Causal contribution and dynamical encoding in the striatum during evidence accumulation.

A broad range of decision-making processes involve gradual accumulation of evidence over time, but the neural circuits responsible for this computation are not yet established. Recent data indicate that cortical regions that are prominently associated with accumulating evidence, such as the posterior parietal cortex and the frontal orienting fields, may not be directly involved in this computation. Which, then, are the regions involved? Regions that are directly involved in evidence accumulation should directly influence the accumulation-based decision-making behavior, have a graded neural encoding of accumulated evidence and contribute throughout the accumulation process. Here, we investigated the role of the anterior dorsal striatum (ADS) in a rodent auditory evidence accumulation task using a combination of behavioral, pharmacological, optogenetic, electrophysiological and computational approaches. We find that the ADS is the first brain region known to satisfy the three criteria. Thus, the ADS may be the first identified node in the network responsible for evidence accumulation

EEG-informed fMRI reveals spatiotemporal characteristics of perceptual decision making

Single-unit and multiunit recordings in primates have already established that decision making involves at least two general stages of neural processing: representation of evidence from early sensory areas and accumulation of evidence to a decision threshold from decision-related regions. However, the relay of information from early sensory to decision areas, such that the accumulation process is instigated, is not well understood. Using a cued paradigm and single-trial analysis of electroencephalography (EEG), we previously reported on temporally specific components related to perceptual decision making. Here, we use information derived from our previous EEG recordings to inform the analysis of fMRI data collected for the same behavioral task to ascertain the cortical origins of each of these EEG components. We demonstrate that a cascade of events associated with perceptual decision making takes place in a highly distributed neural network. Of particular importance is an activation in the lateral occipital complex implicating perceptual persistence as a mechanism by which object decision making in the human brain is instigated

Stochastic models of evidence accumulation in changing environments

Organisms and ecological groups accumulate evidence to make decisions. Classic experiments and theoretical studies have explored this process when the correct choice is fixed during each trial. However, we live in a constantly changing world. What effect does such impermanence have on classical results about decision making? To address this question we use sequential analysis to derive a tractable model of evidence accumulation when the correct option changes in time. Our analysis shows that ideal observers discount prior evidence at a rate determined by the volatility of the environment, and the dynamics of evidence accumulation is governed by the information gained over an average environmental epoch. A plausible neural implementation of an optimal observer in a changing environment shows that, in contrast to previous models, neural populations representing alternate choices are coupled through excitation. Our work builds a bridge between statistical decision making in volatile environments and stochastic nonlinear dynamics.Comment: 26 pages, 7 figure

Is There Neural Evidence for an Evidence Accumulation Process in Memory Decisions?

Models of evidence accumulation have been very successful at describing human decision making behavior. Recent years have also seen the first reports of neural correlates of this accumulation process. However, these studies have mostly focused on perceptual decision making tasks, ignoring the role of additional cognitive processes like memory retrieval that are crucial in real-world decisions. In this study, we tried to find a neural signature of evidence accumulation during a recognition memory task. To do this, we applied a method we have successfully used to localize evidence accumulation in scalp EEG during a perceptual decision making task. This time, however, we applied it to intracranial EEG recordings, which provide a much higher spatial resolution. We identified several brain areas where activity ramps up over time, but these neural patterns do not appear to be modulated by behavioral variables such as the amount of available evidence or response time. This casts doubt on the idea of evidence accumulation as a general decision-making mechanism underlying different types of decisions

The Cat Is On the Mat. Or Is It a Dog? Dynamic Competition in Perceptual Decision Making

Recent neurobiological findings suggest that the brain solves simple perceptual decision-making tasks by means of a dynamic competition in which evidence is accumulated in favor of the alternatives. However, it is unclear if and how the same process applies in more complex, real-world tasks, such as the categorization of ambiguous visual scenes and what elements are considered as evidence in this case. Furthermore, dynamic decision models typically consider evidence accumulation as a passive process disregarding the role of active perception strategies. In this paper, we adopt the principles of dynamic competition and active vision for the realization of a biologically- motivated computational model, which we test in a visual catego- rization task. Moreover, our system uses predictive power of the features as the main dimension for both evidence accumulation and the guidance of active vision. Comparison of human and synthetic data in a common experimental setup suggests that the proposed model captures essential aspects of how the brain solves perceptual ambiguities in time. Our results point to the importance of the proposed principles of dynamic competi- tion, parallel specification, and selection of multiple alternatives through prediction, as well as active guidance of perceptual strategies for perceptual decision-making and the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. These principles could apply to both the simple perceptual decision problems studied in neuroscience and the more complex ones addressed by vision research.Peer reviewe

