A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Graph Matching to be equivalent to Clique Search

This paper formulates a necessary and sufficient condition for a generic graph matching problem to be equivalent to the maximum vertex and edge weight clique problem in a derived association graph. The consequences of this results are threefold: first, the condition is general enough to cover a broad range of practical graph matching problems; second, a proof to establish equivalence between graph matching and clique search reduces to showing that a given graph matching problem satisfies the proposed condition;\ud and third, the result sets the scene for generic continuous solutions for a broad range of graph matching problems. To illustrate the mathematical framework, we apply it to a number of graph matching problems, including the problem of determining the graph edit distance

On the legitimacy of coercion for the nancing of public goods

The literature on public goods has shown that e?cient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions e?ciency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, e?ciency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro?t-maximizing ?rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable

Subjective and objective performance evaluation

We study executive compensation in an environment in which firms compete offering contingent contracts to managers with private information about their ability. We ask whether equilibrium executive compensation depends on subjective evaluations, i.e., on assessments made by the firm which are based on noncontractible information. We also allow for objective (i.e., contractible) performance measures and we depart from the rest of the literature on the topic by assuming that subjective evaluations are made before the uncertainty on the objective performance measures is resolved. We find that even in this case, equilibrium contracts ignore subjective evaluations regardless of their informativeness

Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority

We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party's choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties' conflict of interest. Indeed, the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract

Emergence and persistence of inefficient states

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats. We obtain that the rich–bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support. The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values, and when individuals are sufficiently forward-lookin