impending new Taiwan policy appeared in Hong Kong newspapers as early as October 1978 (see *South China Morning Post*, October 5, 1978, p. 6), and filled the front pages in the latter half of December. For a discussion of this subject, see Li Chih-yuan, "Chung-Mei chien-chiao yu ta-lu, T'ai-wan ho Hsiang-kang" [The Establishment of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations and Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong], in *Kuan-ch'a chia* [Observers Monthly] (Hong Kong), No. 15 (January 1979), pp. 15-19.

discuss with Taipei, appealing to common national interests and to the people's desire for reunion with their long separated families. It promises to make arrangements to assure that the higher standard of living in Taiwan will not be lowered; that the present social and economic system will remain intact; that the security forces will be retained and disarmament will not be required. After the transitional period, Taiwan can still enjoy an autonomous status. Meanwhile, Peking proposes to establish closer contacts with Taiwan.⁸ On January 7, 1979, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications held discussions about setting up postal links with Taiwan. On January 11 and 25, a Ministry of Foreign Trade spokesman stated that direct trade with Taipei could be expanded in various ways. China could supply special local products such as wine, tea, porcelain, and herbal medicines, while Taiwan could offer industrial and agricultural products such as television sets, tape-recorders, sugar, bananas, and the like. Taiwan could even resell goods manufactured with raw materials imported from the mainland. The residents on the island were invited to the Canton Fair, and customs duties on goods moving to and from Taiwan were removed or reduced. Peking also proposed that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait be allowed to visit each other.

Furthermore, the PRC released a group of former Kuomintang (KMT) officials and sent them to Taiwan. It publicized a new policy by which landlords, rich peasants, and other bad elements who had been reeducated would be reclassified as normal members of communes. It noted that Chiang Kai-shek's niece and other ex-KMT personnel in Chikou, Chekiang, had been freed from the landlord designation. Much has also been made of the rehabilitation of the national bourgeoisie and intellectuals, as well as other moves toward social democracy.

For the first time, Communist propaganda does not depict life on Taiwan as "suffering in misery;" instead, Peking concedes that Taiwan is prosperous, a worthy example from which the PRC can learn. China's technical journals and literary magazines have reprinted articles published in Taiwan or by Taiwan authors. Scenes of Taiwanese tourist attractions have appeared on China's television

8. Li Fu-hua, "Chung-kung yu Mei-kuo chien-chiao hou tui wo t'ung-chan yin-mou te fen-hsi" [An Analysis of the Chinese Communist United Front Conspiracy Toward Us After the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the United States], in *Chung-kuo tsa-chih* [China Magazine] (Taipei) (hereinafter CKTC), March 1979, pp. 70-75.

broadcasts and on special stamp sets. Symbolic shelling of the offshore islands has also stopped and troops adjacent to the Taiwan Strait were transferred to other parts of China.

The tactics of this new offensive are wide-ranging and flexible. On January 9, 1979, Teng Hsiao-p'ing claimed that he had already sent several reunification proposals to the Taiwan authorities. Mass organizations, such as labor unions and women's associations, invited the Taiwanese to participate in their activities, while democratic parties, especially the KMT Revolutionary Committee and the Taiwan Democratic League, were resuscitated and made to work on the Taiwan question. Former KMT officials and relatives of present leaders in Taiwan wrote open letters to their compatriots, and many government units issued specific proposals for cooperation with their counterparts in Taiwan. The press, too, made certain that Taiwan-related features, such as national sports events, were not slighted in news reporting. Peking also appealed to compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao, as well as the overseas Chinese, to work for the cause of national unification.

According to press reports, Peking has been considering various reunification options. There is the Hong Kong-Macao formula, under which the PRC and the ROC will maintain mutually profitable relations, while allowing non-Peking rule in Taiwan for an indefinite length of time. The Tibet model will give Taiwan an autonomous status over a long transitional period.⁹ There may even be some kind of federalist relationship between Peking and Taipei.¹⁰ In short, the PRC is ready to make concessions, if Taipei only recognizes Peking as the national capital.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his associates have, however, refrained from painting themselves into a corner. They insisted that Peking would not forswear the use of military forces to achieve reunification, since such renunciation might discourage Taiwan from participating

9. A Taipei radio reported in early 1979 that US Senator Sam Nunn had related promises by Vice Premier Teng whereby Taiwan might, in future, have a status similar to that of Hong Kong and Macao. See CQ, No. 78, p. 408. For suggestions regarding the Tibet model, see the Associated Press dispatch by John Roderick, in *South China Morning Post*, January 2, 1979.

10. Peking has not stated that it favors a federal system, although leftist magazines in Hong Kong have discussed this possibility. See Hai-hsia-jen (pseud.), "Chieh-chueh T'ai-wan wen-t'i: Hsi-ts'ang shih? Lien-pang shih?" [Resolving the Taiwan Problem: Tibet Formula? Federation Formula?], in *Ching pao* [Mirror Monthly] (Hong Kong), No. 18 (January 1979), pp. 12-13; and Huang Hsing-chih, "Chung-kuo ho-p'ing t'ung-i ts'ao-an" [A Draft Proposal for the Peaceful Unification of China], in *Kuang-chueh ching* [Wide Angle Mirror] (Hong Kong), No. 77 (February 1979), pp. 41-53.

in serious talks. Besides, as Teng told a visiting US Senate delegation on January 9, 1979, China might have to resort to force, should Taiwan refuse to hold discussion indefinitely, or should Soviet Russia attempt to meddle in the affairs of the island. Significantly, this important conversation with the Americans is conspicuously missing in both *Beijing Review* (known as *Peking Review* until January 1979, hereinafter PR) and the special pamphlet, entitled *Chung-kuo cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e* [The Policy of the Government of China Toward Taiwan], issued by a PRC outlet in Hong Kong.¹¹

Peking is also unwilling to let Taiwan get away with the "one China, one Taiwan" or "one sovereignty, two government" approach to the question of representation in international organizations or conferences. On this issue, the PRC's concession is limited to allowing Taiwan to be present along with Peking if the name, flag, and anthem of the ROC are not used.¹² The concession is, however, significant since PRC officials have hitherto preferred to withdraw rather than sit in the same meeting hall with ROC representatives. Moreover, among the thirty provincial units in China, including Tibet and other autonomous regions, Taiwan alone can attend international gatherings on its own under the new tacit arrangements.

