Batch Sequencing and Cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufactur- ing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. We first consider sequencing situations with a single batch machine and analyze cooperative games arising from these situations. It is shown that these games are convex and an expression for the Shapley value of these games is provided. We also introduce an equal gain splitting rule for these sequencing situa- tions and provide an axiomatic characterization. Second, we analyze various aspects of flow-shop sequencing situations which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we provide two cases in which the cooperative game arising from the flow-shop sequencing situation is equal to the game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to one specific machine in the flow-shop.Sequencing situations;sequencing games;batch machines

A Cooperative Approach to Sequencing and Connection Problems.

There are many economic settings in which a group of agents wishes to undertake a joint enterprise in order to save costs. The success of such enterprises often relies on agreements on how to share the cost savings generated. The central issue of this monograph is to address cost allocation problems arising from sequencing problems and connection problems. Sequencing problems consider a group of agents who are waiting to be served in a facility and focuses on the problem of the allocation of the cost savings that can be obtained by switching from an initial service order to an optimal one. Connection problems consider the cost allocation problems arising from situations in which a group of agents wishes to collaborate and jointly invest in the construction or the maintenance of a common network. The methods we use in this monograph to analyze the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing and connection problems mainly rely on models of cooperative transferable utility games.

Batch Sequencing and Cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufactur- ing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. We first consider sequencing situations with a single batch machine and analyze cooperative games arising from these situations. It is shown that these games are convex and an expression for the Shapley value of these games is provided. We also introduce an equal gain splitting rule for these sequencing situa- tions and provide an axiomatic characterization. Second, we analyze various aspects of flow-shop sequencing situations which consist of batch machines only. In particular, we provide two cases in which the cooperative game arising from the flow-shop sequencing situation is equal to the game arising from a sequencing situation that corresponds to one specific machine in the flow-shop

Batch sequencing and cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufacturing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. To analyze the allocation problem at hand, it focusses on the existence of core elements, convexity, and the Shapley value