A Survey of Recent Developments in Testability, Safety and Security of RISC-V Processors

With the continued success of the open RISC-V architecture, practical deployment of RISC-V processors necessitates an in-depth consideration of their testability, safety and security aspects. This survey provides an overview of recent developments in this quickly-evolving field. We start with discussing the application of state-of-the-art functional and system-level test solutions to RISC-V processors. Then, we discuss the use of RISC-V processors for safety-related applications; to this end, we outline the essential techniques necessary to obtain safety both in the functional and in the timing domain and review recent processor designs with safety features. Finally, we survey the different aspects of security with respect to RISC-V implementations and discuss the relationship between cryptographic protocols and primitives on the one hand and the RISC-V processor architecture and hardware implementation on the other. We also comment on the role of a RISC-V processor for system security and its resilience against side-channel attacks

Multiple bit error correcting architectures over finite fields

This thesis proposes techniques to mitigate multiple bit errors in GF arithmetic circuits. As GF arithmetic circuits such as multipliers constitute the complex and important functional unit of a crypto-processor, making them fault tolerant will improve the reliability of circuits that are employed in safety applications and the errors may cause catastrophe if not mitigated. Firstly, a thorough literature review has been carried out. The merits of efficient schemes are carefully analyzed to study the space for improvement in error correction, area and power consumption. Proposed error correction schemes include bit parallel ones using optimized BCH codes that are useful in applications where power and area are not prime concerns. The scheme is also extended to dynamically correcting scheme to reduce decoder delay. Other method that suits low power and area applications such as RFIDs and smart cards using cross parity codes is also proposed. The experimental evaluation shows that the proposed techniques can mitigate single and multiple bit errors with wider error coverage compared to existing methods with lesser area and power consumption. The proposed scheme is used to mask the errors appearing at the output of the circuit irrespective of their cause. This thesis also investigates the error mitigation schemes in emerging technologies (QCA, CNTFET) to compare area, power and delay with existing CMOS equivalent. Though the proposed novel multiple error correcting techniques can not ensure 100% error mitigation, inclusion of these techniques to actual design can improve the reliability of the circuits or increase the difficulty in hacking crypto-devices. Proposed schemes can also be extended to non GF digital circuits

Design of a Scan Chain for Side Channel Attacks on AES Cryptosystem for Improved Security

Scan chain-based attacks are side-channel attacks focusing on one of the most significant features of hardware test circuitry. A technique called Design for Testability (DfT) involves integrating certain testability components into a hardware design. However, this creates a side channel for cryptanalysis, providing crypto devices vulnerable to scan-based attacks. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been proven as the most powerful and secure symmetric encryption algorithm announced by USA Government and it outperforms all other existing cryptographic algorithms. Furthermore, the on-chip implementation of private key algorithms like AES has faced scan-based side-channel attacks. With the aim of protecting the data for secure communication, a new hybrid pipelined AES algorithm with enhanced security features is implemented. This paper proposes testing an AES core with unpredictable response compaction and bit level-masking throughout the scan chain process. A bit-level scan flipflop focused on masking as a scan protection solution for secure testing. The experimental results show that the best security is provided by the randomized addition of masked scan flipflop through the scan chain and also provides minimal design difficulty and power expansion overhead with some negligible delay measures. Thus, the proposed technique outperforms the state-of-the-art LUT-based S-box and the composite sub-byte transformation model regarding throughput rate 2 times and 15 times respectively. And security measured in the avalanche effect for the sub-pipelined model has been increased up to 95 per cent with reduced computational complexity. Also, the proposed sub-pipelined S-box utilizing a composite field arithmetic scheme achieves 7 per cent area effectiveness and 2.5 times the hardware complexity compared to the LUT-based model

Quantifiable Assurance: From IPs to Platforms

Hardware vulnerabilities are generally considered more difficult to fix than software ones because they are persistent after fabrication. Thus, it is crucial to assess the security and fix the vulnerabilities at earlier design phases, such as Register Transfer Level (RTL) and gate level. The focus of the existing security assessment techniques is mainly twofold. First, they check the security of Intellectual Property (IP) blocks separately. Second, they aim to assess the security against individual threats considering the threats are orthogonal. We argue that IP-level security assessment is not sufficient. Eventually, the IPs are placed in a platform, such as a system-on-chip (SoC), where each IP is surrounded by other IPs connected through glue logic and shared/private buses. Hence, we must develop a methodology to assess the platform-level security by considering both the IP-level security and the impact of the additional parameters introduced during platform integration. Another important factor to consider is that the threats are not always orthogonal. Improving security against one threat may affect the security against other threats. Hence, to build a secure platform, we must first answer the following questions: What additional parameters are introduced during the platform integration? How do we define and characterize the impact of these parameters on security? How do the mitigation techniques of one threat impact others? This paper aims to answer these important questions and proposes techniques for quantifiable assurance by quantitatively estimating and measuring the security of a platform at the pre-silicon stages. We also touch upon the term security optimization and present the challenges for future research directions

Secure Physical Design

An integrated circuit is subject to a number of attacks including information leakage, side-channel attacks, fault-injection, malicious change, reverse engineering, and piracy. Majority of these attacks take advantage of physical placement and routing of cells and interconnects. Several measures have already been proposed to deal with security issues of the high level functional design and logic synthesis. However, to ensure end-to-end trustworthy IC design flow, it is necessary to have security sign-off during physical design flow. This paper presents a secure physical design roadmap to enable end-to-end trustworthy IC design flow. The paper also discusses utilization of AI/ML to establish security at the layout level. Major research challenges in obtaining a secure physical design are also discussed