THE PRC'S MOTIVES

What are Peking's motives in adopting this new strategy? The ROC charges that this is just another subtle and treacherous move in the continuing civil war, designed to capture Taiwan without sacrificing a soldier.¹³ Specifically, observers on the island have offered the following explanations:

11. *Chung-kuo cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e* [The Policy of the Government of China Toward Taiwan] (Hong Kong: San-lien shu-tien, 1979).

12. Most notable is the case of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). By a vote of sixty-two to seventeen, the IOC decided to restore the PRC's membership, while demanding Taipei to change its official name in the IOC to "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee," and adopt a new anthem, flag, and emblem if it wished to continue to participate.

13. Many articles on this subject have appeared in the KMT's CKTC; see especially the issue of February 1979. The thesis of "continuing civil war" is consistent with Taipei's earlier positions; see Hsiung Shu-chung, *Chung-kung ts'e-lueh chi ch'i tso-fa chih yen-chih* [A Study of Chinese Communist Strategy and Its Operation] (Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chu, 1977), Chapter 5. Others have contented that this united front thesis does not explain the Chinese policy as adequately as the alliance model. See J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

First, the normalization of Sino-American relations has led to Taipei's growing diplomatic isolation, and Peking hopes to accelerate that process. Both Peking and Taipei seem to believe that if the ROC is no longer recognized by any government, it will have to consider seriously returning to "the embrace of motherland." A 1978 study by Taipei's Foreign Ministry predicted that when the US recognized the PRC, the ROC could only count on the support of Saudi Arabia out of the twenty-one governments with which the ROC still maintained diplomatic relations at that time.¹⁴ Similarly, Ch'en Yi-sung, a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, told Kyodo News Service on December 16, 1978 that he expected the number of countries having diplomatic ties with Taiwan to dwindle from twenty-one to five or six in three months.¹⁵

Second, in Taipei's view, another thrust of the PRC's new offensive is directed specifically at Washington. The US-ROC mutual defense pact was nullified at the end of 1979, but the US is continuing to supply military hardware to Taiwan. Peking is trying to convince the Americans that their limited support of the ROC will no longer be necessary, as the Chinese are prepared to solve the Taiwan question by themselves. This explanation is plausible, judging from the politics of the Taiwan Relations Act adopted by the American Congress, as well as the PRC's protest over continued US sales of arms to Taiwan.¹⁶

Third, the New Year's Day message and all other gestures, as Taipei points out, are consistent with the united front "trickery" of the Communists, aimed at promoting dissension among adversaries and thus undermining their morale.¹⁷ There are indeed sentiments and separatist tendencies in Taiwan which Peking can exploit to pressure the KMT authorities to look favorably toward the reunification proposals. Older mainlanders, nostalgic for their homeland, can be lured into hoping for reunion with long-separated loved ones. Patriotic Chinese, too, may be attracted by the PRC's great power

14. Frank Ching, "China: A Soft Line on Taiwan," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 18, 1978.

15. *South China Morning Post*, December 18, 1978, p. 1.

16. Hungdah Chiu (ed.), *Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents* (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1978).

17. See the January and March 1979 issues of CKTC.

status, something which Taiwan can never attain.¹⁸ The prosperous new middle class, especially the young Taiwanese businessmen, can be led to believe that "maintaining the status quo," as promised by the PRC, will definitely be a better alternative to the threat of war.

Fourth, with its united front strategy, Peking also attempts to "delude" the pro-Taiwan elements, especially the overseas Chinese and the American public. In the eyes of third parties, the reasonable conditions outlined by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other PRC leaders may appear magnanimous, while Taipei's refusal to consider them may seem stubborn and unworthy of support.

There is as yet little, if any, trust between the two parties, and trust is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations. As ROC commentators suggest, the "soft offensive" is but a call to surrender, for behind the offers of "peaceful unification" are plans to infiltrate, subvert, and eventually destroy the existing political and socioeconomic structures of Taiwan. To these commentators, Communists are Communists, and it is unrealistic to believe that they can be otherwise.

Nonetheless, Taiwan's jaundiced perception of Peking cannot satisfactorily explain the motives of China's new policy toward the island. One must look beyond the united front thesis for more plausible explanations. For example, the PRC's current policy is doubtless shaped by its determination to pursue the "Four Modernizations." Compared to the pressing needs for a workable national development program and an effective birth control policy, political reunification is a low priority concern. Hasty moves against Taiwan at the present time may be counterproductive. While the PRC is anxious to obtain technology and capital from the industrialized nations, the latter, especially Japan and the US, are reluctant to relinquish their present lucrative economic ties with Taiwan.¹⁹

The PRC has probably come to realize that it is in China's interest to avoid jeopardizing the status quo in Taiwan. In order to promote modernization, Peking has put into practice in the last three years the "revisionist" line of Liu Shao-ch'i. Taiwan can assist China in the pursuit of the "Four Modernizations" if cooperation between

18. Ray Cline, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, projected the perceived power weights for the PRC and the ROC in 1977 at 120 to 37 units, respectively. See Cline, *World Power Assessment, 1977* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 173 ff.

19. See Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh (eds.), *Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China* (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1978), Chapter 5.

the two sides develops. At that time, a booming economy in Taiwan may even help to stimulate China's own economic growth. It does not serve Peking's interests, therefore, to create confusion and panic in Taiwan through controlled air raids, blockade, or international trade squeeze.²⁰

Peking's Taiwan policy can also be construed as an offer of truce with Taipei in order to forestall Taiwan's use of the "Russian card," and to reduce internal unrest caused directly or indirectly by the ROC's clandestine operation in the mainland.

