1,466 research outputs found
Application of a Layered Hidden Markov Model in the Detection of Network Attacks
Network-based attacks against computer systems are a common and increasing problem. Attackers continue to increase the sophistication and complexity of their attacks with the goal of removing sensitive data or disrupting operations. Attack detection technology works very well for the detection of known attacks using a signature-based intrusion detection system. However, attackers can utilize attacks that are undetectable to those signature-based systems whether they are truly new attacks or modified versions of known attacks. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems approach the problem of attack detection by detecting when traffic differs from a learned baseline. In the case of this research, the focus was on a relatively new area known as payload anomaly detection. In payload anomaly detection, the system focuses exclusively on the payload of packets and learns the normal contents of those payloads. When a payload\u27s contents differ from the norm, an anomaly is detected and may be a potential attack. A risk with anomaly-based detection mechanisms is they suffer from high false positive rates which reduce their effectiveness. This research built upon previous research in payload anomaly detection by combining multiple techniques of detection in a layered approach. The layers of the system included a high-level navigation layer, a request payload analysis layer, and a request-response analysis layer. The system was tested using the test data provided by some earlier payload anomaly detection systems as well as new data sets. The results of the experiments showed that by combining these layers of detection into a single system, there were higher detection rates and lower false positive rates
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting - A review of malware C2 techniques, detection and defences
In this survey, we first briefly review the current state of cyber attacks,
highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such attacks are
performed. We then investigate the mechanics of malware command and control
(C2) establishment: we provide a comprehensive review of the techniques used by
attackers to set up such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked
parties and the security tools they use. We then switch to the defensive side
of the problem, and review approaches that have been proposed for the detection
and disruption of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success stories) in
current best practices.Comment: Work commissioned by CPNI, available at c2report.org. 38 pages.
Listing abstract compressed from version appearing in repor
Intelligent Detection and Recovery from Cyberattacks for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Cyberattacks threaten continuously computer security in companies. These attacks evolve everyday, being more and more sophisticated and robust. In addition, they take advantage of security breaches in organizations and companies, both public and private. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME), due to their structure and economic characteristics, are particularly damaged when a cyberattack takes place. Although organizations and companies put lots of efforts in implementing security solutions, they are not always effective. This is specially relevant for SMEs, which do not have enough economic resources to introduce such solutions. Thus, there is a need of providing SMEs with affordable, intelligent security systems with the ability of detecting and recovering from the most detrimental attacks. In this paper, we propose an intelligent cybersecurity platform, which has been designed with the objective of helping SMEs to make their systems and network more secure. The aim of this platform is to provide a solution optimizing detection and recovery from attacks. To do this, we propose the application of proactive security techniques in combination with both Machine Learning (ML) and blockchain. Our proposal is enclosed in the IASEC project, which allows providing security in each of the phases of an attack. Like this, we help SMEs in prevention, avoiding systems and network from being attacked; detection, identifying when there is something potentially harmful for the systems; containment, trying to stop the effects of an attack; and response, helping to recover the systems to a normal state
A Machine Learning Approach for RDP-based Lateral Movement Detection
Detecting cyber threats has been an on-going research endeavor. In this era, advanced persistent threats (APTs) can incur significant costs for organizations and businesses. The ultimate goal of cybersecurity is to thwart attackers from achieving their malicious intent, whether it is credential stealing, infrastructure takeover, or program sabotage. Every cyberattack goes through several stages before its termination. Lateral movement (LM) is one of those stages that is of particular importance. Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a method used in LM to successfully authenticate to an unauthorized host that leaves footprints on both host and network logs. In this thesis, we propose to detect evidence of LM using an anomaly-based approach that leverages Windows RDP event logs. We explore different feature sets extracted from these logs and evaluate various supervised and unsupervised machine learning (ML) techniques for classifying RDP sessions with high precision and recall. We also compare the performance of our proposed approach to a state-of-the-art approach and demonstrate that our ML model outperforms in classifying RDP sessions in Windows event logs. In addition, we demonstrate that our model is robust against certain types of adversarial attacks
An Insider Misuse Threat Detection and Prediction Language
Numerous studies indicate that amongst the various types of security threats, the
problem of insider misuse of IT systems can have serious consequences for the health
of computing infrastructures. Although incidents of external origin are also dangerous,
the insider IT misuse problem is difficult to address for a number of reasons. A
fundamental reason that makes the problem mitigation difficult relates to the level of
trust legitimate users possess inside the organization. The trust factor makes it difficult
to detect threats originating from the actions and credentials of individual users. An
equally important difficulty in the process of mitigating insider IT threats is based on
the variability of the problem. The nature of Insider IT misuse varies amongst
organizations. Hence, the problem of expressing what constitutes a threat, as well as
the process of detecting and predicting it are non trivial tasks that add up to the multi-
factorial nature of insider IT misuse.
This thesis is concerned with the process of systematizing the specification of insider
threats, focusing on their system-level detection and prediction. The design of suitable
user audit mechanisms and semantics form a Domain Specific Language to detect and
predict insider misuse incidents. As a result, the thesis proposes in detail ways to
construct standardized descriptions (signatures) of insider threat incidents, as means
of aiding researchers and IT system experts mitigate the problem of insider IT misuse.
The produced audit engine (LUARM – Logging User Actions in Relational Mode) and
the Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language (ITPSL) are two utilities that
can be added to the IT insider misuse mitigation arsenal. LUARM is a novel audit
engine designed specifically to address the needs of monitoring insider actions. These
needs cannot be met by traditional open source audit utilities. ITPSL is an XML based
markup that can standardize the description of incidents and threats and thus make use
of the LUARM audit data. Its novelty lies on the fact that it can be used to detect as
well as predict instances of threats, a task that has not been achieved to this date by a
domain specific language to address threats.
The research project evaluated the produced language using a cyber-misuse
experiment approach derived from real world misuse incident data. The results of the
experiment showed that the ITPSL and its associated audit engine LUARM
provide a good foundation for insider threat specification and prediction. Some
language deficiencies relate to the fact that the insider threat specification process
requires a good knowledge of the software applications used in a computer system. As
the language is easily expandable, future developments to improve the language
towards this direction are suggested
WOPR: A Dynamic Cybersecurity Detection and Response Framework
Malware authors develop software to exploit the flaws in any platform and application which suffers a vulnerability in its defenses, be it through unpatched known attack vectors or zero-day attacks for which there is no current solution. It is the responsibility of cybersecurity personnel to monitor, detect, respond to and protect against such incidents that could affect their organization. Unfortunately, the low number of skilled, available cybersecurity professionals in the job market means that many positions go unfilled and cybersecurity threats are unknowingly allowed to negatively affect many enterprises.The demand for a greater cybersecurity posture has led several organizations to de- velop automated threat analysis tools which can be operated by less-skilled infor- mation security analysts and response teams. However, the diverse needs and organizational factors of most businesses presents a challenge for a “one size fits all” cybersecurity solution. Organizations in different industries may not have the same regulatory and standards compliance concerns due to processing different forms and classifications of data. As a result, many common security solutions are ill equipped to accurately model cybersecurity threats as they relate to each unique organization.We propose WOPR, a framework for automated static and dynamic analysis of software to identify malware threats, classify the nature of those threats, and deliver an appropriate automated incident response. Additionally, WOPR provides the end user the ability to adjust threat models to fit the risks relevant to an organization, allowing for bespoke automated cybersecurity threat management. Finally, WOPR presents a departure from traditional signature-based detection found in anti-virus and intrusion detection systems through learning system-level behavior and matching system calls with malicious behavior
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