A formal analisys of the computational dynamics in GIGANTEC

An evolutionary algorithm formalism has been forwarded in a previous research, and implemented in the system GIGANTEC: Genetic Induction for General Analytical Non-numeric Task Evolution Compiler [Bad98][Bad99]. A dynamical model is developed to analyze the behaviour of the algorithm. The model is dependent in its analysis on classical Compilers Theory, Game Theory and Markov Chains and its convergence characteristics. The results conclude that a limiting state is reached, which is independent of the initial population and the mutation rate, but dependent on the cardinality of the alphabet of the driving L-system

Bringing Elites Sociology Back in European Integration Theories: A Case Study Based on Commissioners and Directors General

Founded on an analysis of biographies and carriers of top‐rank officials and members of the European Commission, this paper suggest that a lot of recent polemic within the EU Institutions (such as Verheugen controversy, Kinnock reform, etc.) are the expressions of the tensions originating from socio‐morphological transformations. To put it simply, the gap between the members and the officials of the Commission has never been so wide on this score. Commissioners seem to be gaining in political capitals to the detriment of a professional commitment in European politics, which implies for example a minimum degree of attendance in the political space of the EU or the accumulation of capitals relating to this space. Conversely, the top‐level officials increasingly appear to owe their positions to long‐term investment in institutions involving the production and, simultaneously, the accumulation of European capitals, a general tendency whereof the meaning is precisely questioned within the conjuncture of the Kinnock reform and more widely that of the political issues which characterised the mid 2000s. Beyond the conventional issue of the differentiation or de‐differentiation processes of the political and administrative elites, this approach enables to underline the unique relationship between these staff categories in the case of the EU and to point out, to a greater extent, an opposition between temporary and intermittent staff which seems to be a correct indicator of inequal objectivation process of the European institutions

Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case

An evaluation of the Hong Kong Geopark : to what extent does it promote sustainable human development?

This thesis evaluates the objective of the Hong Kong Geopark as promoting sustainable socio-economic development with a case study of Sum Mun Tsai Village, a village adjacent to the Geopark. The research focuses on the human development aspect of sustainable development, since the Geopark is not only concerned with promoting economic development, but also with the social dimension of sustainability. The study analyses the case with insights from Sen’s Capability Approach. Two aspects of freedom were analyzed, process freedom and opportunity freedom. Process freedom refers to the avenues for democratic decision-making and opportunity freedom to the ability of local people to actualize their own socio-economic development, according to their own values. Empirical data were collected through literature reviews, participant observations and semi-structured interviews with the local residents and the Tai Po Environmental Association, a local environmental NGO engaged in the development of the Hong Kong Geopark. Relevant legislative and policy documents were also collected and examined. The low level of community engagement in the decision-making process indicates that the local residents enjoy very limited process freedom in the governance of the Geopark. On the other hand, the increase in income, the acquisition of new skills and the discovery of capabilities that they already had, all indicate that the opportunity freedom has been increased. The Geopark has not been successful in supporting process freedom, but it has made important contributions to human development as it supports opportunity freedom even though this is not a specific policy goal. It is therefore suggested that the government ought to actively engage the community in the decision-making process, in order to fully support human capability and achieve a truly sustainable human development

Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes currently implemented in the industry are the observable items of a more general menu of second best contracts. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by the political aspects of regulation. Moreover, the cost reducing effort of the operators is greater under fixed-price regimes, compared to the cost-plus case.

Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators' costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.