The PRC's concern over Taiwan's "Russian card" is understandable. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had created by 1978 a network of pro-Soviet states in South and Southeast Asia. Tensions at China's borders had been mounting, and Peking had found it necessary to wage a war to "punish" the Vietnamese. China would certainly feel threatened by the establishment of a Taiwan base for the Russian navy. A conciliatory truce offer could induce Taipei to abandon any thought of playing the "Russian card." Apparently, Taipei has not yet seriously contemplated the possibility of a USSR-ROC entente despite the Kremlin's overtures.²¹ Peking must have been relieved, since it was able to free some of its troops from the coastal areas adjacent to Taiwan for the anti-Vietnam campaign in 1979.²²

Internally, the PRC's pursuit of "Four Modernizations" must be supported by political stability and national unity. Taipei has been active in backing dissidents in the mainland through its propaganda machine and planted agents. As China becomes more open to the outside world, these agents are bound to have more opportunity to create trouble. A truce offer to Taipei would give Peking time to bring about internal stability. The new conciliatory policy toward Taiwan is therefore making a virtue out of necessity.

20. To a lesser extent, the PRC wields similar power over Hong Kong and Macao. Walter Easey of Hong Kong Research Project, London, has written a provocative article on Hong Kong's future. A Chinese translation appears in *Ch'i-shih nien-tai* [The Seventies] (Hong Kong) (hereinafter CSNT), No. 119 (December 1, 1979), pp. 67-71.

21. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option: Images and Realty," *Asian Survey*, XVIII, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 751-66.

22. For discussions on China's war with Vietnam, see "Chung-kuo yu Yueh-nan" [China and Vietnam], in *Nan-pei chi* [South and North Poles] (Hong Kong), No. 106 (March 1979), pp. 6-14; and Kuo Ch'ien, "Chung-Yueh chih chan: Shuang-fang chuang-pei, chan-lueh chi chan-shu" [Sino-Vietnamese War: Equipments, Strategies, and Tactics of the Two Parties], in *Ming-pao yueh-k'an* [Ming-pao Monthly] (Hong Kong) (hereinafter MPYK), XIV, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 19-26.

In sum, China wants to concentrate on its work on "Four Modernizations," and it needs political stability at home and peace abroad, as well as foreign capital and technology. It is genuinely concerned with the Taiwan question, but it may also have begun to appreciate Taiwan's potential contribution to the PRC's program of modernization. By late 1978, Peking must have realized the normalization of relations with the US was necessary to ward off the Russian threat; this might also open the possibility of obtaining technology and capital from the West. Meanwhile, Taiwan (as well as Hong Kong, Macao, and the overseas Chinese) must be wooed into cooperating with, or at least acquiescing in, Peking's new ventures. These considerations, more than the united front tactics, are indeed the motivating factors governing Teng Hsiao-p'ing's three salient points, which included the new Taiwan policy.

THE "FOUR MODERNIZATIONS" AND THE REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN

The program of "Four Modernizations" is politically attributable to the late Premier Chou En-lai and his associates, and those opposing it today may be castigated as supporters of the "Gang of Four." Mao Tse-tung is being attacked posthumously by his successors for his "red and expert" approach to China's development which has, according to his critics, made the present modernizing efforts doubly difficult. As noted by *Jen-min jih-pao* [People's Daily] (JMJP), "carrying out the Four Modernizations is the biggest politics" in Peking today.²³

Economically, the PRC can ill afford to postpone its work on "Four Modernizations." Its economy is beset with such serious problems as overpopulation and unemployment; imbalance among the economic sectors; bottlenecks in industry; low productivity in agriculture; an outmolded and inappropriate management system copied from Stalinist Russia; and serious shortages of qualified scientists, technicians, and managers.²⁴ The people's standard of

23. PR, XXII, No. 17 (April 27, 1979), pp. 10-13.

24. See Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the government, presented to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC on June 18, 1979; and "Readjusting the National Economy: Why and How?" PR, XXII, No. 26 (June 29, 1979), pp. 13-23. See also Chien Yuan-heng, "Tui Chung-kung t'iao-cheng ching-chi kung-tso te yen-chiu" [An Analysis of Communist China's Task of Economic Adjustments], in *Chung-kung yen-chiu* [Studies on Chinese Communism] (Taipei), XIII, No. 7 (July 15, 1979), pp. 63-78; and T. T. Hsueh, "Wei Chung-kung ching-chi cheng-ts'e k'an-ping yu ch'u-fang" [Diagnosis and Prescription for Communist China's Economic Policy], MPYK, XIV, No. 10 (October 1979), pp. 49-57.

living cannot be improved without moving swiftly along the road to modernization.²⁵

The program of "Four Modernizations" is also likely to help the PRC's national security. Most observers agree that Peking does not, at present, have the military power to "liberate" Taiwan by force, let alone protecting its borders against the USSR and the pro-Moscow states in the south.

Even in the ideological realm, the ruling CCP elites cannot fail to realize that the superiority of socialism over capitalism will not be proven by a Communist China frantically running in circles at a low level of development. Only through successful modernization can the PRC continue to uphold its belief that Communism will eventually triumph.

The importance of "Four Modernizations" was underscored by Yeh Chien-ying's lengthy speech on the eve of the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. "At the present," he claimed, "the Four Modernizations constitute the pivot of our political life. The security of the state, social stability, and a better material and cultural life for our people all hinge ultimately on the success of modernization, on the growth of production. Our work in every field must revolve around and serve modernization." He urged everyone in China to "concentrate on this great cause of construction."²⁶

Compared to the work on "Four Modernizations," political reunification can hardly be considered equally important. Although both are national goals to be realized, yet at least for now, reunification with Taiwan has to be either laid aside or approached in the least costly way. Modernization, a rational desire for changes and improvement, requires immediate attention. The PRC would be gratified if, by adopting a new policy toward the island, the Taiwan question could be used to serve the program of "Four Modernizations" in some ways.

Thus, the new Taiwan policy embraces the two dimensions of modernization and reunification. The emphasis on modernization has yielded a conciliatory policy toward the island, while the appreciation of Taiwan's potential usefulness has created a new element in the program of "Four Modernizations."

25. James E. Nickum and David C. Schak, "Living Standards and Economic Developments in Shanghai and Taiwan," CQ, No. 77 (March 1979), pp. 25-49.

