Argument-based agreements in agent societies

In this paper, we present an abstract argumentation framework for the support of agreement processes in agent societies. It takes into account arguments, attacks among them, and the social context of the agents that put forward arguments. Then, we de¿ne the semantics of the framework, providing a mechanism to evaluate arguments in view of other arguments posed in the argumentation process. We also provide a translation of the framework into a neural network that computes the set of acceptable arguments and can be tuned to give more or less importance to argument attacks. Finally, the framework is illustrated with an example in a real domain of a water-rights transfer market. & 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reservedThis work is supported by the Spanish government Grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2007-00022, TIN2008-04446 and TIN2009-13839-C03-01 and by the GVA project PROMETEO 2008/051.Heras Barberá, SM.; Botti Navarro, VJ.; Julian Inglada, VJ. (2012). Argument-based agreements in agent societies. Neurocomputing. 75(1):156-162. doi:10.1016/j.neucom.2011.02.022S15616275

An Ontological-based Knowledge-Representation Formalism for Case-Based Argumentation

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10796-014-9524-3[EN] In open multi-agent systems, agents can enter or leave the system, interact, form societies, and have dependency relations with each other. In these systems, when agents have to collaborate or coordinate their activities to achieve their objectives, their different interests and preferences can come into conflict. Argumentation is a powerful technique to harmonise these conflicts. However, in many situations the social context of agents determines the way in which agents can argue to reach agreements. In this paper, we advance research in the computational representation of argumentation frameworks by proposing a new ontologicalbased, knowledge-representation formalism for the design of open MAS in which the participating software agents are able to manage and exchange arguments with each other taking into account the agents’ social context. This formalism is the core of a case-based argumentation framework for agent societies. In addition, we present an example of the performance of the formalism in a real domain that manages the requests received by the technicians of a call centre.This work is supported by the Spanish government grants [CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 CSD2007-00022, TIN2011-27652-C03-01, and TIN2012-36586-C03-01] and by the GVA project [PROMETEO II/2013/019].Heras Barberá, SM.; Botti, V.; Julian Inglada, VJ. (2014). An Ontological-based Knowledge-Representation Formalism for Case-Based Argumentation. Information Systems Frontiers. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-014-9524-3S120Amgoud, L. (2005). An argumentation-based model for reasoning about coalition structures. In 2nd international workshop on argumentation in multi-agent systems, argmas-05(pp. 1–12). Springer.Amgoud, L., Dimopolous, Y., Moraitis, P. (2007). A unified and general framework for argumentation-based negotiation. In 6th international joint conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS-07. IFAAMAS.Atkinson, K., & Bench-Capon, T. (2008). Abstract argumentation scheme frameworks. In Proceedings of the 13th international conference on artificial intelligence: methodology, systems and applications, AIMSA-08, lecture notes in artificial intelligence (Vol. 5253, pp. 220–234). Springer.Aulinas, M., Tolchinsky, P., Turon, C., Poch, M., Cortés, U. (2012). Argumentation-based framework for industrial wastewater discharges management. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, 25(2), 317–325.Bench-Capon, T., & Atkinson, K. (2009). Argumentation in artificial intelligence, chap. abstract argumentation and values (pp. 45–64). Springer.Bench-Capon, T., & Sartor, G. (2003). A model of legal reasoning with cases incorporating theories and values. Artificial Intelligence, 150(1-2), 97–143.Bulling, N., Dix, J., Chesñevar, C.I. (2008). Modelling coalitions: ATL + argumentation. In Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS-08 (Vol. 2, pp. 681–688). ACM Press.Chesñevar, C., McGinnis, J., Modgil, S., Rahwan, I., Reed, C., Simari, G., South, M., Vreeswijk, G., Willmott, S. (2006). Towards an argument interchange format. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 21(4), 293–316.Diaz-Agudo, B., & Gonzalez-Calero, P.A. (2007). Ontologies: A handbook of principles, concepts and applications in information systems, integrated series in information systems, chap. an ontological approach to develop knowledge intensive cbr systems (Vol. 14, pp. 173–214). Springer.Dung, P.M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming, and N -person games. Artificial Intelligence, 77, 321–357.Ferber, J., Gutknecht, O., Michel, F. (2004). From agents to organizations: An organizational view of multi-agent systems. In Agent-oriented software engineering VI, LNCS (Vol. 2935, pp. 214–230.) Springer-Verlag.Hadidi, N., Dimopolous, Y., Moraitis, P. (2010). Argumentative alternating offers. In 9th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS-10 (pp. 441–448). IFAAMAS.Heras, S., Atkinson, K., Botti, V., Grasso, F., Julián, V., McBurney, P. (2010). How argumentation can enhance dialogues in social networks. