Hire the Experts: Combinatorial Auction Based Scheme for Experts Selection in E-Healthcare

During the last decade, scheduling the healthcare services (such as staffs and OTs) inside the hospitals have assumed a central role in healthcare. Recently, some works are addressed in the direction of hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) for the critical healthcare scenarios from outside of the medical unit, in both strategic and non-strategic settings under monetary and non-monetary perspectives. In this paper, we have tried to investigate the experts hiring problem with multiple patients and multiple experts; where each patient reports a preferred set of experts which is private information alongwith their private cost for consultancy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first step in the direction of modeling the experts hiring problem in the combinatorial domain. In this paper, the combinatorial auction based scheme is proposed for hiring experts from outside of the hospitals to have expertise by the preferred doctors set to the patients.Comment: 7 Page

A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A budget feasible mechanism for hiring doctors in e-healthcare

(c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this work in other works.Throughout the past decade, there has been an extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allocation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Hiring expert consultants in e-healthcare: an analytics-based two sided matching approach

Very often in some censorious healthcare scenario, there may be a need to have some expert consultancies (especially by doctors) that are not available in-house to the hospitals. Earlier, this interesting healthcare scenario of hiring the expert consultants (mainly doctors) from outside of the hospitals had been studied with the robust concepts of mechanism design with money and mechanism design without money. In this paper, we explore the more realistic two sided matching market in our healthcare set-up. In this, the members of the two participating communities, namely the patients and the doctors are revealing the strict preference ordering over the members of the opposite community for a stipulated amount of time. We assume that the patients and doctors are strategic in nature. With the theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that the TOMHECs, that results in the stable allocation of doctors to the patients, satisfies the several economic properties such as strategy-proof-ness (or truthfulness) and optimality. Further, the analytically based analysis of our proposed mechanisms i.e. RAMHECs and TOMHECs are carried out on the ground of the expected distance of the allocation done by the mechanisms from the top most preference. The proposed mechanisms are also validated with the help of exhaustive experiments.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A mechanism design framework for hiring experts in e-healthcare

We investigate the problem of hiring experts (motivated socially and monetarily) from outside of the hospital(s) in e-healthcare through the lens of mechanism design with and without money. This paper presents the mechanisms that handle the following scenarios: 1) Multiple patients and multiple experts with patients having zero budget, 2) Single or multiple patients and multiple experts with patient(s) having some positive budget. In this paper, for the first scenario, we have proposed algorithms based on the theory of mechanism design without money that satisfies several economic properties such as truthfulness, pareto optimality, and core allocation. Considering the second scenario, the truthful and budget feasible mechanisms are proposed. Through simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate our proposed mechanismsPeer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft