An Innovative Signature Detection System for Polymorphic and Monomorphic Internet Worms Detection and Containment

Most current anti-worm systems and intrusion-detection systems use signature-based technology instead of anomaly-based technology. Signature-based technology can only detect known attacks with identified signatures. Existing anti-worm systems cannot detect unknown Internet scanning worms automatically because these systems do not depend upon worm behaviour but upon the worm’s signature. Most detection algorithms used in current detection systems target only monomorphic worm payloads and offer no defence against polymorphic worms, which changes the payload dynamically. Anomaly detection systems can detect unknown worms but usually suffer from a high false alarm rate. Detecting unknown worms is challenging, and the worm defence must be automated because worms spread quickly and can flood the Internet in a short time. This research proposes an accurate, robust and fast technique to detect and contain Internet worms (monomorphic and polymorphic). The detection technique uses specific failure connection statuses on specific protocols such as UDP, TCP, ICMP, TCP slow scanning and stealth scanning as characteristics of the worms. Whereas the containment utilizes flags and labels of the segment header and the source and destination ports to generate the traffic signature of the worms. Experiments using eight different worms (monomorphic and polymorphic) in a testbed environment were conducted to verify the performance of the proposed technique. The experiment results showed that the proposed technique could detect stealth scanning up to 30 times faster than the technique proposed by another researcher and had no false-positive alarms for all scanning detection cases. The experiments showed the proposed technique was capable of containing the worm because of the traffic signature’s uniqueness

Applying Machine Learning to Advance Cyber Security: Network Based Intrusion Detection Systems

Many new devices, such as phones and tablets as well as traditional computer systems, rely on wireless connections to the Internet and are susceptible to attacks. Two important types of attacks are the use of malware and exploiting Internet protocol vulnerabilities in devices and network systems. These attacks form a threat on many levels and therefore any approach to dealing with these nefarious attacks will take several methods to counter. In this research, we utilize machine learning to detect and classify malware, visualize, detect and classify worms, as well as detect deauthentication attacks, a form of Denial of Service (DoS). This work also includes two prevention mechanisms for DoS attacks, namely a one- time password (OTP) and through the use of machine learning. Furthermore, we focus on an exploit of the widely used IEEE 802.11 protocol for wireless local area networks (WLANs). The work proposed here presents a threefold approach for intrusion detection to remedy the effects of malware and an Internet protocol exploit employing machine learning as a primary tool. We conclude with a comparison of dimensionality reduction methods to a deep learning classifier to demonstrate the effectiveness of these methods without compromising the accuracy of classification

Shadow Honeypots

We present Shadow Honeypots, a novel hybrid architecture that combines the best features of honeypots and anomaly detection. At a high level, we use a variety of anomaly detectors to monitor all traffic to a protected network or service. Traffic that is considered anomalous is processed by a "shadow honeypot" to determine the accuracy of the anomaly prediction. The shadow is an instance of the protected software that shares all internal state with a regular ("production") instance of the application, and is instrumented to detect potential attacks. Attacks against the shadow are caught, and any incurred state changes are discarded. Legitimate traffic that was misclassified will be validated by the shadow and will be handled correctly by the system transparently to the end user. The outcome of processing a request by the shadow is used to filter future attack instances and could be used to update the anomaly detector. Our architecture allows system designers to fine-tune systems for performance, since false positives will be filtered by the shadow. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach in a proof-of-concept implementation of the Shadow Honeypot architecture for the Apache web server and the Mozilla Firefox browser. We show that despite a considerable overhead in the instrumentation of the shadow honeypot (up to 20% for Apache), the overall impact on the system is diminished by the ability to minimize the rate of false-positives

GUIDE FOR THE COLLECTION OF INSTRUSION DATA FOR MALWARE ANALYSIS AND DETECTION IN THE BUILD AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE

During the COVID-19 pandemic, when most businesses were not equipped for remote work and cloud computing, we saw a significant surge in ransomware attacks. This study aims to utilize machine learning and artificial intelligence to prevent known and unknown malware threats from being exploited by threat actors when developers build and deploy applications to the cloud. This study demonstrated an experimental quantitative research design using Aqua. The experiment\u27s sample is a Docker image. Aqua checked the Docker image for malware, sensitive data, Critical/High vulnerabilities, misconfiguration, and OSS license. The data collection approach is experimental. Our analysis of the experiment demonstrated how unapproved images were prevented from running anywhere in our environment based on known vulnerabilities, embedded secrets, OSS licensing, dynamic threat analysis, and secure image configuration. In addition to the experiment, the forensic data collected in the build and deployment phase are exploitable vulnerability, Critical/High Vulnerability Score, Misconfiguration, Sensitive Data, and Root User (Super User). Since Aqua generates a detailed audit record for every event during risk assessment and runtime, we viewed two events on the Audit page for our experiment. One of the events caused an alert due to two failed controls (Vulnerability Score, Super User), and the other was a successful event meaning that the image is secure to deploy in the production environment. The primary finding for our study is the forensic data associated with the two events on the Audit page in Aqua. In addition, Aqua validated our security controls and runtime policies based on the forensic data with both events on the Audit page. Finally, the study’s conclusions will mitigate the likelihood that organizations will fall victim to ransomware by mitigating and preventing the total damage caused by a malware attack