What does it take to evolve behaviorally complex organisms?

What genotypic features explain the evolvability of organisms that have to accomplish many different tasks? The genotype of behaviorally complex organisms may be more likely to encode modular neural architectures because neural modules dedicated to distinct tasks avoid neural interference, i.e., the arrival of conflicting messages for changing the value of connection weights during learning. However, if the connection weights for the various modules are genetically inherited, this raises the problem of genetic linkage: favorable mutations may fall on one portion of the genotype encoding one neural module and unfavorable mutations on another portion encoding another module. We show that this can prevent the genotype from reaching an adaptive optimum. This effect is different from other linkage effects described in the literature and we argue that it represents a new class of genetic constraints. Using simulations we show that sexual reproduction can alleviate the problem of genetic linkage by recombining separate modules all of which incorporate either favorable or unfavorable mutations. We speculate that this effect may contribute to the taxonomic prevalence of sexual reproduction among higher organisms. In addition to sexual recombination, the problem of genetic linkage for behaviorally complex organisms may be mitigated by entrusting evolution with the task of finding appropriate modular architectures and learning with the task of finding the appropriate connection weights for these architectures

Spatial vision in insects is facilitated by shaping the dynamics of visual input through behavioral action

Egelhaaf M, Boeddeker N, Kern R, Kurtz R, Lindemann JP. Spatial vision in insects is facilitated by shaping the dynamics of visual input through behavioral action. Frontiers in Neural Circuits. 2012;6:108.Insects such as flies or bees, with their miniature brains, are able to control highly aerobatic flight maneuvres and to solve spatial vision tasks, such as avoiding collisions with obstacles, landing on objects, or even localizing a previously learnt inconspicuous goal on the basis of environmental cues. With regard to solving such spatial tasks, these insects still outperform man-made autonomous flying systems. To accomplish their extraordinary performance, flies and bees have been shown by their characteristic behavioral actions to actively shape the dynamics of the image flow on their eyes ("optic flow"). The neural processing of information about the spatial layout of the environment is greatly facilitated by segregating the rotational from the translational optic flow component through a saccadic flight and gaze strategy. This active vision strategy thus enables the nervous system to solve apparently complex spatial vision tasks in a particularly efficient and parsimonious way. The key idea of this review is that biological agents, such as flies or bees, acquire at least part of their strength as autonomous systems through active interactions with their environment and not by simply processing passively gained information about the world. These agent-environment interactions lead to adaptive behavior in surroundings of a wide range of complexity. Animals with even tiny brains, such as insects, are capable of performing extraordinarily well in their behavioral contexts by making optimal use of the closed action-perception loop. Model simulations and robotic implementations show that the smart biological mechanisms of motion computation and visually-guided flight control might be helpful to find technical solutions, for example, when designing micro air vehicles carrying a miniaturized, low-weight on-board processor

Evolution and Analysis of Embodied Spiking Neural Networks Reveals Task-Specific Clusters of Effective Networks

Elucidating principles that underlie computation in neural networks is currently a major research topic of interest in neuroscience. Transfer Entropy (TE) is increasingly used as a tool to bridge the gap between network structure, function, and behavior in fMRI studies. Computational models allow us to bridge the gap even further by directly associating individual neuron activity with behavior. However, most computational models that have analyzed embodied behaviors have employed non-spiking neurons. On the other hand, computational models that employ spiking neural networks tend to be restricted to disembodied tasks. We show for the first time the artificial evolution and TE-analysis of embodied spiking neural networks to perform a cognitively-interesting behavior. Specifically, we evolved an agent controlled by an Izhikevich neural network to perform a visual categorization task. The smallest networks capable of performing the task were found by repeating evolutionary runs with different network sizes. Informational analysis of the best solution revealed task-specific TE-network clusters, suggesting that within-task homogeneity and across-task heterogeneity were key to behavioral success. Moreover, analysis of the ensemble of solutions revealed that task-specificity of TE-network clusters correlated with fitness. This provides an empirically testable hypothesis that links network structure to behavior.Comment: Camera ready version of accepted for GECCO'1

Linking Visual Development and Learning to Information Processing: Preattentive and Attentive Brain Dynamics

National Science Foundation (SBE-0354378); Office of Naval Research (N00014-95-1-0657

Linking Attention to Learning, Expectation, Competition, and Consciousness

The concept of attention has been used in many senses, often without clarifying how or why attention works as it does. Attention, like consciousness, is often described in a disembodied way. The present article summarizes neural models and supportive data and how attention is linked to processes of learning, expectation, competition, and consciousness. A key them is that attention modulates cortical self-organization and stability. Perceptual and cognitive neocortex is organized into six main cell layers, with characteristic sub-lamina. Attention is part of unified design of bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down interactions among indentified cells in laminar cortical circuits. Neural models clarify how attention may be allocated during processes of visual perception, learning and search; auditory streaming and speech perception; movement target selection during sensory-motor control; mental imagery and fantasy; and hallucination during mental disorders, among other processes.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624

Analog VLSI-Based Modeling of the Primate Oculomotor System

One way to understand a neurobiological system is by building a simulacrum that replicates its behavior in real time using similar constraints. Analog very large-scale integrated (VLSI) electronic circuit technology provides such an enabling technology. We here describe a neuromorphic system that is part of a long-term effort to understand the primate oculomotor system. It requires both fast sensory processing and fast motor control to interact with the world. A one-dimensional hardware model of the primate eye has been built that simulates the physical dynamics of the biological system. It is driven by two different analog VLSI chips, one mimicking cortical visual processing for target selection and tracking and another modeling brain stem circuits that drive the eye muscles. Our oculomotor plant demonstrates both smooth pursuit movements, driven by a retinal velocity error signal, and saccadic eye movements, controlled by retinal position error, and can reproduce several behavioral, stimulation, lesion, and adaptation experiments performed on primates

A Goal-Directed Bayesian Framework for Categorization

Categorization is a fundamental ability for efficient behavioral control. It allows organisms to remember the correct responses to categorical cues and not for every stimulus encountered (hence eluding computational cost or complexity), and to generalize appropriate responses to novel stimuli dependant on category assignment. Assuming the brain performs Bayesian inference, based on a generative model of the external world and future goals, we propose a computational model of categorization in which important properties emerge. These properties comprise the ability to infer latent causes of sensory experience, a hierarchical organization of latent causes, and an explicit inclusion of context and action representations. Crucially, these aspects derive from considering the environmental statistics that are relevant to achieve goals, and from the fundamental Bayesian principle that any generative model should be preferred over alternative models based on an accuracy-complexity trade-off. Our account is a step toward elucidating computational principles of categorization and its role within the Bayesian brain hypothesis

Norm-Establishing and Norm-Following in Autonomous Agency

Living agency is subject to a normative dimension (good-bad, adaptive-maladaptive) that is absent from other types of interaction. We review current and historical attempts to naturalize normativity from an organism-centered perspective, identifying two central problems and their solution: (1) How to define the topology of the viability space so as to include a sense of gradation that permits reversible failure, and (2) how to relate both the processes that establish norms and those that result in norm-following behavior. We present a minimal metabolic system that is coupled to a gradient-climbing chemotactic mechanism. Studying the relationship between metabolic dynamics and environmental resource conditions, we identify an emergent viable region and a precarious region where the system tends to die unless environmental conditions change. We introduce the concept of normative field as the change of environmental conditions required to bring the system back to its viable region. Norm-following, or normative action, is defined as the course of behavior whose effect is positively correlated with the normative field. We close with a discussion of the limitations and extensions of our model and some final reflections on the nature of norms and teleology in agency