775 research outputs found

    Security Features in Fingerprint Biometric System

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    Nowadays, embedded systems run in every setting all around the globe. Recent advances in technology have created many sophisticated applications rich with functionality we have never seen. Nonetheless, security and privacy were a common issue for these systems, whether or not sensitive data can be protected from malicious attacks. These concerns are justified on the grounds that the past of security breaches and the resulting consequences narrate horrific stories concerning embedded systems. The attacks are now evolving, becoming more complex with technological advancements. Therefore, a new way of implementing security in embedded systems must be pursued. This paper attempts to demonstrate the incorporation of security features in fingerprint biometric system in the requirements analysis phase, ensuring the same throughout the system life cycle of embedded systems based on case study. The comparison of various biometric technologies such as face, fingerprint, iris, palm print, hand geometry gait, signature, and keystroke is presented. The aim of this paper includes analyzing, decomposing and transforming the threats and counter-measures identified during the requirements analysis using the abuse case into more specific safety requirements or functions. Furthermore, we have shown that the incorporation of security features into the biometric fingerprint system by analyzing the requirements of the system and providing the main steps for the protection of the biometric system in this paper

    Vulnerabilities in biometric systems: Attacks and recent advances in liveness detection

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    This is an electronic version of the paper presented at the Spanish Workshop on Biometrics 2007, SWB-07 held in Girona (Spain)A review of the state-of-the-art in direct and indirect attacks to fingerprint and iris automatic recognition security systems is presented. A summary of the novel liveness detection methods, which take advantage of different physiological properties to distinguish between real and fake biometric traits, is also reported.This work has been supported by the TIC2006-13141-C03-03 project of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and the BioSecure NoE

    Efficient software attack to multimodal biometric systems and its application to face and iris fusion

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    This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Pattern Recognition Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Pattern Recognition Letters 36, (2014) DOI: 10.1016/j.patrec.2013.04.029In certain applications based on multimodal interaction it may be crucial to determine not only what the user is doing (commands), but who is doing it, in order to prevent fraudulent use of the system. The biometric technology, and particularly the multimodal biometric systems, represent a highly efficient automatic recognition solution for this type of applications. Although multimodal biometric systems have been traditionally regarded as more secure than unimodal systems, their vulnerabilities to spoofing attacks have been recently shown. New fusion techniques have been proposed and their performance thoroughly analysed in an attempt to increase the robustness of multimodal systems to these spoofing attacks. However, the vulnerabilities of multimodal approaches to software-based attacks still remain unexplored. In this work we present the first software attack against multimodal biometric systems. Its performance is tested against a multimodal system based on face and iris, showing the vulnerabilities of the system to this new type of threat. Score quantization is afterwards studied as a possible countermeasure, managing to cancel the effects of the proposed attacking methodology under certain scenarios.This work has been partially supported by projects Contexts (S2009/TIC-1485) from CAM, Bio-Challenge (TEC2009-11186) and Bio-Shield (TEC2012-34881) from Spanish MINECO, TABULA RASA (FP7-ICT-257289) and BEAT (FP7-SEC-284989) from EU, and Cátedra UAM-Telefónica

    Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learning

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    Learning-based pattern classifiers, including deep networks, have shown impressive performance in several application domains, ranging from computer vision to cybersecurity. However, it has also been shown that adversarial input perturbations carefully crafted either at training or at test time can easily subvert their predictions. The vulnerability of machine learning to such wild patterns (also referred to as adversarial examples), along with the design of suitable countermeasures, have been investigated in the research field of adversarial machine learning. In this work, we provide a thorough overview of the evolution of this research area over the last ten years and beyond, starting from pioneering, earlier work on the security of non-deep learning algorithms up to more recent work aimed to understand the security properties of deep learning algorithms, in the context of computer vision and cybersecurity tasks. We report interesting connections between these apparently-different lines of work, highlighting common misconceptions related to the security evaluation of machine-learning algorithms. We review the main threat models and attacks defined to this end, and discuss the main limitations of current work, along with the corresponding future challenges towards the design of more secure learning algorithms.Comment: Accepted for publication on Pattern Recognition, 201

    Biometric Spoofing: A JRC Case Study in 3D Face Recognition

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    Based on newly available and affordable off-the-shelf 3D sensing, processing and printing technologies, the JRC has conducted a comprehensive study on the feasibility of spoofing 3D and 2.5D face recognition systems with low-cost self-manufactured models and presents in this report a systematic and rigorous evaluation of the real risk posed by such attacking approach which has been complemented by a test campaign. The work accomplished and presented in this report, covers theories, methodologies, state of the art techniques, evaluation databases and also aims at providing an outlook into the future of this extremely active field of research.JRC.G.6-Digital Citizen Securit

    Biometrics systems under spoofing attack: an evaluation methodology and lessons learned

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    Biometrics already form a significant component of current and emerging identification technologies. Biometrics systems aim to determine or verify the identity of an individual from their behavioral and/or biological characteristics. Despite significant progress, some biometric systems fail to meet the multitude of stringent security and robustness requirements to support their deployment in some practical scenarios. Among current concerns are vulnerabilities to spoofing?persons who masquerade as others to gain illegitimate accesses to protected data, services, or facilities. While the study of spoofing, or rather antispoofing, has attracted growing interest in recent years, the problem is far from being solved and will require far greater attention in the coming years. This tutorial article presents an introduction to spoofing and antispoofing research. It describes the vulnerabilities, presents an evaluation methodology for the assessment of spoofing and countermeasures, and outlines research priorities for the future

    Biometric antispoofing methods: A survey in face recognition

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    Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. J. Galbally, S. Marcel and J. Fierrez, "Biometric Antispoofing Methods", IEEE Access, vol.2, pp. 1530-1552, Dec. 2014In recent decades, we have witnessed the evolution of biometric technology from the rst pioneering works in face and voice recognition to the current state of development wherein a wide spectrum of highly accurate systems may be found, ranging from largely deployed modalities, such as ngerprint, face, or iris, to more marginal ones, such as signature or hand. This path of technological evolution has naturally led to a critical issue that has only started to be addressed recently: the resistance of this rapidly emerging technology to external attacks and, in particular, to spoo ng. Spoo ng, referred to by the term presentation attack in current standards, is a purely biometric vulnerability that is not shared with other IT security solutions. It refers to the ability to fool a biometric system into recognizing an illegitimate user as a genuine one by means of presenting a synthetic forged version of the original biometric trait to the sensor. The entire biometric community, including researchers, developers, standardizing bodies, and vendors, has thrown itself into the challenging task of proposing and developing ef cient protection methods against this threat. The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview on the work that has been carried out over the last decade in the emerging eld of antispoo ng, with special attention to the mature and largely deployed face modality. The work covers theories, methodologies, state-of-the-art techniques, and evaluation databases and also aims at providing an outlook into the future of this very active eld of research.This work was supported in part by the CAM under Project S2009/TIC-1485, in part by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the Bio-Shield Project under Grant TEC2012-34881, in part by the TABULA RASA Project under Grant FP7-ICT-257289, in part by the BEAT Project under Grant FP7-SEC-284989 through the European Union, and in part by the Cátedra Universidad Autónoma de Madrid-Telefónica
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