Testing BOI and BOB algorithms for solving the Winner Determination

Eighth International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems, 2008. HIS '08. Barcelona, 10-12 September 2008Combinatorial auctions are a promising auction format for allocating radio spectrum, as well as other goods. An important handicap of combinatorial auctions is determining the winner bids among many options, that is, solving the winner determination problem (WDP). This paper tackles this computational problem using two approaches in a combinatorial first-price sealed bid auction. The first one, is an A* based on items (BOI). The second one, is an A* based on bids (BOB). These two techniques are tested in several scenarios for allocating radio spectrum licenses. The results obtained reveal that the search algorithm A* with the BOB formulation outperforms the other and always finds the optimal solution very quickly

An Overview of Combinatorial Auctions

An auction is combinatorial when bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. Computer scientists are interested in combinatorial auctions because they are concerned with the expressiveness of bidding languages, as well as the algorithmic aspects of the underlying combinatorial problem. The combinatorial problem has attracted attention from operations researchers, especially those working in combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming, who are fascinated by the idea of applying these tools to auctions. Auctions have been studied extensively by economists, of course. Thus, the newly emerging field of combinatorial auctions lies at the intersection of computer science, operations research, and economics. In this article, we present a brief introduction to combinatorial auctions, based on our book, Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press, 2006), in which we look at combinatorial auctions from all three perspectives.Auctions

Improved opportunity cost algorithm for carrier selection in combinatorial auctions

Transportation costs constitute up to thirty percent of the total costs involved in a supply chain. Outsourcing the transportation service requirements to third party logistics providers have been widely adopted, as they are economically more rational than owning and operating a service. Transportation service procurement has been traditionally done through an auctioning process where the auctioneer (shipper) auctions lanes (distinct delivery routes) to bidders (carriers). Individual lanes were being auctioned separately disallowing the carriers to express complements and substitutes. Using combinatorial auctions mechanism to auction all available lanes together would allow the carriers to take advantage of the lane bundles, their existing service schedule, probability of securing other lanes and available capacity to offer services at lower rates and be more competitive. The winners of the auction are the set of non-overlapping bids that minimize the cost for the shippers. The winner determination problem to be solved in determining the optimal allocation of the services in such kind of combinatorial auctions is a NP-hard problem. Many heuristics like approximate linear programming, stochastic local search have proposed to find an approximate solution to the problem in a reasonable amount of time. Akcoglu et al [22] developed the opportunity cost algorithm using the “local ratio technique” to compute a greedy solution to the problem. A recalculation modification to the opportunity cost algorithm has been formulated where opportunity costs are recalculated every time for the set of remaining bids after eliminating the bid chosen to be a part of the winning solution and its conflicts have eliminated. Another method that formulates the winning solution based on the maximum total revenue values calculated for each bid using the opportunity cost algorithm has also been researched

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations

Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auctions and generating verified executable code

Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable code from the formally defined auction. This removes a source of error in implementing the auction design. We intend to use formal methods to verify new auction designs. Here, our contribution is to introduce and demonstrate the use of formal methods for auction verification in the familiar setting of a well-known auction

Centralized versus market-based approaches to mobile task allocation problem: State-of-the-art

Centralized approach has been adopted for finding solutions to resource allocation problems (RAPs) in many real-life applications. On the other hand, market-based approach has been proposed as an alternative to solve the problem due to recent advancement in ICT technologies. In spite of the existence of some efforts to review the pros and cons of each approach in RAPs, the studies cannot be directly applied to specific problem domains like mobile task allocation problem which is characterised with high level of uncertainty on the availability of resources (workers). This paper aims to review existing studies on task allocation problems(TAPs) focusing on those two approaches and their comparison and identify major issues that need to be resolved for comparing the two approaches in mobile task allocation problems. Mobile Task Allocation Problem (MTAP) is defined and its problematic structures are explained in relation with task allocation to mobile workers. Solutions produced by each approach to some applications and variations of MTAP are also discussed and compared. Finally, some future research directions are identified in order to compare both approaches in function of uncertainty emerging from the mobile nature of the MTAP

A tutorial on optimization for multi-agent systems

Research on optimization in multi-agent systems (MASs) has contributed with a wealth of techniques to solve many of the challenges arising in a wide range of multi-agent application domains. Multi-agent optimization focuses on casting MAS problems into optimization problems. The solving of those problems could possibly involve the active participation of the agents in a MAS. Research on multi-agent optimization has rapidly become a very technical, specialized field. Moreover, the contributions to the field in the literature are largely scattered. These two factors dramatically hinder access to a basic, general view of the foundations of the field. This tutorial is intended to ease such access by providing a gentle introduction to fundamental concepts and techniques on multi-agent optimization. © 2013 The Author.Peer Reviewe