Sequence-of-tense and the features of finite tenses

Sequence-of-tense (SOT) is often described as a (past) tense verb form that does not correspond to a semantically interpretable tense. Since SOT clauses behave in other respects like finite clauses, the question arises as to whether the syntactic category Tense has to be distinguished from the functional category tense.  I claim that SOT clauses do in fact contain interpretable PRESENT tense.  The “past” form is analyzed as a manifestation of agreement with the (matrix past) controller of the SOT clause evaluation time.  One implication of this analysis is that finite verb forms should be analyzed as representing features that correspond to functional categories higher in clause structure, including those of the clausal left periphery. SOT morphology then sheds light on the existence of a series of finer-grained functional heads that contribute to tense construal, and to verbal paradigms. These include Tense, Modality and Force

Metaphysical Explanation and the Inference to the Best Explanation (BA thesis)

Inference to the Best Explanation, roughly put, appeals to the explanatory power of a theory or hypothesis (relative to some data set) as constituting epistemic justification for it. Inference to the Best Explanation (henceforth IBE) is a tool widely employed among all reasoners alike, from the empirical sciences to ordinary life. Philosophical discussions do not differ in the usualness of explanatory appeals of this kind during serious argument. Often enough, the appeal is dialectically blocked, as many of our epistemic peers in philosophy offer reasons to be skeptical of IBE. Our aim with this monograph is to assess one worry that have been raised about this mode of inference: That explanatory power is not truth-conducive. We begin by discussing general features of inferences and then formulating IBE in detail. Afterward, we explicate and apply a canonical understanding of what an explanation is. This will lead to a certain understanding of explanatory power. We undergo a case study to defend the thesis that this kind of explanatory power is indeed epistemically irrelevant – unless, perhaps, when combined with other theoretical virtues. Our conclusion is that the measure what explanations are best requires taking other theoretical virtues into account, such as simplicity and unification. In this case, a complete assessment of IBE requires examining if, when, and how these alleged theoretical virtues are indeed truth-conducive

Mathematical Logic: Proof Theory, Constructive Mathematics

[no abstract available

An Inquisitive Perspective on Modals and Quantifiers

Inquisitive semantics enriches the standard truth-conditional notion of meaning, in order to facilitate an integrated semantic analysis of statements and questions. Taking this richer view on meaning as a starting point, this review presents a new perspective on modal operators and quantifiers, one that has the potential to address a number of challenges for standard semantic analyses of such operators. To illustrate the new perspective, we present an inquisitive take on the semantics of attitude verbs and on quantifiers taking scope out of questions

An Observation about Truth

Tarski's analysis of the concept of truth gives rise to a hierarchy of languages. Does this fragment the concept all the way to philosophical unacceptability? I argue it doesn't, drawing on a modification of Kaplan's theory of indexicals