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on computational models of argument, COMMA-10, frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications (Vol. 216, pp. 267–274). IOS Press.Heras, S., Botti, V., Julián, V. (2011). On a computational argumentation framework for agent societies. In Argumentation in multi-agent systems (pp. 123–140). Springer.Heras, S., Botti, V., Julián, V. (2012). Argument-based agreements in agent societies. Neurocomputing, 75(1), 156–162.Heras, S., Jordán, J., Botti, V., Julián, V. (2013). Argue to agree: A case-based argumentation approach. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 54(1), 82–108.Jordán, J., Heras, S., Julián, V. (2011). A customer support application using argumentation in multi-agent systems. In 14th international conference on information fusion (FUSION-11) (pp. 772– 778).Karunatillake, N.C. (2006). Argumentation-based negotiation in a social context. Ph.D. thesis, School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, UK.Karunatillake, N.C., Jennings, N.R., Rahwan, I., McBurney, P. (2009). Dialogue games that agents play within a society. Artificial Intelligence, 173(9-10), 935–981.Kraus, S., Sycara, K., Evenchik, A. (1998). Reaching agreements through argumentation: a logical model and implementation. Artificial Intelligence, 104, 1–69.López de Mántaras, R., McSherry, D., Bridge, D., Leake, D., Smyth, B., Craw, S., Faltings, B., Maher, M.L., Cox, M., Forbus, K., Keane, M., Watson, I. (2006). Retrieval, reuse, revision, and retention in CBR. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 20(3), 215–240.Luck, M., & McBurney, P. (2008). Computing as interaction: Agent and agreement technologies. In IEEE international conference on distributed human-machine systems. IEEE Press.Oliva, E., McBurney, P., Omicini, A. (2008). Co-argumentation artifact for agent societies. In 5th international workshop on argumentation in multi-agent systems, Argmas-08 (pp. 31–46). Springer.Ontañón, S., & Plaza, E. (2007). Learning and joint deliberation through argumentation in multi-agent systems. In 7th international conference on agents and multi-agent systems, AAMAS-07. ACM Press.Ontañón, S., & Plaza, E. (2009). Argumentation-based information exchange in prediction markets. In Argumentation in multi-agent systems, LNAI (vol. 5384, pp. 181–196). Springer.Parsons, S., Sierra, C., Jennings, N.R. (1998). Agents that reason and negotiate by arguing. Journal of Logic and Computation, 8(3), 261–292.Prakken, H. (2010). An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argument and Computation, 1, 93–124.Prakken, H., Reed, C., Walton, D. (2005). Dialogues about the burden of proof. In Proceedings of the 10th international conference on artificial intelligence and law, ICAIL-05 (pp. 115–124). ACM Press.Sierra, C., Botti, V., Ossowski, S. (2011). Agreement computing. KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 10.1007/s13218-010-0070-y .Soh, L.K., & Tsatsoulis, C. (2005). A real-time negotiation model and a multi-agent sensor network implementation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 11(3), 215–271.Walton, D., Reed, C., Macagno, F. (2008). Argumentation schemes. Cambridge University Press.Wardeh, M., Bench-Capon, T., Coenen, F.P. (2008). PISA - pooling information from several agents: Multiplayer argumentation from experience. In Proceedings of the 28th SGAI international conference on artificial intelligence, AI-2008 (pp. 133–146). Springer.Wardeh, M., Bench-Capon, T., Coenen, F.P. (2009). PADUA: A protocol for argumentation dialogue using association rules. AI and Law, 17(3), 183–215.Wardeh, M., Coenen, F., Bench-Capon, T. (2010). Arguing in groups. In 3rd international conference on computational models of argument, COMMA-10 (pp. 475–486). IOS Press.Willmott, S., Vreeswijk, G., Chesñevar, C., South, M., McGinnis, J., Modgil, S., Rahwan, I., Reed, C., Simari, G. (2006). Towards an argument interchange format for multi-agent systems. In 3rd international workshop on argumentation in multi-agent systems, ArgMAS-06 (pp. 17–34). Springer.Wyner, A., & Schneider, J. (2012). Arguing from a point of view. In Proceedings of the first international conference on agreement technologies

Social Norms and Individual Savings in the Context of Informal Insurance

This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suffers from enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of social norms observed in traditional societies which discourage 'excessive' accumulation of wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings are more likely to benefit poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.

