578 research outputs found

    Framework for privacy-aware content distribution in peer-to- peer networks with copyright protection

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    The use of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks for multimedia distribution has spread out globally in recent years. This mass popularity is primarily driven by the efficient distribution of content, also giving rise to piracy and copyright infringement as well as privacy concerns. An end user (buyer) of a P2P content distribution system does not want to reveal his/her identity during a transaction with a content owner (merchant), whereas the merchant does not want the buyer to further redistribute the content illegally. Therefore, there is a strong need for content distribution mechanisms over P2P networks that do not pose security and privacy threats to copyright holders and end users, respectively. However, the current systems being developed to provide copyright and privacy protection to merchants and end users employ cryptographic mechanisms, which incur high computational and communication costs, making these systems impractical for the distribution of big files, such as music albums or movies.El uso de soluciones de igual a igual (peer-to-peer, P2P) para la distribución multimedia se ha extendido mundialmente en los últimos años. La amplia popularidad de este paradigma se debe, principalmente, a la distribución eficiente de los contenidos, pero también da lugar a la piratería, a la violación del copyright y a problemas de privacidad. Un usuario final (comprador) de un sistema de distribución de contenidos P2P no quiere revelar su identidad durante una transacción con un propietario de contenidos (comerciante), mientras que el comerciante no quiere que el comprador pueda redistribuir ilegalmente el contenido más adelante. Por lo tanto, existe una fuerte necesidad de mecanismos de distribución de contenidos por medio de redes P2P que no supongan un riesgo de seguridad y privacidad a los titulares de derechos y los usuarios finales, respectivamente. Sin embargo, los sistemas actuales que se desarrollan con el propósito de proteger el copyright y la privacidad de los comerciantes y los usuarios finales emplean mecanismos de cifrado que implican unas cargas computacionales y de comunicaciones muy elevadas que convierten a estos sistemas en poco prácticos para distribuir archivos de gran tamaño, tales como álbumes de música o películas.L'ús de solucions d'igual a igual (peer-to-peer, P2P) per a la distribució multimèdia s'ha estès mundialment els darrers anys. L'àmplia popularitat d'aquest paradigma es deu, principalment, a la distribució eficient dels continguts, però també dóna lloc a la pirateria, a la violació del copyright i a problemes de privadesa. Un usuari final (comprador) d'un sistema de distribució de continguts P2P no vol revelar la seva identitat durant una transacció amb un propietari de continguts (comerciant), mentre que el comerciant no vol que el comprador pugui redistribuir il·legalment el contingut més endavant. Per tant, hi ha una gran necessitat de mecanismes de distribució de continguts per mitjà de xarxes P2P que no comportin un risc de seguretat i privadesa als titulars de drets i els usuaris finals, respectivament. Tanmateix, els sistemes actuals que es desenvolupen amb el propòsit de protegir el copyright i la privadesa dels comerciants i els usuaris finals fan servir mecanismes d'encriptació que impliquen unes càrregues computacionals i de comunicacions molt elevades que fan aquests sistemes poc pràctics per a distribuir arxius de grans dimensions, com ara àlbums de música o pel·lícules

    Optimization techniques and new methods for boradcast encryption and traitor tracing schemes

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    Ankara : The Department of Computer Engineering and the Graduate School of Engineering and Science of Bilkent University, 2012.Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Bilkent University, 2012.Includes bibliographical refences.In the last few decades, the use of digital content increased dramatically. Many forms of digital products in the form of CDs, DVDs, TV broadcasts, data over the Internet, entered our life. Classical cryptography, where encryption is done for only one recipient, was not able to handle this change, since its direct use leads to intolerably expensive transmissions. Moreover, new concerns regarding the commercial aspect arised. Since digital commercial contents are sold to various customers, unauthorized copying by malicious actors became a major concern and it needed to be prevented carefully. Therefore, a new research area called digital rights management (DRM) has emerged. Within the scope of DRM, new cryptographic primitives are proposed. In this thesis, we consider three of these: broadcast encryption (BE), traitor tracing (TT), and trace and revoke (T&R) schemes and propose methods to improve the performances and capabilities of these primitives. Particularly, we first consider profiling the recipient set in order to improve transmission size in the most popular BE schemes. We then investigate and solve the optimal free rider assignment problem for one of the most efficient BE schemes so far. Next, we attempt to close the non-trivial gap between BE and T&R schemes by proposing a generic method for adding traitor tracing capability to BE schemes and thus obtaining a T&R scheme. Finally, we investigate an overlooked problem: privacy of the recipient set in T&R schemes. Right now, most schemes do not keep the recipient set anonymous, and everybody can see who received a particular content. As a generic solution to this problem, we propose a method for obtaining anonymous T&R scheme by using anonymous BE schemes as a primitive.Ak, MuratPh.D

    Efficient Public Trace and Revoke from Standard Assumptions

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    We provide efficient constructions for trace-and-revoke systems with public traceability in the black-box confirmation model. Our constructions achieve adaptive security, are based on standard assumptions and achieve significant efficiency gains compared to previous constructions. Our constructions rely on a generic transformation from inner product functional encryption (IPFE) schemes to trace-and-revoke systems. Our transformation requires the underlying IPFE scheme to only satisfy a very weak notion of security -- the attacker may only request a bounded number of random keys -- in contrast to the standard notion of security where she may request an unbounded number of arbitrarily chosen keys. We exploit the much weaker security model to provide a new construction for bounded collusion and random key IPFE from the learning with errors assumption (LWE), which enjoys improved efficiency compared to the scheme of Agrawal et al. [CRYPTO'16]. Together with IPFE schemes from Agrawal et al., we obtain trace and revoke from LWE, Decision Diffie Hellman and Decision Composite Residuosity

