Technology and Biological Weapons: Future Threats

Ye

Tacit knowledge and the biological weapons regime

Bioterrorism has become increasingly salient in security discourse in part because of perceived changes in the capacity and geography of life science research. Yet its salience is founded upon a framing of changes in science and security that does not always take into consideration the somewhat slippery concept of ‘tacit knowledge’, something poorly understood, disparately conceptualised and often marginalised in discussions on state and non-state biological weapons programmes. This paper looks at how changes in science and technology—particularly the evolution of information and communications technology—has contributed to the partial erosion of aspects of tacit knowledge and the implications for the biological weapons regime. This paper concludes by arguing that the marginalisation of tacit knowledge weakens our understanding of the difficulties encountered in biological weapons programmes and can result in distorted perceptions of the threat posed by dual-use biotechnology in the 21st century

Defining the Debate on Controlling Biological Weapons

Looks at the 1972 Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, and outlines the series of measures being negotiated by the world community to create a strong, effective, and enforceable biological weapons treaty

Education and outreach activities within the biological weapons convention

No description supplie

Living Lethal Weapons

Biological weapons, as defined by the Federation of American Scientists, are “toxins and microorganisms, such as viruses and bacteria, used to deliberately inflict disease among people, animals and agriculture.” Biological weapons have been used for hundreds of years on varying scales, from the catapulting of plague-infected corpses into enemy cities in the 14th century, to the testing of infectious diseases in China during WWII, to the 2001 anthrax attacks. These weapons act discreetly, as it is hard to trace an outbreak to a particular attacker and it takes several days for an infected individual to show signs of the disease. Moreover, because biological weapons are often highly infectious, their effect on society is far reaching. While state actors have made use of biological weapons in the past, the discreet and wide-reaching aspects of biological weapons make them increasingly appealing for terrorist groups, as they have the capability to disrupt society and cause panic

Preventing “a virological Hiroshima”: Cold War press coverage of biological weapons disarmament

This article examines representations of biological weapons during a crucial period in the recent history of this form of warfare. The study draws on a corpus of newspaper articles from the US New York Times and the UK Times and Guardian written around the time of the negotiation period of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the international treaty banning this form of warfare. We argue that a conventional discourse can be found wherein biological weapons are portrayed as morally offensive, yet highly effective and militarily attractive. Interwoven with this discourse, however, is a secondary register which depicts biological weapons as ineffective, unpredictable and of questionable value for the military. We finish with a somewhat more speculative consideration of the significance of these discourses by asking what might have been at stake when journalists and other writers deployed such differing representations of biological warfare

International Control Of Biological Weapons

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and resulting decline in fear of nuclear war, attention has shifted to other threats that remained in the background during the superpower confrontation

Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization

Currently there are two means of enforcing the international prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. First, the international community can induce compliance through imposition of sanctions, such as trade embargoes, freezing of assets and diplomatic isolation. Second, when sanctions fail, States can individually or collectively respond to the threat of chemical or biological weapons by using military force. After exploring the potential strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, this article examines the desirability of supplementing them with a third approach based on the criminal prosecution of persons responsible for the production, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical and biological weapons