26. The English version appears in PR, XXII, No. 40 (October 5, 1979), pp. 7-32.

THE PRC AND TAIWAN: SOME COMPARISONS

The developmental processes of the PRC and Taiwan are so different that it is difficult to compare them in any detailed and comprehensive fashion (Table I). Nonetheless, they are both Chinese, sharing the same historical, cultural, and linguistic roots, and they are, by their own claims, two separate parts of a larger entity. It is therefore necessary, perhaps, to compare them in those specific areas targeted by the PRC in its program of "Four Modernizations."²⁷

In agriculture, Taiwan has been notably successful in its land reform program during the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, in its approach to rural construction in the 1970s. The land reform program transferred landownership to the tillers and transformed former landlords into new industrial capitalists. The rural construction programs, supported by a growing industrial sector, absorbed surplus labor, upgraded agricultural technology, and commercialized the rural economy.

But Taiwan, as does the PRC, experiences problems of balance between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy. The ratio of agricultural product to gross domestic product has dropped from 38 percent in 1953 to 16.7 percent in 1972. The growth rate of agriculture has likewise declined from an average of 4.5 percent during 1953-1968 to a low of 2.1 percent in 1969-1972. Per capita income for agricultural households, though substantially increased in absolute terms, has dropped from 75 percent of that of nonagricultural households in 1954 to only 66 percent in 1972.²⁸ This is not so bad as it seems however, at least as compared to the situation in the PRC.

Since 1957, the PRC's population has increased by 50.6 percent while its cultivated land has dropped by 11 percent.²⁹ Peasant income

27. The KMT's CKTC published a special issue in October 1979, in which it compared the PRC with Taiwan in the areas of politics, economy (agriculture, industry, and trade), society, culture and education, and the military. The PRC was put in the worst light, while the ROC appeared remarkably successful and progressive. Some information in the issue is useful, however.

28. Wang Yu-chao, "Chia-su nung-ts'un chien-she ch'eng-chiu chi yuan-ching" [Accelerate the Effects and Prospects of Rural Construction], CKTC, August 1979, pp. 19-23; and Wu and Yeh, "Taiwan's External Economic Relations."

29. Ch'en Ting-chung, "Chung-kung nung-yeh san-shih-nien lai te huo-hai" [Thirty Years of Scourge in Communist China's Agriculture], CKTC, October 1979, p. 62; and Robert F. Dernberger and David Fasenfest, "China's Post-Mao Economic Future," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Chinese Economy Post-Mao, Volume I, Policy and Performance* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 6.

is so low that inclement weather can still precipitate famine in some areas. Many communes are debt-ridden and hard work alone is not likely to improve their poor conditions. At the national level, there are serious problems of coordination between the growth of agricultural production and that of population, as well as between agriculture and industry. Agriculture has become a bottleneck in economic development.

The desire to improve agricultural production had led Mao Tse-tung and his supporters to initiate a nationwide movement to "Learn from Tachai." Defying nature and economic laws, this campaign brought little sustained benefit to the nation as a whole. Many communes squandered away valuable manpower and materials in their attempt to emulate Tachai's example of removing mountains and opening new fields. In a speech on "Four Modernizations" in July 1978, Hu Ch'iao-mu, president of the Academy of Social Science, stressed that it was best to observe economic laws, instead of the laws of Mao. Hua Kuo-feng, too, admitted later that China's economy required restructuring because "in many areas and in varying degrees it violates objective economic laws."³⁰ The Tachai model has since been abandoned.

In industry, Taiwan experienced relatively rapid growth in the latter half of the 1960s during and after its fourth four-year economic plan. In 1963, industry overtook agriculture for the first time as the main sector of the economy. The ratio of industrial product to gross domestic product has increased from 17.9 percent in 1952 to 40.3 percent in 1978.³¹

Because of its limited resources and market, Taiwan has tried to coordinate its industrial development with an expansion in exports by means of such innovative ideas as the export processing zone. There has been no great leap, but the steady growth has been impressive and consequential. Throughout the last three decades, overall government plans have guided and helped private enterprises. Foreign aid and private investment have, by and large, been put to effective use. A structural change is taking place as Taiwan begins to develop heavy and more sophisticated industries on the

30. The full text of Hu's speech appears serially in three issues of PR, XXI, Nos. 45-47 (November 10-21, 1978). Hua's statement is derived from his report on the work of the government, presented to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC.

31. Wei Yung-ning, "Tai-wan te kung-yeh ch'eng-chang chi ch'i chi-kou chuan-pien" [Taiwan's Industrial Growth and Its Structural Change], CKTC, October 1979, p. 72.

basis of its experiences in labor-intensive light industries. Some observers have even argued that the ten great construction projects completed during the 1970s have elevated Taiwan to the rank of an "industrialized nation."

The picture in the PRC is comparatively bleak.³² The lack of material incentives and personal accountability for project mistakes and delays encourages wastefulness, undermines morale, and fosters apathy among the workers. Industrial production, controlled by central plans, is often based on unreliable and unrealistic data. This is especially true in times of frenzied political campaigns when rigid ideological demands outweigh pragmatic decisions and stifle initiatives. Exaggerated claims of production increases are made; quantity, instead of quality, becomes the sole criterion. Consequently, valuable resources are wasted in the overproduction of low technology, low quality goods.

In national defense, Taiwan relies on a smaller, but more professional and better equipped force than the PRC's. At present, observers generally agree on its ability to defend itself against a potential invasion from Peking. The ROC air force, in particular, has had an impressive performance record. The real test, however, is yet to come for Taiwan's defense capability, especially with the termination of the US-Taiwan defense pact at the end of 1979. In the final analysis, Taiwan's military forces cannot hope to match those of the PRC. In this, time is on Peking's side.

