A. Paul Sigurd\u27s Decision

In lieu of an abstract, below is the essay\u27s first paragraph. Well, son, I don\u27t think anyone really knew how he got it. Some said it was always his and that he was always there. Yet others said that he inherited it from his father. And many be1ieved that it was given to him by an impulsive woman - the Hester Prynne type - who, being in dire straits, had to get rid of it. A few even said that he built it himself when lie was a young man. Me? I never cared how he got it; the fact was that he had it and he was there. But I must confess I always wondered why, I mean with no boats coming into the harbor anymore. And did you know that he used to paint it white every spring? And that he used to put the light on every night? Every night it could be seen from the mainland. Going around and around and around. But why? No boats had come into the harbor for nearly twenty years

Around and around the storytelling called «ponderación», and also asking about the «boundaries» of Law

En ese debate, ambos contendores cultivan ciertas respectivas «novelas de conceptos», con base especialmente en puntos de vista tributarios de visiones ius-esencialistas: un esencialismo jurídico«razonabilista» frente a un esencialismo legalista. Así se conservan intactas también las enormes penumbras de vaguedades de ciertos conceptos fundamentales a que respectivamente recurre cada uno de aquéllos. Entonces quedan fuera de foco preguntas cruciales, señaladamente aquéllas del todo básicas que permitan examinar las cuestiones jurídicas en planos que se fijen sobre todo en la practicidad social real de las fórmulas discursivas utilizadas. Con ello el pensamiento se aleja de encarar esas cuestiones en términos capaces de someterlas a exigencias metodológicas —precisión intersubjetiva en el manejo de esos conceptos, aquilatamiento de facticidades sociales— aptas para resolver de la manera más adecuada posible, ¡en la práctica!, los conflictos que llegan a los tribunales. Especialmente se examinan esas cuestiones a propósito de ciertas postulaciones (esencialistas) en cuanto a unos supuestos «límites» netos del derecho y atribuyéndole a éste la condición (imaginaria) de constituir un sistema propiamente dicho. Por último, a tales modelos idealistas de discurso jurídico es contrapuesto aquí un posible modelo realista para los razonamientos judiciales, dirección de pensamiento orientada a poder sacar el máximo provecho de los conocimientos pertinentes suministrados por las ciencias sociales.This paper is a critical commentary on a discussion about the judicial balancing of principles. There, both contenders have raised points of view based on some «novels of concepts», specifically two essentialist conceptions of the judicial discourse: a «rationalistic» law-essentialism vs. a legalistic essentialism. In this way, such approaches also maintain large penumbras of vagueness regarding certain fundamental concepts used by these scholars. Both lines of thinking avoid approaching law matters in a manner that would subject them to more accurate methodological requirements, i. e. through intersubjective specifications regarding those concepts and paying attention to the true social effects of judges’ interpretative choices. Thereby, the very crucial questions remain generally out of focus: notably, the basic alternative issues that would make it possible to assess legal questions through more transparent modes of juridical reasoning, which will mainly highlight the real social effectiveness of the discursive formulas employed for juridical purposes. Especially examined, are certain essentialist postulations which allege that law itself has net «limits» and confer lawyer’s thinking the imaginary condition that it is properly a system. Lastly, such idealist approaches are here countered by a possible realist model for legal reasoning, which is apt to take best advantage of empirical knowledge provided by the social sciences

The Call at Night When I Was Dreaming of Figs

And they were sweet, their seeds popping in my mouth, tiny Vesuvian eruptions, and I ate them until one was left in a Etruscan bowl of sex positions, and it rolled around and around, in orbit of an empty center, until I lifted it to my lips—oh tear-drop fruit!—bared my teeth, pierced skin and flesh

Home Made Rugs

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The Applicability of Occupational Therapy to Correctional Programming

Correctional facilities are a controversial topic in the United States. Whether it is prison reform policy or overcrowding issues that are being debated in a political setting or at the dinner table, it is a hot topic of conversation. The discussion goes around and around to no avail, and seemingly no one is satisfied. A detailed look at current issues facing corrections, what has been done, and then, potentially what could be done may provide some clarity for a situation that is seemingly spinning out of control. Furthermore, occupational therapy and its application to correctional programming is explored as a potential solution to many of the current issues facing today’s correctional system. Therefore, this paper will also discuss the current implementation of occupational therapy within corrections, as well as additional ways that occupational therapy can be utilized in the field

Spinning the Legislative Veto

I am delighted to have been given the opportunity to comment on Judge Breyer\u27s proposal for a fast-track substitute to the legislative veto. Although the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto device in INS v. Chadha, Judge Breyer\u27s proposal demonstrates that innovative thinking may well permit those with enough determination to circumvent the apparent effect of the Court\u27s decision. Even more important, the proposal illustrates why such circumvention is possible. As a doctrinal matter, the legislative veto poses a real dilemma--one that is rooted in fundamental uncertainty about the proper relationship between the Supreme Court and the elected branches of government. Because the Supreme Court tried to resolve the constitutional issues raised by the legislative veto without first resolving that dilemma, the Chadha opinion is unsatisfying. Its tone is glib; its reasoning is superficial; and its analysis is linguistic rather than functional in nature