Better coverage, better outcomes? Mapping mobile network data to official statistics using satellite imagery and radio propagation modelling

Mobile sensing data has become a popular data source for geo-spatial analysis, however, mapping it accurately to other sources of information such as statistical data remains a challenge. Popular mapping approaches such as point allocation or voronoi tessellation provide only crude approximations of the mobile network coverage as they do not consider holes, overlaps and within-cell heterogeneity. More elaborate mapping schemes often require additional proprietary data operators are highly reluctant to share. In this paper, I use human settlement information extracted from publicly available satellite imagery in combination with stochastic radio propagation modelling techniques to account for that. I show in a simulation study and a real-world application on unemployment estimates in Senegal that better coverage approximations do not necessarily lead to better outcome predictions

GNSS Shadow Matching: The Challenges Ahead

GNSS shadow matching is a new technique that uses 3D mapping to improve positioning accuracy in dense urban areas from tens of meters to within five meters, potentially less. This paper presents the first comprehensive review of shadow matching’s error sources and proposes a program of research and development to take the technology from proof of concept to a robust, reliable and accurate urban positioning product. A summary of the state of the art is also included. Error sources in shadow matching may be divided into six categories: initialization, modelling, propagation, environmental complexity, observation, and algorithm approximations. Performance is also affected by the environmental geometry and it is sometimes necessary to handle solution ambiguity. For each error source, the cause and how it impacts the position solution is explained. Examples are presented, where available, and improvements to the shadow-matching algorithms to mitigate each error are proposed. Methods of accommodating quality control within shadow matching are then proposed, including uncertainty determination, ambiguity detection, and outlier detection. This is followed by a discussion of how shadow matching could be integrated with conventional ranging-based GNSS and other navigation and positioning technologies. This includes a brief review of methods to enhance ranging-based GNSS using 3D mapping. Finally, the practical engineering challenges of shadow matching are assessed, including the system architecture, efficient GNSS signal prediction and the acquisition of 3D mapping data

Robust Positioning in the Presence of Multipath and NLOS GNSS Signals

GNSS signals can be blocked and reflected by nearby objects, such as buildings, walls, and vehicles. They can also be reflected by the ground and by water. These effects are the dominant source of GNSS positioning errors in dense urban environments, though they can have an impact almost anywhere. Non- line-of-sight (NLOS) reception occurs when the direct path from the transmitter to the receiver is blocked and signals are received only via a reflected path. Multipath interference occurs, as the name suggests, when a signal is received via multiple paths. This can be via the direct path and one or more reflected paths, or it can be via multiple reflected paths. As their error characteristics are different, NLOS and multipath interference typically require different mitigation techniques, though some techniques are applicable to both. Antenna design and advanced receiver signal processing techniques can substantially reduce multipath errors. Unless an antenna array is used, NLOS reception has to be detected using the receiver's ranging and carrier-power-to-noise-density ratio (C/N0) measurements and mitigated within the positioning algorithm. Some NLOS mitigation techniques can also be used to combat severe multipath interference. Multipath interference, but not NLOS reception, can also be mitigated by comparing or combining code and carrier measurements, comparing ranging and C/N0 measurements from signals on different frequencies, and analyzing the time evolution of the ranging and C/N0 measurements

Architecture and Information Requirements to Assess and Predict Flight Safety Risks During Highly Autonomous Urban Flight Operations

As aviation adopts new and increasingly complex operational paradigms, vehicle types, and technologies to broaden airspace capability and efficiency, maintaining a safe system will require recognition and timely mitigation of new safety issues as they emerge and before significant consequences occur. A shift toward a more predictive risk mitigation capability becomes critical to meet this challenge. In-time safety assurance comprises monitoring, assessment, and mitigation functions that proactively reduce risk in complex operational environments where the interplay of hazards may not be known (and therefore not accounted for) during design. These functions can also help to understand and predict emergent effects caused by the increased use of automation or autonomous functions that may exhibit unexpected non-deterministic behaviors. The envisioned monitoring and assessment functions can look for precursors, anomalies, and trends (PATs) by applying model-based and data-driven methods. Outputs would then drive downstream mitigation(s) if needed to reduce risk. These mitigations may be accomplished using traditional design revision processes or via operational (and sometimes automated) mechanisms. The latter refers to the in-time aspect of the system concept. This report comprises architecture and information requirements and considerations toward enabling such a capability within the domain of low altitude highly autonomous urban flight operations. This domain may span, for example, public-use surveillance missions flown by small unmanned aircraft (e.g., infrastructure inspection, facility management, emergency response, law enforcement, and/or security) to transportation missions flown by larger aircraft that may carry passengers or deliver products. Caveat: Any stated requirements in this report should be considered initial requirements that are intended to drive research and development (R&D). These initial requirements are likely to evolve based on R&D findings, refinement of operational concepts, industry advances, and new industry or regulatory policies or standards related to safety assurance