Thermal-Aware Networked Many-Core Systems

Advancements in IC processing technology has led to the innovation and growth happening in the consumer electronics sector and the evolution of the IT infrastructure supporting this exponential growth. One of the most difficult obstacles to this growth is the removal of large amount of heatgenerated by the processing and communicating nodes on the system. The scaling down of technology and the increase in power density is posing a direct and consequential effect on the rise in temperature. This has resulted in the increase in cooling budgets, and affects both the life-time reliability and performance of the system. Hence, reducing on-chip temperatures has become a major design concern for modern microprocessors. This dissertation addresses the thermal challenges at different levels for both 2D planer and 3D stacked systems. It proposes a self-timed thermal monitoring strategy based on the liberal use of on-chip thermal sensors. This makes use of noise variation tolerant and leakage current based thermal sensing for monitoring purposes. In order to study thermal management issues from early design stages, accurate thermal modeling and analysis at design time is essential. In this regard, spatial temperature profile of the global Cu nanowire for on-chip interconnects has been analyzed. It presents a 3D thermal model of a multicore system in order to investigate the effects of hotspots and the placement of silicon die layers, on the thermal performance of a modern ip-chip package. For a 3D stacked system, the primary design goal is to maximise the performance within the given power and thermal envelopes. Hence, a thermally efficient routing strategy for 3D NoC-Bus hybrid architectures has been proposed to mitigate on-chip temperatures by herding most of the switching activity to the die which is closer to heat sink. Finally, an exploration of various thermal-aware placement approaches for both the 2D and 3D stacked systems has been presented. Various thermal models have been developed and thermal control metrics have been extracted. An efficient thermal-aware application mapping algorithm for a 2D NoC has been presented. It has been shown that the proposed mapping algorithm reduces the effective area reeling under high temperatures when compared to the state of the art.Siirretty Doriast

Remote Attacks on FPGA Hardware

Immer mehr Computersysteme sind weltweit miteinander verbunden und über das Internet zugänglich, was auch die Sicherheitsanforderungen an diese erhöht. Eine neuere Technologie, die zunehmend als Rechenbeschleuniger sowohl für eingebettete Systeme als auch in der Cloud verwendet wird, sind Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Sie sind sehr flexible Mikrochips, die per Software konfiguriert und programmiert werden können, um beliebige digitale Schaltungen zu implementieren. Wie auch andere integrierte Schaltkreise basieren FPGAs auf modernen Halbleitertechnologien, die von Fertigungstoleranzen und verschiedenen Laufzeitschwankungen betroffen sind. Es ist bereits bekannt, dass diese Variationen die Zuverlässigkeit eines Systems beeinflussen, aber ihre Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheit wurden nicht umfassend untersucht. Diese Doktorarbeit befasst sich mit einem Querschnitt dieser Themen: Sicherheitsprobleme die dadurch entstehen wenn FPGAs von mehreren Benutzern benutzt werden, oder über das Internet zugänglich sind, in Kombination mit physikalischen Schwankungen in modernen Halbleitertechnologien. Der erste Beitrag in dieser Arbeit identifiziert transiente Spannungsschwankungen als eine der stärksten Auswirkungen auf die FPGA-Leistung und analysiert experimentell wie sich verschiedene Arbeitslasten des FPGAs darauf auswirken. In der restlichen Arbeit werden dann die Auswirkungen dieser Spannungsschwankungen auf die Sicherheit untersucht. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass verschiedene Angriffe möglich sind, von denen früher angenommen wurde, dass sie physischen Zugriff auf den Chip und die Verwendung spezieller und teurer Test- und Messgeräte erfordern. Dies zeigt, dass bekannte Isolationsmaßnahmen innerhalb FPGAs von böswilligen Benutzern umgangen werden können, um andere Benutzer im selben FPGA oder sogar das gesamte System anzugreifen. Unter Verwendung von Schaltkreisen zur Beeinflussung der Spannung innerhalb eines FPGAs zeigt diese Arbeit aktive Angriffe, die Fehler (Faults) in anderen Teilen des Systems verursachen können. Auf diese Weise sind Denial-of-Service Angriffe möglich, als auch Fault-Angriffe um geheime Schlüsselinformationen aus dem System zu extrahieren. Darüber hinaus werden passive Angriffe gezeigt, die indirekt die Spannungsschwankungen auf dem Chip messen. Diese Messungen reichen aus, um geheime Schlüsselinformationen durch Power Analysis Seitenkanalangriffe zu extrahieren. In einer weiteren Eskalationsstufe können sich diese Angriffe auch auf andere Chips auswirken die an dasselbe Netzteil angeschlossen sind wie der FPGA. Um zu beweisen, dass vergleichbare Angriffe nicht nur innerhalb FPGAs möglich sind, wird gezeigt, dass auch kleine IoT-Geräte anfällig für Angriffe sind welche die gemeinsame Spannungsversorgung innerhalb eines Chips ausnutzen. Insgesamt zeigt diese Arbeit, dass grundlegende physikalische Variationen in integrierten Schaltkreisen die Sicherheit eines gesamten Systems untergraben können, selbst wenn der Angreifer keinen direkten Zugriff auf das Gerät hat. Für FPGAs in ihrer aktuellen Form müssen diese Probleme zuerst gelöst werden, bevor man sie mit mehreren Benutzern oder mit Zugriff von Drittanbietern sicher verwenden kann. In Veröffentlichungen die nicht Teil dieser Arbeit sind wurden bereits einige erste Gegenmaßnahmen untersucht