Nonetheless, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China has its problems, too. It suffered heavy casualties in the 1979 war against Vietnam, and it withdrew without accomplishing its goal. As commentators in Taiwan point out, the PLA's ills have been caused by Mao Tse-tung's anachronistic military thought. Moreover, the purges of P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng in 1959, as well as the Lin Piao affair in 1971, have substantially weakened the military's stature. Consequently, modernization of the armed forces has been retarded, while their capabilities have declined.³³

32. See *supra* n. 24.

33. Chu Liang, "Ts'ung Chung-kung chun-tui kan-pu ssu-hsiang lu-hsien te fen-ch'i k'an Chung-kung chun te hsien-tai-hua ch'ien-t'u" [The Prospects of the Chinese Army's Modernization as Seen from Cleavages in the Thinking of the Army Cadres], in *Chung-kung yen-chiu*, XIII, No. 8 (August 15, 1979), pp. 75-81; and Ellis Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism*, XXVII, No. 6 (November-December 1978), pp. 1-19.

The problems of the socialist system and the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have intensified China's weaknesses in science and technology. Vacillations between "ideo-logic" and "techno-logic" lines are not conducive to basic research and development in these two areas.³⁴ Over the years, there have been some impressive achievements in medicine and in the development of nuclear weapons and orbiting satellites, yet China's recovery from the self-inflicted damages of the Cultural Revolution is likely to take a long time.

For two decades, the PRC has been losing ground in training new scientists and technologists. According to the annual reports of *Who Is Publishing in Science*, there have been fewer authors in the last several years from the PRC than from Taiwan who publish articles in any Western language in some 5,000 scientific journals (Table II). One writer characterizes the PRC's "size of science" as "vanishingly small" in terms of published scientific literature.³⁵ *Who Is Publishing in Science* lists 339,078 authors in 1977. While 327 of them were from the ROC, 137 were associated with the PRC.

China's import of foreign technology increased around 1970, and it has since reached a high level. The PRC has been mostly importing complete sets of equipment; it would like to change gradually to importing mainly technology, "selectively purchasing key equipment and designing the engineering projects ourselves."³⁶ Moreover, because of limited foreign exchange, China would have to pursue the goal of "Four Modernizations . . . through self-reliance and hard work, not through purchases and borrowing."³⁷

TAIWAN'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRC'S MODERNIZATION

In spite of their differences, the PRC may, as suggested earlier in this chapter, find Taiwan's experience helpful to its work on "Four

34. Hans Heymann, Jr., *China's Approach to Technology Acquisition: Part III, Summary Observations* (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1975), pp. v-vi, 4-9.

35. Derek J. de Solla Price, "Measuring the Size of Science," in *Who Is Publishing in Science* (Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, 1977), p. 20.

36. "Importing Technology: Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged," PR, XXII, No. 30 (July 27, 1979), p. 10. In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Kuo-feng also emphasized the importance of technology. He spoke of building up "a number of model enterprises" that could pave the way for adopting modern management methods and advanced technology, especially in the major sectors of the national economy. This was to be achieved "by learning from foreign countries, importing technology, and exerting our own efforts in innovation and invention."

37. JMJP, May 8, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), pp. 11-13.

Modernizations." For Peking, a moderate policy toward the island is therefore desirable. The following are some of the roles which Taiwan can play in the PRC's modernization efforts: First, Taiwan can be a pilot project area for Peking. The island's economic success in the last two decades has, at least, some instructional value for the PRC. Second, Taiwan can be China's friendly competitor. As long as it remains civil, this competition may stimulate progress, and both sides will benefit. Third, Taiwan can assume the form of an opposition party to the CCP on the mainland, thereby offering the Chinese people a choice in governmental system and the way of life.

These roles, however, suggest a much broader concept of modernization than the PRC leadership is, at present, willing to contemplate. According to an article authored by Chou Chen-hua, modernization is an historical and universal concept, instead of an unchanging, abstract notion. It has concrete contents and definite standards in relation to specific times and places. Chou views modernization as a technological revolutionary process of "equipping the national economy, defense and other units with the newest contemporary science and technology, reshaping . . . the entire domain of material production, and raising the societal economy and technology of a given country to the advanced level of its contemporary world."³⁸

This narrow interpretation overlooks the social, cultural, and political aspects of modernization. It echoes the common Chinese interpretation as presented by Chou En-lai in 1964 and 1975, and by Hua Kuo-feng in February 1978.³⁹ More thought, however, has been devoted to the matter since then. As Yeh Chien-ying announced in September 1979, China wanted to build an "advanced socialist democracy and a complete socialist legal system . . . and develop a rich and many-sided cultural life," beyond the four major aspects of modernization. Nonetheless, even this interpretation fails to consider the environmental and psychological consequences of modernization.

In a speech on January 16, 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing identified the four conditions that would help to achieve the goals of the "Four

38. Chou Chen-hua, "Hsien-tai-hua shih i-ko li-shih te shih-chieh-hsing te kai-nien" [Modernization Is an Historical, World-Wide Concept], *Ching-chi yen-chiu* [Studies on Economics], August 1979, pp. 19-22.

39. Yin Chih-p'eng, "Chung-kuo te chiao-yu ke-ming yu ssu-ko hsien-tai-hua" [China's Educational Revolution and the Four Modernizations], in *China Toward Modernization: Collected Essays for the Fifth China Week* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1977), p. 113; and Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the government, delivered to the First Session of the Fifth NPC on February 26, 1978, especially Part 3.

Modernizations." They were: (1) a firm and continual political line; (2) a political situation of stability and unity; (3) a struggling and enterprising spirit and; (4) a troop of able cadre, with professional knowledge and devoted to socialism. Many of the other conditions which have contributed to Taiwan's remarkable success cannot be duplicated in China, yet the island's experience in modernization is, indeed, worthy of Peking's attention.

Specifically, the program of "Four Modernizations" needs a tremendous amount of capital. In 1976-1985, China plans to spend 600-630 billion US dollars, of which no more than 400 billion can be accumulated through forced domestic savings.⁴⁰ The rest must be raised from foreign loans and investments. As the PRC has already found out, this is not easy, since the capitalist lenders are demanding collaterals after advancing initially some easy credit. The 1979 Joint Venture scheme is likely to attract only a small amount of funds, pending enactment of auxiliary laws and regulations on property rights, taxes, and the like.⁴¹

The ROC cannot offer China much capital, even though Taiwan's investment in the US and some Asian countries is considerable. Nonetheless, Taiwan's effort to introduce new technology and attract private investment from overseas by such means as the export processing zones is an experience which Peking cannot afford to ignore.

