On the interplay between games, argumentation and dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents’ behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Assumption-based Argumentation Dialogues

Formal argumentation based dialogue models have attracted some research interests recently. Within this line of research, we propose a formal model for argumentation-based dialogues between agents, using assumption-based argumentation (ABA). Thus, the dialogues amount to conducting an argumentation process in ABA. The model is given in terms of ABA-specific utterances, debate trees and forests implicitly built during and drawn from dialogues, legal-move functions (amounting to protocols) and outcome functions. Moreover, we investigate the strategic behaviour of agents in dialogues, using strategy-move functions. We instantiate our dialogue model in a range of dialogue types studied in the literature, including information-seeking, inquiry, persuasion, conflict resolution, and discovery. Finally, we prove (1) a formal connection between dialogues and well-known argumentation semantics, and (2) soundness and completeness results for our dialogue models and dialogue strategies used in different dialogue types

Acquiring knowledge from expert agents in a structured argumentation setting

Information-seeking interactions in multi-agent systems are required for situations in which there exists an expert agent that has vast knowledge about some topic, and there are other agents (questioners or clients) that lack and need information regarding that topic. In this work, we propose a strategy for automatic knowledge acquisition in an information-seeking setting in which agents use a structured argumentation formalism for knowledge representation and reasoning. In our approach, the client conceives the other agent as an expert in a particular domain and is committed to believe in the expert's qualified opinion about a given query. The client's goal is to ask questions and acquire knowledge until it is able to conclude the same as the expert about the initial query. On the other hand, the expert's goal is to provide just the necessary information to help the client understand its opinion. Since the client could have previous knowledge in conflict with the information acquired from the expert agent, and given that its goal is to accept the expert's position, the client may need to adapt its previous knowledge. The operational semantics for the client-expert interaction will be defined in terms of a transition system. This semantics will be used to formally prove that, once the client-expert interaction finishes, the client will have the same assessment the expert has about the performed query.Fil: Agis, Ramiro Andrés. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación; ArgentinaFil: Gottifredi, Sebastián. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación; ArgentinaFil: García, Alejandro Javier. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Bahía Blanca. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Universidad Nacional del Sur. Departamento de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación. Instituto de Ciencias e Ingeniería de la Computación; Argentin

On the Interplay between Games, Argumentation and Dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents' behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Truth and Consequences

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