A martingale analysis of first passage times of time-dependent Wiener diffusion models

Research in psychology and neuroscience has successfully modeled decision making as a process of noisy evidence accumulation to a decision bound. While there are several variants and implementations of this idea, the majority of these models make use of a noisy accumulation between two absorbing boundaries. A common assumption of these models is that decision parameters, e.g., the rate of accumulation (drift rate), remain fixed over the course of a decision, allowing the derivation of analytic formulas for the probabilities of hitting the upper or lower decision threshold, and the mean decision time. There is reason to believe, however, that many types of behavior would be better described by a model in which the parameters were allowed to vary over the course of the decision process. In this paper, we use martingale theory to derive formulas for the mean decision time, hitting probabilities, and first passage time (FPT) densities of a Wiener process with time-varying drift between two time-varying absorbing boundaries. This model was first studied by Ratcliff (1980) in the two-stage form, and here we consider the same model for an arbitrary number of stages (i.e. intervals of time during which parameters are constant). Our calculations enable direct computation of mean decision times and hitting probabilities for the associated multistage process. We also provide a review of how martingale theory may be used to analyze similar models employing Wiener processes by re-deriving some classical results. In concert with a variety of numerical tools already available, the current derivations should encourage mathematical analysis of more complex models of decision making with time-varying evidence

Modelling decision-making biases

Biases are a fundamental aspect of everyday life decision-making. A variety of modelling approaches have been suggested to capture decision-making biases. Statistical models are a means to describe the data, but the results are usually interpreted according to a verbal theory. This can lead to an ambiguous interpretation of the data. Mathematical cognitive models of decision-making outline the structure of the decision process with formal assumptions, providing advantages in terms of prediction, simulation, and interpretability compared to statistical models. We compare studies that used both signal detection theory and evidence accumulation models as models of decision-making biases, concluding that the latter provides a more comprehensive account of the decision-making phenomena by including response time behavior. We conclude by reviewing recent studies investigating attention and expectation biases with evidence accumulation models. Previous findings, reporting an exclusive influence of attention on the speed of evidence accumulation and prior probability on starting point, are challenged by novel results suggesting an additional effect of attention on non-decision time and prior probability on drift rate

Quantifying decision-making in dynamic, continuously evolving environments

During perceptual decision-making tasks, centroparietal electroencephalographic (EEG) potentials report an evidence accumulation-to-bound process that is time locked to trial onset. However, decisions in real-world environments are rarely confined to discrete trials; they instead unfold continuously, with accumulation of time-varying evidence being recency-weighted towards its immediate past. The neural mechanisms supporting recency-weighted continuous decision-making remain unclear. Here, we use a novel continuous task design to study how the centroparietal positivity (CPP) adapts to different environments that place different constraints on evidence accumulation. We show that adaptations in evidence weighting to these different environments are reflected in changes in the CPP. The CPP becomes more sensitive to fluctuations in sensory evidence when large shifts in evidence are less frequent, and the potential is primarily sensitive to fluctuations in decision-relevant (not decision-irrelevant) sensory input. A complementary triphasic component over occipito-parietal cortex encodes the sum of recently accumulated sensory evidence, and its magnitude covaries with parameters describing how different individuals integrate sensory evidence over time. A computational model based on leaky evidence accumulation suggests that these findings can be accounted for by a shift in decision threshold between different environments, which is also reflected in the magnitude of pre-decision EEG activity. Our findings reveal how adaptations in EEG responses reflect flexibility in evidence accumulation to the statistics of dynamic sensory environments

Deciding when to decide : time-variant sequential sampling models explain the emergence of value-based decisions in the human brain

The cognitive and neuronal mechanisms of perceptual decision making have been successfully linked to sequential sampling models. These models describe the decision process as a gradual accumulation of sensory evidence over time. The temporal evolution of economic choices, however, remains largely unexplored. We tested whether sequential sampling models help to understand the formation of value-based decisions in terms of behavior and brain responses. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity while human participants performed a buying task in which they freely decided upon how and when to choose. Behavior was accurately predicted by a time-variant sequential sampling model that uses a decreasing rather than fixed decision threshold to estimate the time point of the decision. Presupplementary motor area, caudate nucleus, and anterior insula activation was associated with the accumulation of evidence over time. Furthermore, at the beginning of the decision process the fMRI signal in these regions accounted for trial-by-trial deviations from behavioral model predictions: relatively high activation preceded relatively early responses. The updating of value information was correlated with signals in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, left and right orbitofrontal cortex, and ventral striatum but also in the primary motor cortex well before the response itself. Our results support a view of value-based decisions as emerging from sequential sampling of evidence and suggest a close link between the accumulation process and activity in the motor system when people are free to respond at any time