8,765 research outputs found

    Auction-Based Mechanisms for Electronic Procurement

    Full text link

    A Decision Support System for Market Mechanisms Choice in e-Procurement

    Get PDF
    Since the rise of the Internet electronic markets have become an important component of e-procurement by bringing together demand and supply. E-markets are meeting venues for component suppliers and purchasers, who use exchange mechanisms to electronically support the procurement process. Exchange mechanisms can be conceived as market institutions providing sets of rules, which determine the functioning of the market and the permissible actions such as bidding deadlines, non-disclosure rules or bid-revocation constraints. In nowadays procurement landscape, mechanisms vary from electronic procurement catalogues, where requests and offers are publicly announced, to e-negotiationswhere the participants bargain over the conditions of a trade using electronic message exchange and / or decision support platforms, to auctions, where one or two sides automate the process during which participants from the other side compete against each other (Kersten, Neumann, Vahidov, & Chen, 2006). The variety of procurement solutions already suggests that there is no single best solution for all imaginable sourcing activities. Instead, some mechanisms like e.g. an auction might be advantageous in certain situations while others are not (and vice versa). In this paper we present a knowledge-based system (KMS) aimed at supporting procurement staff in their decision making on which mechanism to choose best for a specific sourcing scenario

    Coordination of Purchasing and Bidding Activities Across Markets

    Get PDF
    In both consumer purchasing and industrial procurement, combinatorial interdependencies among the items to be purchased are commonplace. E-commerce compounds the problem by providing more opportunities for switching suppliers at low costs, but also potentially eases the problem by enabling automated market decision-making systems, commonly referred to as trading agents, to make purchasing decisions in an integrated manner across markets. Most of the existing research related to trading agents assumes that there exists a combinatorial market mechanism in which buyers (or sellers) can bid (or sell) service or merchant bundles. Todayâ??s prevailing e-commerce practice, however, does not support this assumption in general and thus limits the practical applicability of these approaches. We are investigating a new approach to deal with the combinatorial interdependency challenges for online markets. This approach relies on existing commercial online market institutions such as posted-price markets and various online auctions that sell single items. It uses trading agents to coordinate a buyerâ??s purchasing and bidding activities across multiple online markets simultaneously to achieve the best overall procurement effectiveness. This paper presents two sets of models related to this approach. The first set of models formalizes optimal purchasing decisions across posted-price markets with fixed transaction costs. Flat shipping costs, a common e-tailing practice, are captured in these models. We observe that making optimal purchasing decisions in this context is NP-hard in the strong sense and suggest several efficient computational methods based on discrete location theory. The second set of models is concerned with the coordination of bidding activities across multiple online auctions. We study the underlying coordination problem for a collection of first or second-price sealed-bid auctions and derive the optimal coordination and bidding policies.

    Competition Between Auctions

    Get PDF
    Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses

    An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions

    Get PDF
    Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.Combinatorial Auction, Market Design Methodology, Market Architecture Design, Auction Rule Design, Winner Determination Design, Agent-Based System

    Electronic Reverse Auctions: Spawning Procurement Innovation in the Context of Arab Culture

    Get PDF
    Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This case describes procurement at a forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in a foreign country

    Communication and Reputation in Procurement Auctions – Some Empirical Evidence

    Get PDF
    This paper studies the role of communication and reputation in market interactions using data from online procurement auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning the auction. Messages are primarily used to reduce the asymmetric information associated with transactions.Communication; procurement auctions; reputation
    corecore