Recycling Parrondo games

We consider a deterministic realization of Parrondo games and use periodic orbit theory to analyze their asymptotic behavior.Comment: 12 pages, 9 figure

Resilient Autonomous Control of Distributed Multi-agent Systems in Contested Environments

An autonomous and resilient controller is proposed for leader-follower multi-agent systems under uncertainties and cyber-physical attacks. The leader is assumed non-autonomous with a nonzero control input, which allows changing the team behavior or mission in response to environmental changes. A resilient learning-based control protocol is presented to find optimal solutions to the synchronization problem in the presence of attacks and system dynamic uncertainties. An observer-based distributed H_infinity controller is first designed to prevent propagating the effects of attacks on sensors and actuators throughout the network, as well as to attenuate the effect of these attacks on the compromised agent itself. Non-homogeneous game algebraic Riccati equations are derived to solve the H_infinity optimal synchronization problem and off-policy reinforcement learning is utilized to learn their solution without requiring any knowledge of the agent's dynamics. A trust-confidence based distributed control protocol is then proposed to mitigate attacks that hijack the entire node and attacks on communication links. A confidence value is defined for each agent based solely on its local evidence. The proposed resilient reinforcement learning algorithm employs the confidence value of each agent to indicate the trustworthiness of its own information and broadcast it to its neighbors to put weights on the data they receive from it during and after learning. If the confidence value of an agent is low, it employs a trust mechanism to identify compromised agents and remove the data it receives from them from the learning process. Simulation results are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach

Asymptotics of Fingerprinting and Group Testing: Tight Bounds from Channel Capacities

In this work we consider the large-coalition asymptotics of various fingerprinting and group testing games, and derive explicit expressions for the capacities for each of these models. We do this both for simple decoders (fast but suboptimal) and for joint decoders (slow but optimal). For fingerprinting, we show that if the pirate strategy is known, the capacity often decreases linearly with the number of colluders, instead of quadratically as in the uninformed fingerprinting game. For many attacks the joint capacity is further shown to be strictly higher than the simple capacity. For group testing, we improve upon known results about the joint capacities, and derive new explicit asymptotics for the simple capacities. These show that existing simple group testing algorithms are suboptimal, and that simple decoders cannot asymptotically be as efficient as joint decoders. For the traditional group testing model, we show that the gap between the simple and joint capacities is a factor 1.44 for large numbers of defectives.Comment: 14 pages, 6 figure

Robust Exponential Worst Cases for Divide-et-Impera Algorithms for Parity Games

The McNaughton-Zielonka divide et impera algorithm is the simplest and most flexible approach available in the literature for determining the winner in a parity game. Despite its theoretical worst-case complexity and the negative reputation as a poorly effective algorithm in practice, it has been shown to rank among the best techniques for the solution of such games. Also, it proved to be resistant to a lower bound attack, even more than the strategy improvements approaches, and only recently a family of games on which the algorithm requires exponential time has been provided by Friedmann. An easy analysis of this family shows that a simple memoization technique can help the algorithm solve the family in polynomial time. The same result can also be achieved by exploiting an approach based on the dominion-decomposition techniques proposed in the literature. These observations raise the question whether a suitable combination of dynamic programming and game-decomposition techniques can improve on the exponential worst case of the original algorithm. In this paper we answer this question negatively, by providing a robustly exponential worst case, showing that no intertwining of the above mentioned techniques can help mitigating the exponential nature of the divide et impera approaches.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2017, arXiv:1709.0176

Collaboration in Social Networks

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in the structural hubs of sparse networks

Markov modeling of moving target defense games

We introduce a Markov-model-based framework for Moving Target Defense (MTD) analysis. The framework allows modeling of broad range of MTD strategies, provides general theorems about how the probability of a successful adversary defeating an MTD strategy is related to the amount of time/cost spent by the adversary, and shows how a multi-level composition of MTD strategies can be analyzed by a straightforward combination of the analysis for each one of these strategies. Within the proposed framework we define the concept of security capacity which measures the strength or effectiveness of an MTD strategy: the security capacity depends on MTD specific parameters and more general system parameters. We apply our framework to two concrete MTD strategies