8,573 research outputs found

    Insecure

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    Evaluating Prolog environments

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    Securing library information system: Vulnerabilities and threats

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    Threats and vulnerabilities in computers and networks are common nowadays since computers are widely used by the public. The risks of computer threats and vulnerabilities are high since most computers are connected to the internet. Library Information Systems is also vulnerable to attack since it is a public access institution. Majority of users are naive when it comes to computer and network securities. Some breaches in Library Information System are intentional and some are unintentional. Risks analysis should be done to find the threats and risks in designing the Library Information System. Threats are made possible due to lack of proper procedures, software flaws and policies. The administrators should anticipate all the possible attacks and their mitigation techniques. In this paper, we will try to address various issues arise from this vulnerabilities and threats. We will also describe how we can reduce and overcome this vulnerabilities and threats

    Enforcing Secure Object Initialization in Java

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    Sun and the CERT recommend for secure Java development to not allow partially initialized objects to be accessed. The CERT considers the severity of the risks taken by not following this recommendation as high. The solution currently used to enforce object initialization is to implement a coding pattern proposed by Sun, which is not formally checked. We propose a modular type system to formally specify the initialization policy of libraries or programs and a type checker to statically check at load time that all loaded classes respect the policy. This allows to prove the absence of bugs which have allowed some famous privilege escalations in Java. Our experimental results show that our safe default policy allows to prove 91% of classes of java.lang, java.security and javax.security safe without any annotation and by adding 57 simple annotations we proved all classes but four safe. The type system and its soundness theorem have been formalized and machine checked using Coq

    Web development evolution: the business perspective on security

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    Protection of data, information, and knowledge is a hot topic in today’s business environment. Societal, legislative and consumer pressures are forcing companies to examine business strategies, modify processes and acknowledge security to accept and defend accountability. Research indicates that a significant portion of the financial losses is due to straight forward software design errors. Security should be addressed throughout the application development process via an independent methodology containing customizable components. The methodology is designed to integrate with an organization’s existing software development processes while providing structure to implement secure applications, helping companies mitigate hard and soft costs

    More security or less insecurity (transcript of discussion)

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    The purpose of this talk is to explore the possibility of an exploitable analogy between approaches to secure system design and theories of jurisprudence. The prevailing theory of jurisprudence in the West at the moment goes back to Hobbes. It was developed by Immanuel Kant and later by Rousseau, and is sometimes called the contractarian model after Rousseau’s idea of the social contract. It’s not the sort of contract that you look at and think, oh gosh, that might be nice, I might think about opting in to that, it’s more like a pop up licence agreement that says, do you want to comply with this contract, or would you rather be an outlaw. So you don’t get a lot of choice about it. Sometimes the same theory, flying the flag of Immanuel Kant, is called transcendental institutionalism, because the basic approach says, you identify the legal institutions that in a perfect world would govern society, and then you look at the processes and procedures, the protocols that everyone should follow in order to enable those institutions to work, and then you say, right, that can’t be transcended, so therefore there’s a moral imperative for everyone to do it. So this model doesn’t pay any attention to the actual society that emerges, or to the incentives that these processes actually place on various people to act in a particular way. It doesn’t look at any interaction effects, it simply says, well you have to behave in this particular way because that’s what the law says you have to do, and the law is the law, and anybody who doesn’t behave in that way is a criminal, or (in our terms) is an attackerFinal Accepted Versio
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