Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $n$ items facing a single buyer. We introduce the notion of symmetric menu complexity of a mechanism, which counts the number of distinct options the buyer may purchase, up to permutations of the items. Our main result is that a mechanism of quasi-polynomial symmetric menu complexity suffices to guarantee a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation when the buyer is unit-demand over independent items, even when the value distribution is unbounded, and that this mechanism can be found in quasi-polynomial time. Our key technical result is a polynomial time, (symmetric) menu-complexity-preserving black-box reduction from achieving a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation for unbounded valuations that are subadditive over independent items to achieving a $(1-O(\varepsilon))$-approximation when the values are bounded (and still subadditive over independent items). We further apply this reduction to deduce approximation schemes for a suite of valuation classes beyond our main result. Finally, we show that selling separately (which has exponential menu complexity) can be approximated up to a $(1-\varepsilon)$ factor with a menu of efficient-linear $(f(\varepsilon) \cdot n)$ symmetric menu complexity.Comment: FOCS 201

Optimal Pricing Is Hard

We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer’s value distribution is a sum of independently distributed attributes, or multi-item settings where the buyer’s values for the items are independent. We also show that it is intractable to optimally price the grand bundle of multiple items for an additive bidder whose values for the items are independent. These difficulties stem from implicit definitions of a value distribution. We provide three instances of how different properties of implicit distributions can lead to intractability: the first is a #P-hardness proof, while the remaining two are reductions from the SQRT-SUM problem of Garey, Graham, and Johnson [14]. While simple pricing schemes can oftentimes approximate the best scheme in revenue, they can have drastically different underlying structure. We argue therefore that either the specification of the input distribution must be highly restricted in format, or it is necessary for the goal to be mere approximation to the optimal scheme’s revenue instead of computing properties of the scheme itself.Microsoft Research (Fellowship)Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (Fellowship)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CAREER Award CCF-0953960)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-1101491)Hertz Foundation (Daniel Stroock Fellowship

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. We suggest using the a-priori better of two simple pricing methods: selling the items separately, each at its optimal price, and bundling together, in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items

A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. Theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits in the past decades and analytical solutions are known for only a few simple settings. Computational approaches to the problem through the use of LPs have their own set of limitations. Building on the success of deep learning, a new approach was recently proposed by Duetting et al. (2019) in which the auction is modeled by a feed-forward neural network and the design problem is framed as a learning problem. The neural architectures used in that work are general purpose and do not take advantage of any of the symmetries the problem could present, such as permutation equivariance. In this work, we consider auction design problems that have permutation-equivariant symmetry and construct a neural architecture that is capable of perfectly recovering the permutation-equivariant optimal mechanism, which we show is not possible with the previous architecture. We demonstrate that permutation-equivariant architectures are not only capable of recovering previous results, they also have better generalization properties

Simple vs. Optimal Mechanism Design

Mechanism design has found various applications in today\u27s economy, such as ad auctions and online markets. The goal of mechanism design is to design a mechanism or system such that a group of strategic agents are incentivized to choose actions that also help achieve the designer’s objective. However, in many of the mechanism design problems, the theoretically optimal mechanisms are complex and randomized, while mechanisms used in practice are usually simple and deterministic. The focus of this thesis is to resolve the discrepancy between theory and practice by studying the following questions: Are the mechanisms used in practice close to optimal? Can we design simple mechanisms to approximate the optimal one? In this thesis we focus on two important mechanism design settings: multi-item auctions and two-sided markets. We show that in both of the settings, there are indeed simple and approximately-optimal mechanisms. Following Myerson\u27s seminal result, which provides a simple and revenue-optimal auction when a seller is selling a singleitem to multiple buyers, there has been extensive research effort on maximizing revenue in multi-item auctions. However, the revenue-optimal mechanism is proved to be complex and randomized. We provide a unified framework to approximate the optimal revenue in a fairly general setting of multi-item auctions with multiple buyers. Our result substantially improves the results in the literature and applies to broader cases. Another line of works in this thesis focuses on two-sided markets, where sellers also participate in the mechanism and have their own costs. The impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that even in the simplist bilateral trade setting (1 buyer, 1 seller, 1 item), the full welfare is not achievable by a truthful mechanism that does not run a deficit. In this thesis we focus on a more challenging objective gains from trade --- the increment of the welfare, and provide simple mechanisms that approximate the optimal gains from trade, in bilateral trade and many other two-sided market settings

