Local and Global Interactions in an Evolutionary Resource Game

Conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game are studied. This combines in a unique way local and global interactions. A fixed number of harvesters are located on a spatial grid. Harvesters choose among three strategies: defection, cooperation, and enforcement. Individual payoffs are affected by both global factors, namely, aggregate harvest and resource stock level, and local factors, such as the imposition of sanctions on neighbors by enforcers. The evolution of strategies in the population is driven by social learning through imitation. Numerous types of equilibria exist in these settings. An important new finding is that clusters of cooperators and enforcers can survive among large groups of defectors. We discuss how the results contrast with the non-spatial, but otherwise similar, game of Sethi and Somanathan (1996).Common property, Cooperation, Evolutionary game theory, Global interactions, Local interactions, Social norms

Analysis of intellectual property cooperation behavior based on stochastic catastrophe theory and the QSIM algorithm

This article introduces a new model, the catastrophe model of intellectual property cooperation behavior. The purpose of the model is to analyze the evolutionary track of intellectual property cooperation behavior. After providing a general of catastrophe mechanism of intellectual property cooperation behavior and introducing stochastic catastrophe theory, this article offers a catastrophe model of intellectual property cooperation behavior. And then, based on the survey data of high-tech enterprises, the model parameters were given by introducing the qualitative simulation algorithm. The results demonstrate that intellectual property cooperation is composed of a cooperation strategic planning stage, cooperation system formation stage, cooperation system working stage, and cooperation profit distribution stage. Under the influence of control variables, the intellectual property cooperation behavior will appear catastrophic near the set of bifurcation points. Most previous studies on intellectual property cooperation have disregarded the characteristic of the sudden changes in cooperation behavior. Therefore, this article offers an integrated catastrophe model and explains the nature of intellectual property cooperation behavior

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located around a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find that a large diversity of equilibria exists in this game. In particular, we derive conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also discuss the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.Common property, Evolutionary game theory, Local interactions game, Self-organization, Cooperation

Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law

Recently, commentators have applied insights from complexity theory to legal analysis generally and to administrative law in particular. This Article focuses on one of the central problems that complexity. theory addresses, the importance and mechanisms of adaptation within complex systems. In Part I, the Article uses three features of complex adaptive systems-emergence from self-assembly, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions-and explores the extent to which they may add value as a matter of positive analysis to the understanding of change within legal systems. In Part H, the Article focuses on three normative claims in public law scholarship that depend explicitly or implicitly on notions of adaptation: that states offer advantages over the federal government because experimentation can make them more adaptive, that federal agencies should themselves become more experimentalist using the tool of adaptive management, and that administrative agencies shou Id adopt collaborative mechanisms in policymaking. Using two analytic tools found in the complexity literature, the genetic algorithm and evolutionary game theory, the Article tests the extent to which these three normative claims are borne out

Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

Modeling collective dynamics of social systems: Incorporating various social mechanisms into agent-based models

I present three original papers demonstrating complex behavior arising from collective dynamics in agent-based models (ABM) focusing on evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms. The first report demonstrates the coupled emergence of cooperation and selfish punishment behavior in groups of individuals playing an iterated public goods game. The second report demonstrates the effects of mental modeling within groups of decision makers. The third report demonstrates a synthesis of evolutionary and cognitive mechanisms

Динамика генотипа в нейроэволюции агентов в моделях искусственной жизни

Кооперативна поведінка є однією з найбільш часто використовуваних та поширених рис для багатоагентних систем. У деяких випадках поява такої поведінки пов’язана із поділом населення на співіснуючі субпопуляції [1, 2]. Групова взаємодія може набувати не лише форми антагоністичного конфлікту, але й зумовлюватися генетичним дрейфом, який приводить до конкуренції поведінкових стратегій та можливої асиміляції [3]. Продемонстровано різні види залежностей між групами агентів та їх поведінковими стратегіями. Використано методологію спостереження за динамікою агентного генотипу [2], відповідно до якої популяція у просторі генотипів може мати вигляд хмари точок, кожна точка якої відповідає одній особині. Розглянуто динаміку центроїда населення — центра хмари генотипу. Аналіз таких траєкторій може сприяти дослідженню різних режимів існування популяції та їх зародження.Cooperation behavior is one of the most used and spread Multi-agent system feature. In some cases emergence of this behaviour can be characterized by division of population on co-evolving subpopulations [1], [2]. Group interaction can take not only antagonistic conflict form but also genetic drift that results with strategies competition and assimilation [3]. In this work we demonstrate different relation between agent grouping and they behavior strategies. We use approach proposed in work [2] methodology of agent genotype dynamic tracking, due to this approach the evolving population can be presented in genotype space as a cloud of points where each point corresponds to one individual. In current work consider the movement of population centroid – the center of the genotype cloud. Analysis of such trajectories can shad the light on the regimes of population existence and genesis.Кооперативное поведение является одной из наиболее часто используемых и распространенных черт для многоагентных систем. В некоторых случаях появление такого поведения связано с разделением населения на сосуществующие субпопуляции [1, 2]. Групповое взаимодействие может принимать не только форму антагонистического конфликта, но и обуслoвливаться генетическим дрейфом, приводящим к конкуренции поведенческих стратегий и возможной ассимиляции [3]. Продемонстрированы различные виды зависимостей между группами агентов и их поведенческими стратегиями. Использована методология наблюдения за динамикой агентного генотипа [2], согласно которой популяция может быть представлена в пространстве генотипов в виде облака точек, где каждая точка соответствует одной особи. Рассмотрена динамика центроида популяции — центр облака генотипа. Анализ таких траекторий может помочь исследованию различных режимов существования популяции и их зарождения