‘The uses of ethnography in the science of cultural evolution’. Commentary on Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. and K. Laland ‘Toward a unified science of cultural evolution’

There is considerable scope for developing a more explicit role for ethnography within the research program proposed in the article. Ethnographic studies of cultural micro-evolution would complement experimental approaches by providing insights into the “natural” settings in which cultural behaviours occur. Ethnography can also contribute to the study of cultural macro-evolution by shedding light on the conditions that generate and maintain cultural lineages

Embodiment, Transparency and the Disclosiveness of Failure

In this paper, I want to argue that embodiment is characterised by a plasticity which entails that it can include both the biological limb and the ‘artificial’ tool, as evidenced by recent research in cognitive science. Moreover, I want to claim that it is only in failure that the embodied limb and tool are phenomenologically distinct. I will go on to argue that this claim is essential for understanding the phenomenon of failed embodiment, such as that found within the clowning tradition, before concluding with a short provocation regarding the social and political implications of such a view

Theoretical Approaches and Key Concepts in Medical Anthropology

The theoretical views and ideas offered in the following pages – which are quite long in order to offer a through explanation of the vast and diverse medical and anthropological literature we have available – regard specific concepts and paradigms that will be useful in order to create a solid framework for the ethnographic material we have gathered

The advent of heroic anthropology in the history of ideas

In this article the advent of Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology is described as a reaction against the predominantly phenomenological bias of French philosophy in the post-war years as well as against the old humanism of existentialism which seemed parochial both in its confinement to a specific tradition of western philosophy and in its lack of interest in scientific approach. Nevertheless, the paradigm of structural anthropology cannot be equated with the field of structuralism, which became a very contestable form of intellectual fashion. The reception of Lévi-Strauss’s theory in the English-speaking world carried on both the same enthusiasm and the same distortions and simplifications, to the extent that in the course of anti-structural criticism, the main thrust of the epistemological approach of Lévi-Strauss seems to have been lost, to the collective detriment of social sciences and anthropology

Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found

Liturgical anthropology : a developmental perspective

According to recent accounts of so called “liturgical anthropology,” human beings are ritual creatures shaped more by what they feel than what they think. This is because the liturgies that make up our daily lives orient our desires towards certain goals and visions of the good life. We seek to expand this vision of liturgical anthropology by offering a critique of a predominantly affective vision of human development in which liturgy shapes primarily what we love. Drawing insights from developmental psychology, we argue that affect and cognition are intertwined throughout development, each reinforcing the other. Instead of attempting to artificially separate cognition and affect, then, we offer a vision of liturgical anthropology that is holistic, paying attention to the ways in which both our desires and beliefs are shaped by participation in liturgies, whether these be religious or otherwise. Finally, we argue that the psychological concept of “joint attention” can provide a helpful focal point for establishing why liturgy and ritual is so formative for human development.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Logical word learning: The case of kinship

We examine the conceptual development of kinship through the lens of program induction. We present a computational model for the acquisition of kinship term concepts, resulting in the first computational model of kinship learning that is closely tied to developmental phenomena. We demonstrate that our model can learn several kinship systems of varying complexity using cross-linguistic data from English, Pukapuka, Turkish, and Yanomamö. More importantly, the behavioral patterns observed in children learning kinship terms, under-extension and over-generalization, fall out naturally from our learning model. We then conducted interviews to simulate realistic learning environments and demonstrate that the characteristic-to-defining shift is a consequence of our learning model in naturalistic contexts containing abstract and concrete features. We use model simulations to understand the influence of logical simplicity and children’s learning environment on the order of acquisition of kinship terms, providing novel predictions for the learning trajectories of these words. We conclude with a discussion of how this model framework generalizes beyond kinship terms, as well as a discussion of its limitations