1,585 research outputs found
Secure publish-subscribe protocols for heterogeneous medical wireless body area networks
Security and privacy issues in medical wireless body area networks (WBANs) constitute a major unsolved concern because of the challenges posed by the scarcity of resources in WBAN devices and the usability restrictions imposed by the healthcare domain. In this paper, we describe a WBAN architecture based on the well-known publish-subscribe paradigm. We present two protocols for publishing data and sending commands to a sensor that guarantee confidentiality and fine-grained access control. Both protocols are based on a recently proposed ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme that is lightweight enough to be embedded into wearable sensors. We show how sensors can implement lattice-based access control (LBAC) policies using this scheme, which are highly appropriate for the eHealth domain. We report experimental results with a prototype implementation demonstrating the suitability of our proposed solution.This work was supported by the MINECO grant TIN2013-46469-R (SPINY: Security and Privacy in the Internet of You)
Zero-Power Defense Done Right: Shielding IMDs from Battery-Depletion Attacks
The wireless capabilities of modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) make them vulnerable to security attacks. One prominent attack, which has disastrous consequences for the patient’s wellbeing, is the battery Denial-of-Service attack whereby the IMD is occupied with continuous authentication requests from an adversary with the aim of depleting its battery. Zero-Power Defense (ZPD), based on energy harvesting, is known to be an excellent protection against these attacks. This paper raises essential design considerations for employing ZPD techniques in commercial IMDs, offers a critical review of ZPD techniques found in literature and, subsequently, gives crucial recommendations for developing comprehensive ZPD solutions
IMDfence: Architecting a Secure Protocol for Implantable Medical Devices
Over the past decade, focus on the security and privacy aspects of implantable medical
devices (IMDs) has intensified, driven by the multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities found in various
existing devices. However, due to their strict computational, energy and physical constraints, conventional
security protocols are not directly applicable to IMDs. Custom-tailored schemes have been proposed instead
which, however, fail to cover the full spectrum of security features that modern IMDs and their ecosystems so
critically require. In this paper we propose IMDfence, a security protocol for IMD ecosystems that provides a
comprehensive yet practical security portfolio, which includes availability, non-repudiation, access control,
entity authentication, remote monitoring and system scalability. The protocol also allows emergency access
that results in the graceful degradation of offered services without compromising security and patient safety.
The performance of the security protocol as well as its feasibility and impact on modern IMDs are extensively
analyzed and evaluated. We find that IMDfence achieves the above security requirements at a mere less than
7% increase in total IMD energy consumption, and less than 14 ms and 9 kB increase in system delay and
memory footprint, respectively
Model-based Safety and Security Co-analysis: a Survey
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and
security analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures,
and security absence of malicious attacks. We consider ten model-based
formalisms, comparing their modeling principles, the interaction between safety
and security, and analysis methods. In each formalism, we model the classical
Locked Door Example where possible. Our key finding is that the exact nature of
safety-security interaction is still ill-understood. Existing formalisms merge
previous safety and security formalisms, without introducing specific
constructs to model safety-security interactions, or metrics to analyze trade
offs
Model-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security:Survey and Identification of Gaps
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing
Osmosis - Spring 2020
Osmosis is a student read, led, and written publication from the University of Richmond, focusing on all aspects of healthcare and science
- …