26 research outputs found
Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules
Clan game;Big boss game;Core;Decision making;Fuzzy coalition;Fuzzy game;Monotonic allocation rule
A Situation of Economic Management in NTU Cooperative Fuzzy Games
In economic management, we often use some (divisible) private resources to cooperative. Fuzzy coalitions always be used to describe this situation in cooperative fuzzy games. In this paper, we proposed two new solution concepts in NTU cooperative fuzzy games, and discussed their properties
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition
formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that
consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are
associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one
task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle
such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping
coalitions--or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the
issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the
core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional
(non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we
characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core
maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for
overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures
that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion
of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions
convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative
notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore
the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as
the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the
general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational
perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental
structure
Convex Fuzzy Games and Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes
AMS classifications: 90D12; 03E72Convex games;Core;Decisionmaking;Fuzzy coalitions;Fuzzy games;Monotonic allocation schemes;Weber set
Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes
90D12;03E72cooperative games
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions—or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure
A bargaining-Walras approach for finite economies
We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Moreover, we also show that justified objections equate with Walrasian objections. Our bargaining-Walras equivalence provides a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell (1989) for continuum economies.
Some further results highlight whether it is possible to restrict the formation of coalitions and still get the bargaining set. Finally, recasting some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set