43 research outputs found

    Reflective-Physically Unclonable Function based System for Anti-Counterfeiting

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    Physically unclonable functions (PUF) are physical security mechanisms, which utilize inherent randomness in processes used to instantiate physical objects. In this dissertation, an extensive overview of the state of the art in implementations, accompanying definitions and their analysis is provided. The concept of the reflective-PUF is presented as a product security solution. The viability of the concept, its evaluation and the requirements of such a system is explored

    Understanding Quantum Technologies 2022

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    Understanding Quantum Technologies 2022 is a creative-commons ebook that provides a unique 360 degrees overview of quantum technologies from science and technology to geopolitical and societal issues. It covers quantum physics history, quantum physics 101, gate-based quantum computing, quantum computing engineering (including quantum error corrections and quantum computing energetics), quantum computing hardware (all qubit types, including quantum annealing and quantum simulation paradigms, history, science, research, implementation and vendors), quantum enabling technologies (cryogenics, control electronics, photonics, components fabs, raw materials), quantum computing algorithms, software development tools and use cases, unconventional computing (potential alternatives to quantum and classical computing), quantum telecommunications and cryptography, quantum sensing, quantum technologies around the world, quantum technologies societal impact and even quantum fake sciences. The main audience are computer science engineers, developers and IT specialists as well as quantum scientists and students who want to acquire a global view of how quantum technologies work, and particularly quantum computing. This version is an extensive update to the 2021 edition published in October 2021.Comment: 1132 pages, 920 figures, Letter forma

    Design and Analysis of Security Schemes for Low-cost RFID Systems

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    With the remarkable progress in microelectronics and low-power semiconductor technologies, Radio Frequency IDentification technology (RFID) has moved from obscurity into mainstream applications, which essentially provides an indispensable foundation to realize ubiquitous computing and machine perception. However, the catching and exclusive characteristics of RFID systems introduce growing security and privacy concerns. To address these issues are particularly challenging for low-cost RFID systems, where tags are extremely constrained in resources, power and cost. The primary reasons are: (1) the security requirements of low-cost RFID systems are even more rigorous due to large operation range and mass deployment; and (2) the passive tags' modest capabilities and the necessity to keep their prices low present a novel problem that goes beyond the well-studied problems of traditional cryptography. This thesis presents our research results on the design and the analysis of security schemes for low-cost RFID systems. Motivated by the recent attention on exploiting physical layer resources in the design of security schemes, we investigate how to solve the eavesdropping, modification and one particular type of relay attacks toward the tag-to-reader communication in passive RFID systems without requiring lightweight ciphers. To this end, we propose a novel physical layer scheme, called Backscatter modulation- and Uncoordinated frequency hopping-assisted Physical Layer Enhancement (BUPLE). The idea behind it is to use the amplitude of the carrier to transmit messages as normal, while to utilize its periodically varied frequency to hide the transmission from the eavesdropper/relayer and to exploit a random sequence modulated to the carrier's phase to defeat malicious modifications. We further improve its eavesdropping resistance through the coding in the physical layer, since BUPLE ensures that the tag-to-eavesdropper channel is strictly noisier than the tag-to-reader channel. Three practical Wiretap Channel Codes (WCCs) for passive tags are then proposed: two of them are constructed from linear error correcting codes, and the other one is constructed from a resilient vector Boolean function. The security and usability of BUPLE in conjunction with WCCs are further confirmed by our proof-of-concept implementation and testing. Eavesdropping the communication between a legitimate reader and a victim tag to obtain raw data is a basic tool for the adversary. However, given the fundamentality of eavesdropping attacks, there are limited prior work investigating its intension and extension for passive RFID systems. To this end, we firstly identified a brand-new attack, working at physical layer, against backscattered RFID communications, called unidirectional active eavesdropping, which defeats the customary impression that eavesdropping is a ``passive" attack. To launch this attack, the adversary transmits an un-modulated carrier (called blank carrier) at a certain frequency while a valid reader and a tag interacts at another frequency channel. Once the tag modulates the amplitude of reader's signal, it causes fluctuations on the blank carrier as well. By carefully examining the amplitude of the backscattered versions of the blank carrier and the reader's carrier, the adversary could intercept the ongoing reader-tag communication with either significantly lower bit error rate or from a significantly greater distance away. Our concept is demonstrated and empirically analyzed towards a popular low-cost RFID system, i.e., EPC Gen2. Although active eavesdropping in general is not trivial to be prohibited, for a particular type of active eavesdropper, namely a greedy proactive eavesdropper, we propose a simple countermeasure without introducing extra cost to current RFID systems. The needs of cryptographic primitives on constraint devices keep increasing with the growing pervasiveness of these devices. One recent design of the lightweight block cipher is Hummingbird-2. We study its cryptographic strength under a novel technique we developed, called Differential Sequence Attack (DSA), and present the first cryptanalytic result on this cipher. In particular, our full attack can be divided into two phases: preparation phase and key recovery phase. During the key recovery phase, we exploit the fact that the differential sequence for the last round of Hummingbird-2 can be retrieved by querying the full cipher, due to which, the search space of the secret key can be significantly reduced. Thus, by attacking the encryption (decryption resp.) of Hummingbird-2, our algorithm recovers 36-bit (another 28-bit resp.) out of 128-bit key with 2682^{68} (2602^{60} resp.) time complexity if particular differential conditions of the internal states and of the keys at one round can be imposed. Additionally, the rest 64-bit of the key can be exhaustively searched and the overall time complexity is dominated by 2682^{68}. During the preparation phase, by investing 2812^{81} effort in time, the adversary is able to create the differential conditions required in the key recovery phase with at least 0.5 probability. As an additional effort, we examine the cryptanalytic strength of another lightweight candidate known as A2U2, which is the most lightweight cryptographic primitive proposed so far for low-cost tags. Our chosen-plaintext-attack fully breaks this cipher by recovering its secret key with only querying the encryption twice on the victim tag and solving 32 sparse systems of linear equations (where each system has 56 unknowns and around 28 unknowns can be directly obtained without computation) in the worst case, which takes around 0.16 second on a Thinkpad T410 laptop

    Kelowna Courier

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    The Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment

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    This open access volume is the first comprehensive assessment of the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region. It comprises important scientific research on the social, economic, and environmental pillars of sustainable mountain development and will serve as a basis for evidence-based decision-making to safeguard the environment and advance people’s well-being. The compiled content is based on the collective knowledge of over 300 leading researchers, experts and policymakers, brought together by the Hindu Kush Himalayan Monitoring and Assessment Programme (HIMAP) under the coordination of the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). This assessment was conducted between 2013 and 2017 as the first of a series of monitoring and assessment reports, under the guidance of the HIMAP Steering Committee: Eklabya Sharma (ICIMOD), Atiq Raman (Bangladesh), Yuba Raj Khatiwada (Nepal), Linxiu Zhang (China), Surendra Pratap Singh (India), Tandong Yao (China) and David Molden (ICIMOD and Chair of the HIMAP SC). This First HKH Assessment Report consists of 16 chapters, which comprehensively assess the current state of knowledge of the HKH region, increase the understanding of various drivers of change and their impacts, address critical data gaps and develop a set of evidence-based and actionable policy solutions and recommendations. These are linked to nine mountain priorities for the mountains and people of the HKH consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals. This book is a must-read for policy makers, academics and students interested in this important region and an essentially important resource for contributors to global assessments such as the IPCC reports. ; Constitutes the first comprehensive assessment of the Hindu Kush Himalaya region, providing an authoritative overview of the region Assembles the collective knowledge of over 300 leading researchers, practitioners, experts, and policymakers Combines the current state of knowledge of the Hindu Kush Himalaya region in one volume Offers Open Access to a set of practically oriented policy recommendation

    Security and Privacy in RFID Systems

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    This PhD thesis is concerned with authentication protocols using portable lightweight devices such as RFID tags. these devices have lately gained a significant attention for the diversity of the applications that could benefit form their features, ranging from inventory systems and building access control, to medical devices. However, the emergence of this technology has raised concerns about the possible loss of privacy carrying such tags induce in allowing tracing persons or unveiling the contents of a hidden package. this fear led to the appearance of several organizations which goal is to stop the spread of RFID tags. We take a cryptographic viewpoint on the issue and study the extent of security and privacy that RFID-based solutions can offer. In the first part of this thesis, we concentrate on analyzing two original primitives that were proposed to ensure security for RFID tags. the first one, HB#, is a dedicated authentication protocol that exclusively uses very simple arithmetic operations: bitwise AND and XOR. HB# was proven to be secure against a certain class of man-in-the-middle attacks and conjectured secure against more general ones. We show that the latter conjecture does not hold by describing a practical attack that allows an attacker to recover the tag's secret key. Moreover, we show that to be immune against our attack, HB#'s secret key size has to be increased to be more than 15 000 bits. this is an unpractical value for the considered applications. We then turn to SQUASH, a message authentication code built around a public-key encryption scheme, namely Rabin's scheme. By mounting a practical key recovery attack on the earlier version of SQUASH, we show that the security of all versions of SQUASH is unrelated to the security of Rabin encryption function. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to the privacy aspects related to the RFID technology. We first emphasize the importance of establishing a framework that correctly captures the intuition that a privacy-preserving protocol does not leak any information about its participants. For that, we show how several protocols that were supported by simple arguments, in contrast to a formal analysis, fail to ensure privacy. Namely, we target ProbIP, MARP, Auth2, YA-TRAP, YA-TRAP+, O-TRAP, RIPP-FS, and the Lim-Kwon protocol. We also illustrate the shortcomings of other privacy models such as the LBdM model. The rest of the dissertation is then dedicated to our privacy model. Contrarily to most RFID privacy models that limit privacy protection to the inability of linking the identity of two participants in two different protocol instances, we introduce a privacy model for RFID tags that proves to be the exact formalization of the intuition that a private protocol should not leak any information to the adversary. the model we introduce is a refinement of Vaudenay's one that invalidates a number of its limitations. Within these settings, we are able to show that the strongest notion of privacy, namely privacy against adversaries that have a prior knowledge of all the tags' secrets, is realizable. To instantiate an authentication protocol that achieves this level of privacy, we use plaintext-aware encryption schemes. We then extend our model to the case of mutual authentication where, in addition to a tag authenticating to the reader, the reverse operation is also required

    Portland Daily Press: June 22,1872

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    https://digitalmaine.com/pdp_1872/1058/thumbnail.jp
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