Automatically Verifying Railway Interlockings using SAT-based Model Checking

In this paper, we demonstrate the successful application of various SAT-based model checking techniques to verify train control systems. Starting with a propositional model for a control system, we show how execution of the system can be modelled via a finite automaton. We give algorithms to perform SAT-based model checking over such an automaton. In order to tackle state-space explosion we propose slicing. Finally we comment on results obtained by applying these methods to verify two real-world railway interlocking systems

OnTrack: Reflecting on domain specific formal methods for railway designs

OnTrack is a tool that supports workflows for railway verification that has been implemented using model driven engineering frameworks. Starting with graphical scheme plans and finishing with automatically generated formal models set-up for verification, OnTrack allows railway engineers to interact with verification procedures through encapsulating formal methods. OnTrack is grounded on a domain specification language (DSL) capturing scheme plans and supports generation of various formal models using model transformations. In this paper, we detail the role model driven engineering takes within OnTrack and reflect on the use of model driven engineering concepts for developing domain specific formal methods toolsets

On modelling and verifying railway interlockings: Tracking train lengths

The safety analysis of interlocking railway systems involves verifying freedom from collision, derailment and run-through (that is, trains rolling over wrongly-set points). Typically, various unrealistic assumptions are made when modelling trains within networks in order to facilitate their analyses. In particular, trains are invariably assumed to be shorter than track segments; and generally only a very few trains are allowed to be introduced into the network under consideration. In this paper we propose modelling methodologies which elegantly dismiss these assumptions. We first provide a framework for modelling arbitrarily many trains of arbitrary length in a network; and then we demonstrate that it is enough with our modelling approach to consider only two trains when verifying safety conditions. That is, if a safety violation appears in the original model with any number of trains of any and varying lengths, then a violation will be exposed in the simpler model with only two trains. Importantly, our modelling framework has been developed alongside - and in conjunction with - railway engineers. It is vital that they can validate the models and verification conditions, and - in the case of design errors - obtain comprehensible feedback. We demonstrate our modelling and abstraction techniques on two simple interlocking systems proposed by our industrial partner. As our formalization is, by design, near to their way of thinking, they are comfortable with it and trust it