Rethinking the semantics of attitude reports

In response to John Locke’s death in 1704, Pierre Coste (1824) penned a letter containing the following passage: [H]e was naturally somewhat choleric. But his anger never lasted long...I remember, that two or three weeks before his death, as he was sitting in a garden, taking the air in a bright sunshine, whose warmth afforded him a great deal of pleasure...; we happened to speak of Horace, I know not on what occasion, and having repeated to him these verses, where that Poet says of himself, that he was Solibus aptum; Irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem: “That he loved the warmth of the sun, and that tho’ he was naturally choleric, his anger was easily appeased.” Mr. Locke replied, that if he durst presume to compare himself with Horace in any thing, he thought he was perfectly like him in those two respects. (170, bold emphasis mine) This passage loosely contains a sentence of the form ⌜x says of y that p⌝ and ends with an anaphoric reference to “two respects” that, at face value, are designated by clausal complements, viz. ‘that he loved the warmth of the sun’ and ‘that tho he was naturally choleric, his anger was easily appeased.’ This dissertation concerns the semantics of these and related constructions, with an emphasis placed on those of the form ⌜x believes about y that p.⌝ These belief-about reports have received less attention than reports of the form ⌜x believes that p,⌝ but the former – along with their syntactically derived forms – are just as much a part of present-day, natural language English as the latter. Indeed, once I started studying ‘about’-constructions systematically, I immediately began to notice their regular appearance “in the wild.” This dissertation represents my attempts at taming this small corner, replete with philosophical significance, of the English language. There are three chapters, and they all concern the semantics of attitude verbs with clausal complements; I focus on ‘believes’ for ease of exposition. Chapters 1 and 3 can be read as standalone works. Chapter 2 should be read after Chapter 1. In Chapter 1, “A Puzzle about Belief-about,” I argue that certain valid inferences involving belief-about reports are prima facie inconsistent with orthodox views of the belief relation as binary and propositional. In response, I propose a conservative departure from orthodoxy according to which certain ‘that’-clauses designate novel devices of semantic type called open propositions; the view of belief as binary and propositional is retained. I give some reasons for thinking that open propositions are properties of a certain kind, give a bridge principle between belief-about and belief simpliciter, and formally implement the resulting view in accordance with contemporary theories of syntax and compositional semantics. The upshot is that theorists committed to orthodoxy must complicate their account of certain ‘that’-clauses in surprising ways. In Chapter 2, “Belief is a Ternary Relation,” I object to the semantic complexity required by the proposal advanced in Chapter 1 and investigate a more radical departure from orthodoxy, viz. that belief is a ternary relation between subjects, objects (“targets”), and properties (“contents”). After showing how the resulting Target and Content View can be formally implemented, I respond to a variety of objections that fall roughly into one of two categories: semantic and metaphysical. Responding to the semantic objections requires developing accounts of truth, assertion, and related notions, while responding to the metaphysical objections requires defending a particular view on the nature of propositions. The upshot is that if theorists are unwilling to countenance the semantic complexity required to save orthodoxy in the way proposed in Chapter 1, then the Target and Content View is an attractive alternative with theoretical benefits that are significant in their own right. The formal implementation of the view proposed in Chapter 2 presupposes an intensional semantic framework attributable to the linguistic development of variable-based theories of intensionality, which purport to explain the transparency of determiner phrases in the context of attitude reports. In Chapter 3, “Variable-based Intensionality for Structured Propositions,” I argue that these theories in their simple, traditional forms are not available to advocates of structured propositions, and that the only attempt so far to unify these approaches is unsuccessful. So, I develop an improved variable-based theory of intensionality for structured propositions. Due to the underappreciated generality of the intensional phenomena at issue, however, it turns out that all theories face further challenges still. The upshot is that advocates of structured propositions might even be in a stronger position than other theorists when it comes to tackling these challenges purely semantically, but the complications required also suggest that non-semantic explanations of transparency are worth investigating now more than ever. I’ll end with a note on methodology. This dissertation is couched within the theoretical framework of generative grammar and compositional semantics. One of its guiding principles is, accordingly, that truth-conditions for English sentences in context must be compositionally derived on the basis of syntactically respectable logical forms. This dissertation is also strongly influenced by the methods and tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. So, another one of its guiding principle is that we ought to take seriously the nature of the entities appealed to by our best scientific theories, including the science of language. A recurring theme is therefore the dovetailing of considerations from formal semantics, on the one hand, and philosophical argumentation pertaining to the metaphysical natures of compositional semantic values (in context), on the other. I’ve tried to treat linguistic and philosophical considerations as on a par with one another throughout, conceiving of their distinction ultimately as an arbitrary matter – or, at least, as one that can be safely bracketed for present purposes.Philosoph

Workshop on Database Programming Languages

These are the revised proceedings of the Workshop on Database Programming Languages held at Roscoff, Finistère, France in September of 1987. The last few years have seen an enormous activity in the development of new programming languages and new programming environments for databases. The purpose of the workshop was to bring together researchers from both databases and programming languages to discuss recent developments in the two areas in the hope of overcoming some of the obstacles that appear to prevent the construction of a uniform database programming environment. The workshop, which follows a previous workshop held in Appin, Scotland in 1985, was extremely successful. The organizers were delighted with both the quality and volume of the submissions for this meeting, and it was regrettable that more papers could not be accepted. Both the stimulating discussions and the excellent food and scenery of the Brittany coast made the meeting thoroughly enjoyable. There were three main foci for this workshop: the type systems suitable for databases (especially object-oriented and complex-object databases,) the representation and manipulation of persistent structures, and extensions to deductive databases that allow for more general and flexible programming. Many of the papers describe recent results, or work in progress, and are indicative of the latest research trends in database programming languages. The organizers are extremely grateful for the financial support given by CRAI (Italy), Altaïr (France) and AT&T (USA). We would also like to acknowledge the organizational help provided by Florence Deshors, Hélène Gans and Pauline Turcaud of Altaïr, and by Karen Carter of the University of Pennsylvania

Introduction

Human languages are inextricably a part of our mind/brain. No other animal has a comparable ability with the same complexity and richness that humans do. An important research goal is to better understand this ability for language: What is it that enables human to acquire and use language the way we do? One way of answering this is to argue that there are aspects of our biology that enable us to acquire and use language. This has been the answer that in modern times has been advocated by generative grammar, in particular in approaches developed based on work by Noam Chomsky (1965, 1986, 2009), although its origins are much older. This approach holds that there are universal aspects of language that all humans share. However, it is at the same time evident that languages also differ: A child growing up in Japan will acquire Japanese whereas a child growing up in Norway will acquire Norwegian. An adequate theory of human language needs to be able to account for both possibly universals and language variation. However, a core question is what such an adequate theory may look like