On specification-based cyber-attack detection in smart grids

The transformation of power grids into intelligent cyber-physical systems brings numerous benefits, but also significantly increases the surface for cyber-attacks, demanding appropriate countermeasures. However, the development, validation, and testing of data-driven countermeasures against cyber-attacks, such as machine learning-based detection approaches, lack important data from real-world cyber incidents. Unlike attack data from real-world cyber incidents, infrastructure knowledge and standards are accessible through expert and domain knowledge. Our proposed approach uses domain knowledge to define the behavior of a smart grid under non-attack conditions and detect attack patterns and anomalies. Using a graph-based specification formalism, we combine cross-domain knowledge that enables the generation of whitelisting rules not only for statically defined protocol fields but also for communication flows and technical operation boundaries. Finally, we evaluate our specification-based intrusion detection system against various attack scenarios and assess detection quality and performance. In particular, we investigate a data manipulation attack in a future-orientated use case of an IEC 60870-based SCADA system that controls distributed energy resources in the distribution grid. Our approach can detect severe data manipulation attacks with high accuracy in a timely and reliable manner

Verifying correctness of persistent concurrent data structures: a sound and complete method

Non-volatile memory (NVM), aka persistent memory, is a new memory paradigm that preserves its contents even after power loss. The expected ubiquity of NVM has stimulated interest in the design of persistent concurrent data structures, together with associated notions of correctness. In this paper, we present a formal proof technique for durable linearizability, which is a correctness criterion that extends linearizability to handle crashes and recovery in the context ofNVM.Our proofs are based on refinement of Input/Output automata (IOA) representations of concurrent data structures. To this end, we develop a generic procedure for transforming any standard sequential data structure into a durable specification and prove that this transformation is both sound and complete. Since the durable specification only exhibits durably linearizable behaviours, it serves as the abstract specification in our refinement proof. We exemplify our technique on a recently proposed persistentmemory queue that builds on Michael and Scott’s lock-free queue. To support the proofs, we describe an automated translation procedure from code to IOA and a thread-local proof technique for verifying correctness of invariants

Generating Correct-by-Construction Distributed Implementations from Formal Maude Designs

Developing a reliable distributed system meeting desired performance requirements is a hard and very labor-intensive task. Formal specification of a system design and formal analysis can yield provably correct designs as well as reliable performance predictions. But there is still a formality gap between verified designs and distributed implementations. We present a correct-by-construction automatic transformation mapping a formal specification of a system design M in Maude to a distributed implementation D(M) with the same safety and liveness properties as M. Two case studies applying this transformation to state-of-the art distributed transaction systems show that high-quality implementations with acceptable performance and meeting performance predictions can be obtained in this way. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that formal models of distributed systems analyzed within the same formal framework for both logical and performance properties are automatically transformed into correct-by-construction implementations for which similar performance trends can be shown.Ope

Mechanized proofs of opacity: A comparison of two techniques

Software transactional memory (STM) provides programmers with a high-level programming abstraction for synchronization of parallel processes, allowing blocks of codes that execute in an interleaved manner to be treated as atomic blocks. This atomicity property is captured by a correctness criterion called opacity, which relates the behaviour of an STM implementation to those of a sequential atomic specification. In this paper, we prove opacity of a recently proposed STM implementation: the Transactional Mutex Lock (TML) by Dalessandro et al. For this, we employ two different methods: the first method directly shows all histories of TML to be opaque (proof by induction), using a linearizability proof of TML as an assistance; the second method shows TML to be a refinement of an existing intermediate specification called TMS2 which is known to be opaque (proof by simulation). Both proofs are carried out within interactive provers, the first with KIV and the second with both Isabelle and KIV. This allows to compare not only the proof techniques in principle, but also their complexity in mechanization. It turns out that the second method, already leveraging an existing proof of opacity of TMS2, allows the proof to be decomposed into two independent proofs in the way that the linearizability proof does not