Autonomy and the Limits of Cognitive Enhancement

In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy-based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition-enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to develop a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to cognitive enhancement. By drawing a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the exercise and achievement of autonomy and by exploring the possible effects of cognitive enhancement on both competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy, the paper identifies and explains which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the limits of cognitive enhancement as a means for enhancing autonomy

A cybersecure P300-based brain-to-computer interface against noise-based and fake P300 cyberattacks

In a progressively interconnected world where the internet of things (IoT), ubiquitous computing, and artificial intelligence are leading to groundbreaking technology, cybersecurity remains an underdeveloped aspect. This is particularly alarming for brain-to-computer interfaces (BCIs), where hackers can threaten the user’s physical and psychological safety. In fact, standard algorithms currently employed in BCI systems are inadequate to deal with cyberattacks. In this paper, we propose a solution to improve the cybersecurity of BCI systems. As a case study, we focus on P300-based BCI systems using support vector machine (SVM) algorithms and EEG data. First, we verified that SVM algorithms are incapable of identifying hacking by simulating a set of cyberattacks using fake P300 signals and noise-based attacks. This was achieved by comparing the performance of several models when validated using real and hacked P300 datasets. Then, we implemented our solution to improve the cybersecurity of the system. The proposed solution is based on an EEG channel mixing approach to identify anomalies in the transmission channel due to hacking. Our study demonstrates that the proposed architecture can successfully identify 99.996% of simulated cyberattacks, implementing a dedicated counteraction that preserves most of BCI functions

Can self-validating neuroenhancement be autonomous?

Consider that an individual improves her capacities by neuroscientific means. It turns out that, besides altering her in the way(s) she intended, the enhancement also changes her personality in significant way(s) she did not foresee. Yet the person endorses her new self because the neuroenhancement she underwent changed her. Can the person’s approval of her new personality be autonomous? While questions of autonomy have already gathered a significant amount of attention in philosophical literature on human enhancement, the problem just described—henceforth referred to as the question whether selfvalidatingneuroenhancement can be autonomous—would not appear to have received due consideration. This article takes a step towards remedying the shortage. I start by explicating the main points of departure of its argument. In the subsequent sections of the article, I consider several possible reasons for deeming self-validating neuroenhancement incompatible with autonomy. On the basis of the consideration, I propose that self-validating neuroenhancement can be autonomous. Keywords Autonomy · Human enhancement · Neuroscience · Personality change</p

Technology of deep brain stimulation: current status and future directions

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a neurosurgical procedure that allows targeted circuit-based neuromodulation. DBS is a standard of care in Parkinson disease, essential tremor and dystonia, and is also under active investigation for other conditions linked to pathological circuitry, including major depressive disorder and Alzheimer disease. Modern DBS systems, borrowed from the cardiac field, consist of an intracranial electrode, an extension wire and a pulse generator, and have evolved slowly over the past two decades. Advances in engineering and imaging along with an improved understanding of brain disorders are poised to reshape how DBS is viewed and delivered to patients. Breakthroughs in electrode and battery designs, stimulation paradigms, closed-loop and on-demand stimulation, and sensing technologies are expected to enhance the efficacy and tolerability of DBS. In this Review, we provide a comprehensive overview of the technical development of DBS, from its origins to its future. Understanding the evolution of DBS technology helps put the currently available systems in perspective and allows us to predict the next major technological advances and hurdles in the field.ope

Dimensions of the Threat to the Self Posed by Deep Brain Stimulation: Personal Identity, Authenticity, and Autonomy

Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) is an invasive therapeutic method involving the implantation of electrodes and the electrical stimulation of specific areas of the brain to modulate their activity. DBS brings therapeutic benefits, but can also have adverse side effects. Recently, neuroethicists have recognized that DBS poses a threat to the very fabric of human existence, namely, to the selves of patients. This article provides a review of the neuroethical literature examining this issue, and identifies the crucial dimensions related to the self which DBS may endanger—personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy. The most influential theories accounting for these dimensions are analyzed herein, and it is argued that most of these theories require further refinement. This paper also demonstrates the interrelation between personal identity, authenticity, and autonomy, and concludes that one can only fully understand the impact of DBS on the self when all of these factors are taken into account

Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether “. . . the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent”. In this book, I bring recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, I develop a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different form of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. I contrast my rationalist with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outline the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity

Strategies for the Reduction of Cybersecurity Breaches in Hospitals

AbstractRecent cyberattacks in hospitals show the urgency of the need to enhance secure information technology (IT) infrastructure. Hospitals are statistically more at cyber risk than all the multiple industries against ransomware, malware, hacking and internal threats. Guided by routine activity theory, the purpose of this exploratory multiple case study was to explore strategies utilized by hospitals\u27 IT security managers to reduce cybersecurity breaches associated with sensitive data. The participants were nine IT security managers from hospitals in the eastern United States. Data were collected via semistructured interviews and supporting documentation from the consenting participants and hospitals\u27 websites. Through thematic analysis, seven core themes emerged: (a) ensure adherence to top cybersecurity framework, (b) implement adequate and effective cybersecurity controls, (c) conduct a regular cybersecurity risk assessment, (d) maintain an air gap technique backup, (e) cultivate security awareness culture, (f) encrypt all data at rest and in transit, and (g) keep abreast with cybersecurity news and risks. A key recommendation for IT security managers is to utilize the maintenance of regularly updated backup as a crucial tactic for reducing exposure to cybercriminals. The implication for positive social change includes the potential to increase patients\u27 trust and reduce the threat to human life

Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics, and the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as an uncontroversial claim in this sphere. Yet, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship between rationality and autonomy. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether “. . . the reasons for making the choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent”. In this book, I bring recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, I develop a new framework for thinking about the concept, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in personal autonomy. Furthermore, the account outlined here allows for a deeper understanding of different form of controlling influence, and the relationship between our freedom to act, and our capacity to decide autonomously. I contrast my rationalist with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and outline the revisionary implications it has for various practical questions in bioethics in which autonomy is a salient concern, including questions about the nature of informed consent and decision-making capacity

Brainjacking in deep brain stimulation and autonomy

'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim that the possibility of brainjacking DBS raises particularly profound concerns about individual autonomy, since the possibility of hacking such devices raises the prospect of third parties exerting influence over the neural circuits underpinning the subject’s cognitive, emotional and motivational states. However, although it seems natural to assume that brainjacking represents a profound threat to individual autonomy, we suggest that the implications of brainjacking for individual autonomy are complicated by the fact that technologies targeted by brainjacking often serve to enhance certain aspects of the user’s autonomy. The difficulty of ascertaining the implications of brainjacking DBS for individual autonomy is exacerbated by the varied understandings of autonomy in the neuroethical and philosophical literature. In this paper, we seek to bring some conceptual clarity to this area by mapping out some of the prominent views concerning the different dimension of autonomous agency, and the implications of brainjacking DBS for each dimension. Drawing on three hypothetical case studies, we show that there could plausibly be some circumstances in which brainjacking could potentially be carried out in ways that could serve to enhance certain dimensions of the target’s autonomy. Our analysis raises further questions about the power, scope, and necessity of obtaining prior consent in seeking to protect patient autonomy when directly interfering with their neural states, in particular in the context of self-regulating closed-loop stimulation devices

Brainjacking in deep brain stimulation and autonomy

'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim that the possibility of brainjacking DBS raises particularly profound concerns about individual autonomy, since the possibility of hacking such devices raises the prospect of third parties exerting influence over the neural circuits underpinning the subject’s cognitive, emotional and motivational states. However, although it seems natural to assume that brainjacking represents a profound threat to individual autonomy, we suggest that the implications of brainjacking for individual autonomy are complicated by the fact that technologies targeted by brainjacking often serve to enhance certain aspects of the user’s autonomy. The difficulty of ascertaining the implications of brainjacking DBS for individual autonomy is exacerbated by the varied understandings of autonomy in the neuroethical and philosophical literature. In this paper, we seek to bring some conceptual clarity to this area by mapping out some of the prominent views concerning the different dimension of autonomous agency, and the implications of brainjacking DBS for each dimension. Drawing on three hypothetical case studies, we show that there could plausibly be some circumstances in which brainjacking could potentially be carried out in ways that could serve to enhance certain dimensions of the target’s autonomy. Our analysis raises further questions about the power, scope, and necessity of obtaining prior consent in seeking to protect patient autonomy when directly interfering with their neural states, in particular in the context of self-regulating closed-loop stimulation devices