Artificial morality: Making of the artificial moral agents

Abstract: Artificial Morality is a new, emerging interdisciplinary field that centres around the idea of creating artificial moral agents, or AMAs, by implementing moral competence in artificial systems. AMAs are ought to be autonomous agents capable of socially correct judgements and ethically functional behaviour. This request for moral machines comes from the changes in everyday practice, where artificial systems are being frequently used in a variety of situations from home help and elderly care purposes to banking and court algorithms. It is therefore important to create reliable and responsible machines based on the same ethical principles that society demands from people. New challenges in creating such agents appear. There are philosophical questions about a machine’s potential to be an agent, or mora l agent, in the first place. Then comes the problem of social acceptance of such machines, regardless of their theoretic agency status. As a result of efforts to resolve this problem, there are insinuations of needed additional psychological (emotional and cogn itive) competence in cold moral machines. What makes this endeavour of developing AMAs even harder is the complexity of the technical, engineering aspect of their creation. Implementation approaches such as top- down, bottom-up and hybrid approach aim to find the best way of developing fully moral agents, but they encounter their own problems throughout this effort

Improving fairness in machine learning systems: What do industry practitioners need?

The potential for machine learning (ML) systems to amplify social inequities and unfairness is receiving increasing popular and academic attention. A surge of recent work has focused on the development of algorithmic tools to assess and mitigate such unfairness. If these tools are to have a positive impact on industry practice, however, it is crucial that their design be informed by an understanding of real-world needs. Through 35 semi-structured interviews and an anonymous survey of 267 ML practitioners, we conduct the first systematic investigation of commercial product teams' challenges and needs for support in developing fairer ML systems. We identify areas of alignment and disconnect between the challenges faced by industry practitioners and solutions proposed in the fair ML research literature. Based on these findings, we highlight directions for future ML and HCI research that will better address industry practitioners' needs.Comment: To appear in the 2019 ACM CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 2019

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

Micro- and Macro-Level Validation in Agent-Based Simulation: Reproduction of Human-Like Behaviors and Thinking in a Sequential Bargaining Game

This paper addresses both micro- and macro-level validation in agent-based simulation (ABS) to explore validated agents that can reproduce not only human-like behaviors externally but also human-like thinking internally. For this purpose, we employ the sequential bargaining game, which can investigate a change in humans' behaviors and thinking longer than the ultimatum game (i.e., one-time bargaining game), and compare simulation results of Q-learning agents employing any type of the three types of action selections (i.e., the ε-greedy, roulette, and Boltzmann distribution selections) in the game. Intensive simulations have revealed the following implications: (1) Q-learning agents with any type of three action selections can reproduce human-like behaviors but not human-like thinking, which means that they are validated from the macro-level viewpoint but not from the micro-level viewpoint; and (2) Q-learning agents employing Boltzmann distribution selection with changing the random parameter can reproduce both human-like behaviors and thinking, which means that they are validated from both micro- and macro-level viewpoints.Micro- and Macro-Level Validation, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent Modeling, Sequential Bargaining Game, Reinforcement Learning

Learning to Reach Agreement in a Continuous Ultimatum Game

It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have much difficulty with social dilemmas, as they are able to balance personal benefit and group benefit. As agents in multi-agent systems are regularly confronted with social dilemmas, for instance in tasks such as resource allocation, these agents may benefit from the inclusion of mechanisms thought to facilitate human fairness. Although many of such mechanisms have already been implemented in a multi-agent systems context, their application is usually limited to rather abstract social dilemmas with a discrete set of available strategies (usually two). Given that many real-world examples of social dilemmas are actually continuous in nature, we extend this previous work to more general dilemmas, in which agents operate in a continuous strategy space. The social dilemma under study here is the well-known Ultimatum Game, in which an optimal solution is achieved if agents agree on a common strategy. We investigate whether a scale-free interaction network facilitates agents to reach agreement, especially in the presence of fixed-strategy agents that represent a desired (e.g. human) outcome. Moreover, we study the influence of rewiring in the interaction network. The agents are equipped with continuous-action learning automata and play a large number of random pairwise games in order to establish a common strategy. From our experiments, we may conclude that results obtained in discrete-strategy games can be generalized to continuous-strategy games to a certain extent: a scale-free interaction network structure allows agents to achieve agreement on a common strategy, and rewiring in the interaction network greatly enhances the agents ability to reach agreement. However, it also becomes clear that some alternative mechanisms, such as reputation and volunteering, have many subtleties involved and do not have convincing beneficial effects in the continuous case