Beyond core-periphery relationship in the EC cooperation

During the current process of EU enlargement, regions are confronted with a need to revise their relative position within the newly formed socio-economic, spatial and cultural spaces. As existing equilibria are severely affected, the type and direction of developmental trends of member states (and regions) are increasingly questioned. Concerns are being raised about the risks that the annealing process would trigger a number of undesirable processes, i.e. loss of comparative advantages, regions lagging behind, accentuation of socio-economic gaps, social unbalances resulting from migration flows of poor population. These might hamper the path of European integration and eventually result in a reinforcement of the more accessible well developed areas and a loss of more peripheral and relatively underdeveloped ones. In this context, cooperation amongst the member states, and in particular, their local governments, may play a significant role to both overcome those risks and favouring the EU integration process. Information on cooperation (and integration) for the European countries is extensive and provides detailed accounts of the initiatives which have been undertaken since the establishment of EU programs in the early sixties. Although the variety of cooperation (integration) programs which have been launched as the EU unification progressed are well documented, existing studies have rarely questioned the kind of evolution ( i.e. type and extent of the changes underlying the various initiatives) those programs underwent. The aim of this paper is to undertake a preliminary step in this analysis. A claim is made that: a. on the one hand, the widening of the scopes of cooperation programs and increasing number of eligible actors involved are significantly reinforcing the potentials of cooperation in favouring the integration process not only among the member countries but also different kind of areas (i.e. between metropolitan and peripheral cities); b. on the other hand, there is a need to refine the current approaches to cooperation and develop a conceptual framework which serves as a basis for both formulating the various initiatives and defining effective benchmarks for their evaluation. The paper is organized in three main sections. The first addresses some methodological questions about the definition of what should be understood as a cooperation situation. An effort is made to identify a conceptual framework which might be relevant for dealing with cooperative actions in a institutionalised setting. This is then used in the second section to provide an account of the evolution of the EU programs on cooperation. Finally, in the last section attention is turned to the strengths (i.e. greater attention to the spatial dimension of cooperation programs, more equalitarian relationships amongst the participants) and weaknesses (i.e. lack of a shared model of cooperative actions) of the current approaches to cooperation. An effort is made to emphasize a few relevant questions which can be challenging in the current EU policies and thinking.

Access and reward in the information society: regulating the collective management of copyright

Copyright Collecting Societies have proliferated, with more than 150 organisations now collecting and distributing licensing fees for rights in music, literary, audio-visual and graphic works within the European Union. From the perspective of Competition Law, collecting societies may be viewed as price-fixing cartels under Art. 81 EC, and as vulnerable to challenges under Art. 82 EC (i.e. abusing a dominant position as the sole provider of a management infrastructure to right holders, and as the only supplier of licences to copyright users). Yet, collective administration of copyright has important policy benefits: (i) From a user perspective, collecting societies may offer a single point licence providing easy and wide access to copyright protected contents. This can be a solution to innovation issues in an information society where major right holders otherwise may dictate problematic terms. (ii) Creators at the margins of commercial viability have access to a mechanism of collective bargaining against major rights exploiters, such as publishers, record labels and broadcasters. This may support a culturally diverse society. This article develops principles for regulating the collective management of copyrights from a critique of EC competition jurisprudence