The PRC also needs scientists, technicians, social scientists, managers, and highly skilled personnel. To train these experts, Peking must expand and improve its higher education. Yet, the Cultural Revolution has devastated the PRC's higher education system. Without such interruptions, China could have produced 1.5 million more scientists and technicians in 1966-1976.⁴²

40. Estimates vary. These figures are given by Li Kuo-ting, former minister of economics in Taiwan, in "I T'ai-wan fa-chan ching-yen p'ing-ku ta-lu hsien-tai-hua" [Evaluating and Forecasting Modernization on the Mainland by Taiwan's Developmental Experiences], *Hai-wai hsueh-jen* [Overseas Scholars] (Taipei), No. 84 (July 1979), p. 5; and by Cheng Chu-yuan, "Chung-kung te ching-chi wen-t'i" [Communist China's Economic Problems], in *Chung-kuo jen* [The Chinese] (Hong Kong), I, No. 9 (October 1979), p. 15.

41. Ch'en Hsin, "Chung-wai ho-tzu-fa wen-t'i ch'u-t'an" [A Preliminary Analysis of the Laws on Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investments], CSNT, No. 115 (August 1979), pp. 34-37.

42. This is an estimate of the number of PRC students (about 150,000 per year) who could have received higher education in 1966-1976, had there been no Cultural Revolution.

By contrast, the ROC has produced an impressive number of well-trained and highly capable people in all fields through education at home and abroad (Table III). This is one of the major reasons for Taiwan's successes in economic development and overall modernization. Indeed, the PRC has already begun to tap scientists and experts in various disciplines, who have received at least part of their education and training in Taiwan. Clearly, there is a serious educational problem in the PRC which Taiwan may help to remedy. Ironically, the fact that the island has not been "liberated" during these years may be a blessing in disguise for Peking.

In China, scientific and technological training in the West continues to enjoy greater prestige than that in the USSR. The majority of the Chinese leaders in scientific and technical fields received their education in the West before 1949. In its exchange of students and scholars with the US after the purge of the "Gang of Four," China has admitted that the pre-1978 training of its university and college graduates was largely inadequate.⁴³ They are not capable of engaging in postgraduate studies when sent abroad to the advanced Western nations. This difficulty is compounded by the problems of prohibitive costs and cultural shock, as well as the risk of defections. Peking has to decide whether to send more students to the West under the present circumstances. A report shows that there were only 2,230 PRC students abroad during the twenty-two months preceding November 1979.⁴⁴

Taiwan, on the other hand, has been sending students to foreign countries over the years (Table IV). For a time, there were complaints of the "brain drain" from the island. Recently, however, many foreign trained scholars, scientists, technicians, managers, and other highly skilled personnel have returned to fill key posts in Taiwan, and they have contributed significantly to its progress. There is probably a surplus of overseas Chinese experts in many fields who are currently unemployed or otherwise temporarily idle. It is sad that this should be so when their talents and skills are badly needed by the PRC.

For linguistic, cultural, and nationalistic reasons, an expert from Taiwan can relate to the Chinese conditions more effectively than a non-Chinese. Should Peking be willing to minimize its ideological

43. Chang Tu-sheng, "San-shih-nien lai Chung-kung chiao-yu te yu-hui tao-lu" [The Winding Road of Communist China's Education During the Last Thirty Years], MPYK, XIV, No. 10 October 1979), pp. 107-13.

44. PR, XXII, No. 47 (November 23, 1979), p. 7.

differences with the non-Communist world, it could attract experts in Taiwan and the overseas Chinese in the West. This may cause some resentment among locally trained people in the PRC, but it is a price worth paying in the present situation. Indeed, Peking may want to send some of its students to Taiwan. In terms of China's immediate needs, Taiwan has much to offer.

The PRC also has the "fifth modernization" problem.⁴⁵ In the winter of 1978-1979, big character posters on the Democratic Wall in Peking called for a move toward democracy, with greater freedom and participation in public decision-making. Moreover, they favored the rule of law, with greater protection of human rights. To a limited extent, this sentiment is shared by many CCP leaders who were victimized by the abuses of the Cultural Revolution. But they are unwilling to allow this "fifth modernization" problem either to undermine their authority or to create social and political instability.

How can the PRC mobilize its people to support the modernization efforts without yielding to the demands for a more democratic political process? To maintain a proper balance, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his associates have, on the one hand, encouraged production by offering material incentives, redress of past grievances, and greater freedom in decision-making at the production level, in the market, and even in the mass media. On the other hand, they insisted on the people's compliance with such regulations of conduct as the six prohibitive rules and the four basic principles.⁴⁶ They also ordered the

45. This is the key issue in the celebrated case of Wei Ching-sheng; see MPYK, XIV, No. 11 (November 1979); *Chung-kuo jen*, I, No. 11 (December 1979); and CSNT, No. 119 (December 1979).

46. The six prohibitive rules, promulgated on March 29, 1979, by the Peking Revolutionary Committee, were as follows: (1) Citizens should obey the direction of the people's police when engaging in assembly or demonstration; (2) Assault upon party, government and military organs, and enterprise units was not permitted; neither was occupation of offices, obstruction of public business, or destruction of public facilities; (3) People were not allowed to incite strife, misguide the masses with rumors, do mischief, or libel and make false charges; (4) Citizens were prohibited from blocking vehicles or riding vehicles without ticket; (5) Except in specified areas, people were not permitted to post or print slogans, posters, big character posters, or small character posters; and (6) Slogans, posters, big character posters, and small character posters, as well as books, magazines, pictorials, photographs, and pictures that were opposed to socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought were all prohibited; so were those that leaked national secrets or violated the constitution and the laws. The four basic principles, announced in a JMJP editorial on April 5, 1979, reaffirmed the need to keep to the socialist road, to uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought.

incarceration of the boldest of the dissidents who dared not only to demand democracy but also to challenge Marxism-Leninism and the basis of Teng's power. During the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, the CCP proposed to eliminate the following "Four Great Freedoms" from the 1978 PRC constitution: (1) speak out freely; (2) air views fully; (3) hold great debates; and (4) write big character posters.⁴⁷

By Western standards, Taiwan is not a shining example of democracy. For more than thirty years, the KMT's central leadership has ruled the island with firm hands. The Legislative and Control Yuans, as well as the National Assembly, are gerontological bodies claiming to represent not only the inhabitants of Taiwan, but also the nearly one billion people on the mainland.⁴⁸ The island has been

47. See the communiqué and resolutions of the Fifth Session of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee, in PR, XXIII, No. 10 (March 10, 1980), pp. 7-17; and Ch'i Hsin, "K'an Chung-kung ju-ho ch'iang-hua tsu-chih" [Let Us See How the Chinese Communists Strengthen Their Organization], CSNT, No. 123 (April 1980), pp. 55-60.

