Are digital picturings representations?

The philosopher of art Roger Scruton has claimed that photographic images are not representations, on the basis of the role of causal rather than intentional processes in arriving at the content of a photographic image (Scruton, 1981). His claim was controversial at the time, and still is, but had the merit of being a springboard for asking important questions about what kinds of representation result from the technologies used in depicting and visualising. In the context of computational picturing of different kinds, in imaging and other forms of visualisation, the question arises again, but this time in an even more interesting form, since these techniques are often hybrids of different principles and techniques. A digital image results from a complex interrelationship of physical, mathematical and technological principles, embedded within human and social situations. This paper consists of three sections, each presenting a view of the question whether digital imaging and digital visual artefacts generally are representations, from a different perspective. These perspectives are not representative, but aim only to accomplish what Scruton’s paper did succeed in accomplishing, that is, being a provocation and a springboard for a broader discussion

OK computer? Digital community archaeologies in practice

The articles in this section of Internet Archaeology came out of a Theoretical Archaeology Group session at Manchester University in 2014. The session was motivated to explore issues associated with 'digital public archaeology' (DPA). The articles presented here deal with a number of themes which arise when doing digital public archaeology

Crowd-sourcing archaeological research: HeritageTogether digital public archaeology in practice

Archaeologists are increasingly working with crowd-sourced digital data. Using evidence from other disciplines about the nature of crowd-sourcing in academic research, we suggest that archaeological projects using donated data can usefully be differentiated between generative projects (which rely on data collected by citizen scientists), and analytical projects (which make use of volunteers to classify, or otherwise analyse data that are provided by the project). We conclude that projects which privilege hyper-local research (such as surveying specific sites) might experience tension if the audience they are appealing to are 'cyber local'. In turn, for more 'traditional' archaeological audiences (when the primary motivating interests may be the tangible, physical nature of portable material culture or the archaeological site itself), then intangible, digital simulacra may not provide an effective medium through which to undertake digital public archaeology

Programming Visuals, Visualising Programs

This article examines the role of visualisations in astrophysics programming work, showing that visualisations are not only outputs for those producing them, but can help those developing them understand how to do their work. Studies of visualization in programming have mainly been of social and cultural factors influencing scientific research. We concentrate on the material aspects of scientific work, as of interest in their own right and on methodological grounds (since capturing the material practices of computer screen-work is an underexplored area). Using a ‘video-aided ethnographic’ method we analyse an episode of computational astrophysics involving the use of the Python programming language. We identify a selection of activities comprising the screen work of an astrophysics researcher to unpack how those activities contribute to the production of scientific knowledge

Repurposing digital traces to organize social attention

In the late 1990s, Google pioneered the idea of scraping and repurposing digital traces as a new form of data with which to understand people’s preferences and behaviour. This way of generating empirical sensitivity towards the world can be termed digital methods and the last five years have seen such methods gain influence beyond the field of Internet search. Organizations of different kinds are increasingly mentioning the need to harness the intelligence of ‘big’ digital datasets, and the social sciences have similarly been marked by suggestions to move away from established methods such as surveys and focus groups, and learn from the way Google and other companies have succeeded in turning big datasets into knowledge of social dynamics. By enabling new combinations of data and software and by providing new ways of searching, aggregating, and cross-referencing empirical datasets, it seems probable that the spread of digital methods will re-configure the way organizations, social scientists, and citizens ‘see’ the world in which they live

Are digital picturings representations?

The philosopher of art Roger Scruton has claimed that photographic images are not representations, on the basis of the role of causal rather than intentional processes in arriving at the content of a photographic image (Scruton, 1981). His claim was controversial at the time, and still is, but had the merit of being a springboard for asking important questions about what kinds of representation result from the technologies used in depicting and visualising. In the context of computational picturing of different kinds, in imaging and other forms of visualisation, the question arises again, but this time in an even more interesting form, since these techniques are often hybrids of different principles and techniques. A digital image results from a complex interrelationship of physical, mathematical and technological principles, embedded within human and social situations. This paper consists of three sections, each presenting a view of the question whether digital imaging and digital visual artefacts generally are representations, from a different perspective. These perspectives are not representative, but aim only to accomplish what Scruton’s paper did succeed in accomplishing, that is, being a provocation and a springboard for a broader discussion

Are digital picturings representations?

The philosopher of art Roger Scruton has claimed that photographic images are not representations, on the basis of the role of causal rather than intentional processes in arriving at the content of a photographic image (Scruton, 1981). His claim was controversial at the time, and still is, but had the merit of being a springboard for asking important questions about what kinds of representation result from the technologies used in depicting and visualising. In the context of computational picturing of different kinds, in imaging and other forms of visualisation, the question arises again, but this time in an even more interesting form, since these techniques are often hybrids of different principles and techniques. A digital image results from a complex interrelationship of physical, mathematical and technological principles, embedded within human and social situations. This paper consists of three sections, each presenting a view of the question whether digital imaging and digital visual artefacts generally are representations, from a different perspective. These perspectives are not representative, but aim only to accomplish what Scruton’s paper did succeed in accomplishing, that is, being a provocation and a springboard for a broader discussion