Rawls, John

No abstract available

The relationship between copyright and contract law

Contracts lie at the heart of the regulatory system governing the creation and dissemination of cultural products in two respects: (1) The exclusive rights provided by copyright law only turn into financial reward, and thus incentives to creators, through a contract with a third party to exploit protected material. (2) From a user perspective purchases of protected material may take the form of a licensing contract, governing behaviour after the initial transaction. Thus, a review of the relationship between copyright and contract law has to address both supply- and demand-side issues. On the supply side, policy concerns include whether copyright law delivers the often stated aim of securing the financial independence of creators. Particularly acute are the complaints by both creators and producers that they fail to benefit from the exponential increase in the availability of copyright materials on the Internet. On the demand side, the issue of copyright exceptions and their policy justification has become central to a number of reviews and consultations dealing with digital content. Are exceptions based on user needs or market failure? Do exceptions require financial compensation? Can exceptions be contracted out by licence agreements? This report (i) reviews economic theory of contracts, value chains and transaction costs, (ii) identifies a comprehensive range of regulatory options relating to creator and user contracts, using an international comparative approach, (iii) surveys the empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory intervention, and (iv) where no evidence is available, extrapolates predicted effects from theory

Using the event calculus for tracking the normative state of contracts

In this work, we have been principally concerned with the representation of contracts so that their normative state may be tracked in an automated fashion over their deployment lifetime. The normative state of a contract, at a particular time, is the aggregation of instances of normative relations that hold between contract parties at that time, plus the current values of contract variables. The effects of contract events on the normative state of a contract are specified using an XML formalisation of the Event Calculus, called ecXML. We use an example mail service agreement from the domain of web services to ground the discussion of our work. We give a characterisation of the agreement according to the normative concepts of: obligation, power and permission, and show how the ecXML representation may be used to track the state of the agreement, according to a narrative of contract events. We also give a description of a state tracking architecture, and a contract deployment tool, both of which have been implemented in the course of our work.

Advancing subsidy reforms: towards a viable policy package

Executive Summary: World subsidies may total some $800 billion, of which perhaps two-thirds occur in the developed economies of the OECD. Reforming subsidy regimes that damage the prospects for sustainable development is immensely complex. Simply calling for subsidy removal is unlikely to succeed. The complexity arises from the fact that subsidies are manifestations of rent-seeking, which, in turn is part of a wider category of unproductive activity in economic systems. Rentseeking involves redirecting economic resources to special interest groups rather than using resources productively. Interest groups then use those resources to reinforce their privleged positions. Subsidy reform will inevitably conflict with those special interests. The idea that subsidy reform is a ‘win-win’ policy is therefore misleading – there will always be losers, even if they are undeserving losers. In many cases, the most harmful subsidies will be those that are least easy to remove. Subsidy reform is therefore about dissipating rents, has to be part of a wider programme of macroeconomic and political reform. Subsidies are often linked to corruption, thus emphasising the difficulty of securing the political changes that are needed. Moreover, instituting democratic reform is not sufficient either: democratic societies have even larger subsidy regimes than less democratic societies. Political change has to be combined with economic reform. Some have advocated ‘sudden shocks’ whereby dramatic events are seized as an opportunity to institute reform. There is some evidence to suggest that if a crisis does occur, it may be best to implement subsidy reform along with other transitional measures in one large package. An alternative is to let the almost inevitable growth of subsidies produce economic bankruptcy, and then institute reform. But many societies have proved surprisingly resilient whilst sustaining extensive subsidy regimes, and the costs of waiting may not be acceptable anyway. In the absence of crisis, a gradual approach is best. Policies need to be pre-announced and gradual subsidy reduction needs to be combined with careful public awareness campaigns and efforts at political transparency and accountability. Bilateral and multilateral lenders have a strong role to play, even though reforming subsidies as part of a conditionality package is still controversial. Reform almost inevitably involves privatisation since exposure to market forces is essential for rent dissipation. Nonetheless, reform is complex and its success if difficult to guarantee: for example, privatisation may simply shift rents from the public to the private sector. Subsidy regimes seem peculiarly resilient to change

Fiscal decentralization, tax competition, and federal tax administration: A note from the Argentine experience

The paper analyses the usual arguments discussed in the fiscal federalism literature about fiscal decentralization through normative and positive (public choice) approaches. Afterwards, limits to enhance significantly fiscal decentralization in countries with important regional asymmetries like Argentina are analyzed. Finally, the author suggests the necessity of a fiscal institutional reform, which allows an efficient and responsible vertical coordination. A superlative role is assigned to the federal revenue administration in the suggested reform.Fiscal decentralization, Tax Competition, Federal Tax Administration, Argentina