Decentralized Pricing in Minimum Cost Spanning Trees

In the minimum cost spanning tree model we consider decentralized pricing rules, i.e. rules that cover at least the efficient cost while the price charged to each user only depends upon his own connection costs. We define a canonical pricing rule and provide two axiomatic characterizations. First, the canonical pricing rule is the smallest among those that improve upon the Stand Alone bound, and are either superadditive or piece-wise linear in connection costs. Our second, direct characterization relies on two simple properties highlighting the special role of the source cost.pricing rules; minimum cost spanning trees; canonical pricing rule; stand-alone cost; decentralization

Cooperative games for minimum cost spanning tree problems

Minimum cost spanning tree problems are well known problems in the Operations Research literature. Some agents, located at different geographical places, want a service provided by a common supplier. Agents will be served through costly connections. Some part of the literature has focused, mainly, in studying how to allocate the connection cost among the agents. We review the papers that have addressed the allocation problem using cooperative game theory

Sharing the cost of maximum quality optimal spanning trees

Minimum cost spanning tree problems have been widely studied in operation research and economic literature. Multi-objective optimal spanning trees provide a more realistic representation of different actual problems. Once an optimal tree is obtained, how to allocate its cost among the agents defines a situation quite different from what we have in the minimum cost spanning tree problems. In this paper, we analyze a multi-objective problem where the goal is to connect a group of agents to a source with the highest possible quality at the cheapest cost. We compute optimal networks and propose cost allocations for the total cost of the project. We analyze properties of the proposed solution; in particular, we focus on coalitional stability (core selection), a central concern in the literature on minimum cost spanning tree problems.This work is supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, under project ECO2016-77200-P. Financial support from the Generalitat Valenciana (BEST/2019 Grants) to visit the UNSW is also acknowledged

네트워크 구조가 있는 비용 배분 문제에서의 샤플리 밸류에 관한 연구

학위논문 (박사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2021. 2. 전영섭.This study consists of three chapters. Each chapter addresses independent issues. However they are connected in that they are analyzing economic phenomena using a network structure and they investigate the distribution of benefits or costs arising from cooperation using cooperative game theory. The first chapter investigate positional queueing problem which is a generalized problem of the classical queueing problem. In this chapter, we obtain generalized versions of the minimal transfer rule and of the maximal transfer rule. We also investigate properties of each rules and axiomatically characterized them. The second chapter investigate the minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. We investigate the properties and axiomatic characterization of the Kar rule for the minimum cost spanning tree problems with multiple sources. The final chapter investigate the profit allocation in the Korean automotive industry using the buyer-supplier network among the vehicle manufacturers and its first-tier vendors from the perspective of cooperative game theory. Some models are constructed and the Shapley values of each models are calculated. We compare them with real profit allocation of the Korean automotive industry.본 연구는 3개의 장으로 구성되어 있다. 각 장은 독립적인 문제를 다루고 있지만, 경제학적 현상을 네트워크 구조를 활용하여 분석하고 있다는 것과 협력에서 발생하는 이익 또는 비용의 배분 문제를 협조적 게임이론을 활용하여 분석하고 있다는 점에서 각 장은 상호 연결성을 갖는다. 첫 번째 장에서는 고전적인 대기열게임을 일반화한 문제(positional queueing problem)에서의 최소이전규칙(minimal transfer rule)과 최대이전규칙(maximal transfer rule)의 특성을 밝힌다. 두 번째 장에서는 소스가 여러 개인 최소신장가지문제(minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources)에서의 카규칙(Kar rule)의 특성을 밝힌다. 마지막 장에서는 한국의 자동차 산업에서의 완성차 기업과 1차 벤더 사이의 이윤분배 문제를 협조적 게임이론적 접근법을 통해서 분석한다. 4가지 모형을 구축하고 각 모형에서 계산된 이윤분배와 현실의 이윤분배를 비교할 때, 완성차 기업의 영향력을 가장 크게 가정한 모형의 이윤분배 결과가 현실의 이윤분배와 가장 근접한 것을 확인하였다.1. The Shapley Value in Positional Queueing Problems and axiomatic characterizations 1 1.1. Introduction 1 1.2. The Positional Queueing Problem 2 1.3. An optimistic approach and the minimal transfer rule 5 1.4. A pessimistic approach and the maximal transfer rule 8 1.5. Axioms and characterizations 21 1.6. Concluding remarks 31 Bibliography. 46 2. The Kar Solution for multi-source minimum cost spanning tree problems 49 2.1. Introduction 49 2.2. Model 50 2.3. An axiomatic characterization 51 2.4. Conclusion 62 Bibliography. 63 3. A cooperative game theoretic approach on the profit allocation of the Koreanautomotive industry 65 3.1. Introduction 65 3.2. Model 66 3.3. Analysis method 71 3.4. Analysis result 78 3.5. Conclusion 80 Bibliography. 82Docto

Anonymity in sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in these problems are equal treatment of equals, weak equal treatment of equals and symmetry. We study the relationship between all impartiality axioms. Besides we combine anonymity with other existing axioms in the literature. Some combinations give rise to new characterizations of well-known rules. The family of generalized split rules is characterized with anonymity, additivity and null team. The concede-and-divide rule is characterized with anonymity, additivity and essential team. Others combinations characterize new rules that had not been considered before. We provide three characterizations in which three axioms are the same (anonymity, additivity, and order preservation) the fourth one is different (maximum aspirations, weak upper bound, and non-negativity). Depending on the fourth axiom we obtain three different families of rules. In all of them concede-and-divide plays a central role

Inventory management of repairable service parts for personal computers:A case study

Recent years have seen an increase of interest in the field of service parts inventory - particularly in computer industry. The computer industry is a highly competitive industry; products have to be repaired as quickly as possible, since slow repair can lead to loss of future business to competitors with better service reputations. A good reputation is therefore closely linked to the availability of spare parts on the market. Given this fact and using a real-life case study, this paper first elaborates on the management and control of service-parts inventory and presents a brief overview of the contemporary literature on the subject. Next the paper presents the solution approach adopted and the results of study, which indicate that significant savings can be realized through good management of service-parts inventory.

Compromising to share the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for sports leagues. We characterize the sharing rules satisfying three basic and intuitive axioms: symmetry, additivity and maximum aspirations. They convey a natural compromise between two focal rules, arising from polar estimations of teams' loyal viewers. We also show that these compromise rules have further interesting properties, such as allowing for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium. We bring some of the testable implications from our axiomatic analysis to the real case of European football leagues