An Outlook on Design Technologies for Future Integrated Systems

The economic and social demand for ubiquitous and multifaceted electronic systems-in combination with the unprecedented opportunities provided by the integration of various manufacturing technologies-is paving the way to a new class of heterogeneous integrated systems, with increased performance and connectedness and providing us with gateways to the living world. This paper surveys design requirements and solutions for heterogeneous systems and addresses design technologies for realizing them

Holistic security 4.0

The future computer climate will represent an ever more aligned world of integrating technologies, affecting consumer, business and industry sectors. The vision was first outlined in the Industry 4.0 conception. The elements which comprise smart systems or embedded devices have been investigated to determine the technological climate. The emerging technologies revolve around core concepts, and specifically in this project, the uses of Internet of Things (IoT), Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and Internet of Everything (IoE). The application of bare metal and logical technology qualities are put under the microscope to provide an effective blue print of the technological field. The systems and governance surrounding smart systems are also examined. Such an approach helps to explain the beneficial or negative elements of smart devices. Consequently, this ensures a comprehensive review of standards, laws, policy and guidance to enable security and cybersecurity of the 4.0 systems

Towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware

Historically, hardware was thought to be inherently secure and trusted due to its obscurity and the isolated nature of its design and manufacturing. In the last two decades, however, hardware trust and security have emerged as pressing issues. Modern day hardware is surrounded by threats manifested mainly in undesired modifications by untrusted parties in its supply chain, unauthorized and pirated selling, injected faults, and system and microarchitectural level attacks. These threats, if realized, are expected to push hardware to abnormal and unexpected behaviour causing real-life damage and significantly undermining our trust in the electronic and computing systems we use in our daily lives and in safety critical applications. A large number of detective and preventive countermeasures have been proposed in literature. It is a fact, however, that our knowledge of potential consequences to real-life threats to hardware trust is lacking given the limited number of real-life reports and the plethora of ways in which hardware trust could be undermined. With this in mind, run-time monitoring of hardware combined with active mitigation of attacks, referred to as trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware, is proposed as the last line of defence. This last line of defence allows us to face the issue of live hardware mistrust rather than turning a blind eye to it or being helpless once it occurs. This thesis proposes three different frameworks towards trustworthy computing on untrustworthy hardware. The presented frameworks are adaptable to different applications, independent of the design of the monitored elements, based on autonomous security elements, and are computationally lightweight. The first framework is concerned with explicit violations and breaches of trust at run-time, with an untrustworthy on-chip communication interconnect presented as a potential offender. The framework is based on the guiding principles of component guarding, data tagging, and event verification. The second framework targets hardware elements with inherently variable and unpredictable operational latency and proposes a machine-learning based characterization of these latencies to infer undesired latency extensions or denial of service attacks. The framework is implemented on a DDR3 DRAM after showing its vulnerability to obscured latency extension attacks. The third framework studies the possibility of the deployment of untrustworthy hardware elements in the analog front end, and the consequent integrity issues that might arise at the analog-digital boundary of system on chips. The framework uses machine learning methods and the unique temporal and arithmetic features of signals at this boundary to monitor their integrity and assess their trust level

On mixed abstraction, languages and simulation approach to refinement with SystemC AMS

Executable specifications and simulations arecornerstone to system design flows. Complex mixed signalembedded systems can be specified with SystemC AMSwhich supports abstraction and extensible models of computation. The language contains semantics for moduleconnections and synchronization required in analog anddigital interaction. Through the synchronization layer, user defined models of computation, solvers and simulators can be unified in the SystemC AMS simulator for achieving low level abstraction and model refinement. These improvements assist in amplifying model aspects and their contribution to the overall system behavior. This work presents cosimulating refined models with timed data flow paradigm of SystemC AMS. The methodology uses Cbased interaction between simulators. An RTL model ofdata encryption standard is demonstrated as an example.The methodology is flexible and can be applied in earlydesign decision trade off, architecture experimentation and particularly for model refinement and critical behavior analysis