Fundamental Tradeoffs for Modeling Customer Preferences in Revenue Management

Revenue management (RM) is the science of selling the right product, to the right person, at the right price. A key to the success of RM, which now spans a broad array of industries, is its grounding in mathematical modeling and analytics. This dissertation contributes to the development of new RM tools by: (1) exploring some fundamental tradeoffs underlying any RM problems, and (2) designing efficient algorithms for some RM applications. Another underlying theme of this dissertation is the modeling of customer preferences, a key component of any RM problem. The first chapters of this dissertation focus on the model selection problem: many demand models are available but picking the right model is a challenging task. In particular, we explore the tension between the richness of a model and its tractability. To quantify this tradeoff, we focus on the assortment optimization problem, a very general and core RM problem. To capture customer preferences in this context, we use choice models, a particular type of demand model. In Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 we design efficient algorithms for the assortment optimization problem under different choice models. By assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different choice models, we can quantify the cost in tractability one has to pay for better predictive power. This in turn leads to a better understanding of the tradeoffs underlying the model selection problem. In Chapter 5, we focus on a different question underlying any RM problem: choos- ing how to sell a given product. We illustrate this tradeoff by focusing on the problem of selling ad impressions via Internet display advertising platforms. In particular, we study how the presence of risk-averse buyers affects the desire for reservation con- tracts over real time buy via a second-price auction. In order to capture the risk aversion of buyers, we study different utility models

Essays on Shipment Consolidation Scheduling and Decision Making in the Context of Flexible Demand

This dissertation contains three essays related to shipment consolidation scheduling and decision making in the presence of flexible demand. The first essay is presented in Section 1. This essay introduces a new mathematical model for shipment consolidation scheduling for a two-echelon supply chain. The problem addresses shipment coordination and consolidation decisions that are made by a manufacturer who provides inventory replenishments to multiple downstream distribution centers. Unlike previous studies, the consolidation activities in this problem are not restricted to specific policies such as aggregation of shipments at regular times or consolidating when a predetermined quantity has accumulated. Rather, we consider the construction of a detailed shipment consolidation schedule over a planning horizon. We develop a mixed-integer quadratic optimization model to identify the shipment consolidation schedule that minimizes total cost. A genetic algorithm is developed to handle large problem instances. The other two essays explore the concept of flexible demand. In Section 2, we introduce a new variant of the vehicle routing problem (VRP): the vehicle routing problem with flexible repeat visits (VRP-FRV). This problem considers a set of customers at certain locations with certain maximum inter-visit time requirements. However, they are flexible in their visit times. The VRP-FRV has several real-world applications. One scenario is that of caretakers who provide service to elderly people at home. Each caretaker is assigned a number of elderly people to visit one or more times per day. Elderly people differ in their requirements and the minimum frequency at which they need to be visited every day. The VRP-FRV can also be imagined as a police patrol routing problem where the customers are various locations in the city that require frequent observations. Such locations could include known high-crime areas, high-profile residences, and/or safe houses. We develop a math model to minimize the total number of vehicles needed to cover the customer demands and determine the optimal customer visit schedules and vehicle routes. A heuristic method is developed to handle large problem instances. In the third study, presented in Section 3, we consider a single-item cyclic coordinated order fulfillment problem with batch supplies and flexible demands. The system in this study consists of multiple suppliers who each deliver a single item to a central node from which multiple demanders are then replenished. Importantly, demand is flexible and is a control action that the decision maker applies to optimize the system. The objective is to minimize total system cost subject to several operational constraints. The decisions include the timing and sizes of batches delivered by the suppliers to the central node and the timing and amounts by which demanders are replenished. We develop an integer programing model, provide several theoretical insights related to the model, and solve the math model for different problem sizes