    Fully Collusion Resistant Trace-and-Revoke Functional Encryption for Arbitrary Identities

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    Functional Encryption (FE) has been extensively studied in the recent years, mainly focusing on the feasibility of constructing FE for general functionalities, as well as some realizations for restricted functionalities of practical interest, such as inner-product. However, little consideration has been given to the issue of key leakage on FE. The property of FE that allows multiple users to obtain the same functional keys from the holder of the master secret key raises an important problem: if some users leak their keys or collude to create a pirated decoder, how can we identify at least one of those users, given some information about the compromised keys or the pirated decoder? Moreover, how do we disable the decryption capabilities of those users (i.e. traitors)? Two recent works have offered potential solutions to the above traitor scenario. However, the two solutions satisfy weaker notions of security and traceability, can only tolerate bounded collusions (i.e., there is an a priori bound on the number of keys the pirated decoder obtains), or can only handle a polynomially large universe of possible identities. In this paper, we study trace-and-revoke mechanism on FE and provide the first construction of trace-and-revoke FE that supports arbitrary identities, is both fully collusion resistant and fully anonymous. Our construction relies on a generic transformation from revocable predicate functional encryption with broadcast (RPFE with broadcast, which is an extension of revocable predicate encryption with broadcast proposed by Kim and J. Wu at ASIACRYPT\u272020) to trace-and-revoke FE. Since this construction admits a generic construction of trace-and-revoke inner-product FE (IPFE), we instantiate the trace-and-revoke IPFE from the well-studied Learning with Errors (LWE). This is achieved by proposing a new LWE-based attribute-based IPFE (ABIPFE) scheme to instantiate RPFE with broadcast

    White Box Traitor Tracing

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    Traitor tracing aims to identify the source of leaked decryption keys. Since the traitor can try to hide their key within obfuscated code in order to evade tracing, the tracing algorithm should work for general, potentially obfuscated, decoder programs. In the setting of such general decoder programs, prior work uses black box tracing: the tracing algorithm ignores the implementation of the decoder, and instead traces just by making queries to the decoder and observing the outputs. We observe that, in some settings, such black box tracing leads to consistency and user privacy issues. On the other hand, these issues do not appear inherent to white box tracing, where the tracing algorithm actually inspects the decoder implementation. We therefore develop new white box traitor tracing schemes providing consistency and/or privacy. Our schemes can be instantiated under various assumptions ranging from public key encryption and NIZKs to indistinguishability obfuscation, with different trade-offs. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider white box tracing in the general decoder setting

    Towards Black-Box Accountable Authority IBE with Short Ciphertexts and Private Keys

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    At Crypto'07, Goyal introduced the concept of Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption as a convenient tool to reduce the amount of trust in authorities in Identity-Based Encryption. In this model, if the Private Key Generator (PKG) maliciously re-distributes users' decryption keys, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted. Goyal proposed two constructions: the first one is efficient but can only trace well-formed decryption keys to their source; the second one allows tracing obfuscated decryption boxes in a model (called weak black-box model) where cheating authorities have no decryption oracle. The latter scheme is unfortunately far less efficient in terms of decryption cost and ciphertext size. In this work, we propose a new construction that combines the efficiency of Goyal's first proposal with a very simple weak black-box tracing mechanism. Our scheme is described in the selective-ID model but readily extends to meet all security properties in the adaptive-ID sense, which is not known to be true for prior black-box schemes.Comment: 32 page

    Resistance to Pirates 2.0: A Method from Leakage Resilient Cryptography

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    In the classical model of traitor tracing, one assumes that a traitor contributes its entire secret key to build a pirate decoder. However, new practical scenarios of pirate has been considered, namely Pirate Evolution Attacks at Crypto 2007 and Pirates 2.0 at Eurocrypt 2009, in which pirate decoders could be built from sub-keys of users. The key notion in Pirates 2.0 is the anonymity level of traitors: they can rest assured to remain anonymous when each of them only contributes a very small fraction of its secret information. This scenario encourages dishonest users to participate in collusion and the size of collusion could become very large, possibly beyond the considered threshold in the classical model. There are numerous attempts to deal with Pirates 2.0 each of which only considers a particular form of Pirates 2.0. In this paper, we propose a method for fighting Pirates 2.0 in any form. Our method is based on the researches in key-leakage resilience. It thus gives an interesting and rather surprised connection between the rich domain of key-leakage resilient cryptography and Pirates 2.0. We first formalize the notion of key-leakage resilient revoke system and then identify sufficient conditions so that a key-leakage resilient revoke scheme can resist Pirates 2.0 in any form. We finally propose a construction of a secure key-leakage resilient identity-based revoke system that fulfills the required conditions. The main ingredient in the construction relies on the identity-based encryption with wildcards (\WIBE) and our construction of key-leakage resilient \WIBE could be useful in its own right
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