48. (Editors' note) Of the 2961 National Assembly members elected in 1947, only 1393 were still serving in 1971; of the 759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434 remained; and in the Control Yuan, where the average age of members was over sixty-five years, membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971. Because it claims to be the only government of China, the Nationalist government was reluctant to hold a general election in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC has had to recognize the phenomenon of political stagnation and the rising demands of its local residents to participate in the policymaking process. As a result, in 1972, 53 new members were elected to the National Assembly, 36 to the Legislative Yuan, and 7 to the Control Yuan. Their terms are three (Legislative Yuan) and six years (Control Yuan and National Assembly), respectively, according to the provisions of the constitution. See Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China," in Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Question* (New York, Praeger, 1973), p. 98.

On June 11, 1980, the government announced further expansion of the number of new members for the above three bodies. In total 204 new members will be elected in Taiwan — 76 to the National Assembly, bringing the total to 1218, 96 to the Legislative Yuan, bringing the total to 412, and 32 to Control Yuan, bringing the total to 74. "Parliamentary Seats Added," *Free China Weekly*, Vol. XXI, No. 23 (June 15, 1980), p. 1.

Among the three bodies, the most important one is the Legislative Yuan. The election of 96 new members to this body will significantly revitalize that body. Moreover, many remaining members are too old or ill to be active. As a result, less than half of the remaining members regularly attend the meetings of the Yuan. So, in practical terms, after the recent increase of the membership, approximately half of the active members of the Legislative Yuan will be elected in Taiwan. See Hungdah Chiu, "The Future of Political Stability in Taiwan," in *Taiwan: One Year After United States — China Normalization* (A Senate Foreign Relations Committee — Congressional Research Service of Library of Congress Workshop, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1980), pp. 40-41.

under martial law since 1947, and the myth of "recovering the mainland" is still a national policy not open to discussion. The press is controlled, and magazines stepping beyond "acceptable" bounds are suspended. In 1980, eight leading dissidents were brought to trial in Taipei, and they were punished according to martial law.⁴⁹

Yet, it would be mistaken to argue that Taiwan is as undemocratic as the PRC. To the common people on the island who acquiesce to his supreme power, Chiang Ching-kuo is benevolent. They support him because of his populist style, and also because of the success of his economic policies. Taiwan has survived international setbacks, and it has time and again reemerged stronger and more prosperous. The KMT government has relaxed its control, and it has even allowed local elections to take place, if only grudgingly.

Perhaps the PRC can learn from Taiwan's experience in holding local elections. If one accepts the thesis that democratic tradition has never been a part of the Chinese political culture, what is taking place in Taiwan must then be considered a significant step toward the creation of a democratic process. Taiwan has indeed been experimenting with a limited democracy in the last decade, and there are promising signs pointing to greater popular participation in the governmental process. It may therefore serve the PRC's interest to allow Taiwan's experiment to continue instead of terminating it by premature unification.

CONCLUSION

In his fable of the "Foolish Old Man," Mao Tse-tung described imperialism and feudalism as the two mountains standing in the way of China's goal of achieving modernity and national greatness. The present rulers in the PRC name two more such obstacles: (1) bureaucratic capitalism which they claim to have got rid of and; (2) economic and technological backwardness which they are now trying to eliminate through the program of "Four Modernizations."⁵⁰ Yet, to accomplish the objectives of "Four Modernizations," the PRC must

49. For non-KMT reports and analyses of the Kao-hsiung Incident, see the two issues of *Ya-chou-jen* [The Asians], published by dissidents in Taipei in February and March 1980. On April 18, 1980, the eight defendants were found guilty and sentenced to life or long-term imprisonment. Peking condemned the KMT's "suppression of democratic movement." See *Ta-kung pao* [L'impartial] (Hong Kong), April 21, 1978, p.2.

50. MJP, February 9, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 8 (February 23, 1979), pp. 5-6.

put aside Mao's revolutionary rhetoric, observe objective economic laws, devise realistic plans, import foreign technology, raise a huge amount of capital, train a large number of skilled personnel, and, above all, curb its population growth.

Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, Chinese leaders have displayed a more pragmatic and business-like attitude.⁵¹ There is a growing awareness of the worth of the individual and the need to enlist his genuine support in working toward national goals. To motivate the workers, the leaders have resorted to material incentives similar to the system championed in the early 1960s by Liu Shao-ch'i, who was officially rehabilitated in February 1980. The general mood reflects a new realism and open-mindedness.

In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Kuo-feng stressed the need for readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement as the task for the PRC in 1979-1981. It is evident that China's modernization cannot be accelerated at will by Peking. The post-Mao leaders are realistic and courageous enough to recognize the shortcomings of their ideology and admit their past mistakes. They are now regrouping for their next move toward modernization, and Taiwan's possible role in that move is an important part of Peking's consideration.

At a time when the PRC needs all the resources it can muster to push forward the program of "Four Modernizations," it would be foolish for the leaders to divert any of these resources to "liberate" Taiwan. The island poses no real threat to the PRC; it may, indeed, be helpful to China's modernization efforts. Moreover, the US and Japan are still keen on doing business with Taiwan, and it would not be to China's advantage to antagonize the Americans and the Japanese.

Taiwan can play these positive roles in China's modernization only if it is free from Peking's direct political control. It would seem advisable, therefore, that China should leave Taiwan alone, except for certain mutually acceptable contacts. The KMT authorities have already rejected the idea of reunification with the mainland, even

51. Ch'i Hsin, "Chung-kung wan-ch'eng liao chi chuan-wan: San-chung ch'uan-hui te t'ai-ch'ien no-hou" [Communist China Makes a Quick Turnabout: The Ins and Outs of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee], in CSNT, No. 109 (February 1979), pp. 7-9; and "Chung-kuo ta-lu te chieh-chi chuang-k' uang ho chu-yao mao-tun" [The Class Situation and the Major Contradictions in the Chinese Mainland], CSNT, No. 115 (August 1979), pp. 26-33.

under the generous terms offered by the PRC. This must have been a factor in Peking's formulation of its new Taiwan policy in 1979, a policy which may well be calculated to permit the island to play certain roles as China proceeds toward modernization. Time will tell.

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE NAMES

<i>Wade-Giles</i>	<i>Pinyin</i>
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao	Zhang Qunqiao
Ch'en Hsi-lien	Chen Xilian
Ch'en Yi-sung	Chen Yisong
Chi Teng-k'uei	Ji Dengkui
Chiang Ch'ing	Jiang Qing
Ch'iao Kuan-hua	Qiao Guanhua
Ch'ing (dynasty)	Qing
Chou Chen-hua	Zhou Zhenhua
Chou En-lai	Zhou Enlai
Chu Teh	Zhu De
Fu Tso-yi	Fu Zuoyi
Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien	Xu Xiangqian
Hu Ch'iao-mu	Hu Qiaomu
Hua Kuo-feng	Hua Guofeng
Huang K'o-ch'eng	Huang Kecheng
Ili	Yili
Ining	Yining
Kao-hsiung	Gaoxiung
Keng Piao	Geng Biao
Kuomintang	Guomindang
Li Hsien-nien	Li Xiannian
Liao Ch'eng-chih	Liao Chengzhi
Lin Piao	Lin Biao
Liu Shao-ch'i	Liu Shaoqi
Mao Tse-min	Mao Zemin
Mao Tse-tung	Mao Zedong
Peking	Beijing
P'eng Teh-huai	Peng Dehuai
Sheng Shih-ts'ai	Sheng Shizai
Sinkiang	Xinjiang
Tachai	Dazhai
Taipei	Taibei
Teng Hsiao-p'ing	Deng Xiaoping
Wang Hung-wen	Wang Hongwen
Yang Ch'eng-wu	Yang Chengwu
Yao Wen-yuan	Yao Wenyuan
Yeh Chien-ying	Ye Jianying
Yu Chan	Yu Zhan

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TABLE I
PRC VERSUS ROC:
A COMPARISON OF VITAL STATISTICS

	<i>PRC</i>	<i>ROC</i>
Area (thousand square kilometers)	9,597	36
Population (millions in mid-1977)	885.6	16.8
Literacy	25%	85%
Life expectancy at birth (1977)	64	72
GNP per capita (US dollars, 1977)	390	1,170
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1977	5.1%	6.2%
Gross domestic product:		
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1970	6.6%	9.2%
1970-1977	5.8%	7.7%
Working age (15-64) population, 1960	58%	52%
1977	61%	63%
Labor force in agriculture, 1960	75%	56%
1977	53%	34%
Labor force in industry, 1960	15%	11%
1977	24%	27%
Labor force in services, 1960	10%	33%
1977	13%	39%
Daily per capita calorie supply:		
1974	2,330	2,780
As percentage of requirement	99%	119%
Total manufactured exports:		
1976 (millions US dollars)	3,124	6,922
Destination of manufactured exports, 1976		
To developed countries	32%	73%
To developing countries	53%	24%
To centrally planned economies	12%	0%
To capital surplus oil exporters	3%	3%
Per capita energy consumption:		
Kilograms of coal equivalent, 1960	683	583
1976	706	1,797
Physical quality of life index (PQLI)*	59	88
Per capita military expenditures:		
1973 (US dollars)	19	53

* The PQLI of the PRC and the ROC ratings are based on an average of each government's index ratings for life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy in the mid-1970s.

Sources: *World Development Report, 1979* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979); and *The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

TABLE II
**NUMBERS OF PUBLISHING AUTHORS IN SCIENCES,
IN THE PRC AND THE ROC, 1973-1977**

	<i>PRC</i>	<i>ROC</i>
1977	137	327
1976	102	292
1975	107	275
1974	136	269
1973	47	226

Source: *Who Is Publishing in Science*, Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, 1974-1978 Annuals.

TABLE III
**HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENTS IN THE
PRC AND THE ROC:
SELECTED YEARS**

	<i>PRC</i>			<i>ROC</i>		
	<i>Total enrollments</i>	<i>Population in millions</i>	<i>%*</i>	<i>Total enrollments</i>	<i>Population in millions**</i>	<i>%</i>
1952-1953	191,000	590	0.037	10,037	8.29	0.12
1956-1957	403,000	623	0.065	22,606	9.54	0.23
1965-1966	695,000	722	0.097	85,346	12.81	0.66
1973-1974	324,000	825	0.039	270,895	15.71	1.72
1974-1975	440,000	839	0.053	282,618	16.00	1.77

* estimated % of total population.

** population figures in this column are averages of the two related years in each case.

Sources: For the PRC, see Richard P. Suttmeier, "Scientific Institutions," in *Science and Technology in the People's Republic of China*, Paris: OECD, 1976; and *Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific*, 1976, United Nations. For the ROC, see Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, Executive Yuan, ROC, *Taiwan Statistical Data Book*, 1966, Taipei; *China Yearbook*, 1978, Taipei; and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China*, 1976.

TABLE IV

TAIWAN STUDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1973-1977

	<i>US</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Canada</i>	<i>Other Countries</i>	<i>Total</i>
1973	1,650	74	30	212	1,966
1974	1,992	74	43	177	2,285
1975	1,824	112	139	226	2,301
1976	3,173	156	111	201	3,641
1977	3,369	156	44	219	3,788

Source: *China Yearbook*, Taipei, 1974-1978.

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