Nonlinear Pricing on Private Roads with Congestion and Toll Collection Costs

Nonlinear pricing (a form of second-degree price discrimination) is widely used in transportation and other industries but it has been largely overlooked in the road-pricing literature. This paper explores the incentives for a profit-maximizing toll-road operator to adopt some simple nonlinear pricing schemes when there is congestion and collecting tolls is costly. Users are assumed to differ in their demands to use the road. Regardless of the severity of congestion, an access fee is always profitable to implement either as part of a two-part tariff or as an alternative to paying a toll. Use of access fees for profit maximization can increase or decrease welfare relative to usage-only pricing. Hence a ban on access fees could reduce welfare.congestion pricing; two-part pricing; private roads; toll collection costs

On access pricing problems in telecom industry

本文主要研究电信产业的接入定价问题。各瓶颈网络运营商之间以及瓶颈网络运营商与非瓶颈网络运营商之间的接入问题是电信产业形成有序、有效竞争格局最为关键的一环。接入问题主要包括技术上的可行性和经济上的有效性两个方面。前者已基本得以解决。但后者还在探索之中。就我国而言，接入定价引发出来的联而不通、通而不畅、人为的蓄意破坏(sabotage)等行为已成为阻碍我国电信产业有序、有效竞争格局形成的重要因素。本文旨在从接入定价的角度来探讨在不同市场结构下的接入定价行为及其对电信竞争和相应福利结果的影响。电信产业的接入定价问题主要包含三方面：一是对接入类型的界定。本文将接入划分为单向接入与双向接入。接入类型与市...This dissertation is on access pricing problems in telecom industry. To form an ordered and effectively competitive structure in telecom industry, the key problem is that all bottled-net operators should provide access services to each other impartially and to non-bottled-net operators equally. There are two aspects of access problems: the feasibility of accessing technologically and economically....学位：经济学硕士院系专业：经济学院经济研究所_产业经济学学号：20021600

A Curious Tale of Economics and Common Carriage (Net Neutrality) at the FCC: A Reply to Faulhaber, Singer, and Urschel

This reply to "The Curious Absence of Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission" (Faulhaber, Singer, & Urschel, 2017) makes three claims. First, we document the paper's undisclosed origins as a white paper commissioned by an advocacy group with deep ties to the telecommunications industry. Second, we describe two of the authors' active participation, on behalf of clients, in a range of contested issues before the FCC in recent years, none of which they disclose. Finally, our review of FCC workshops, roundtables, seminars, dockets and rulings—including during its landmark 2015 Open Internet Order and several blockbuster mergers and acquisitions—provides detailed evidence to refute the paper's core "curious absence" charge. The stakes could not be higher, we conclude, as the new FCC chair Ajit Pai has repeatedly referenced the paper to justify his rollback of FCC regulations—including, crucially, the common carriage/net neutrality rules so vigorously opposed by the paper's funders

Modeling the regulatory intervention in the telecommunications market

This thesis discusses the role of sector-specific regulators in the rapidly changing telecommunications industry. In particular, it studies the access pricing policy which provides the optimal balance between static and dynamic efficiency that better reflects the changing regulatory goals in a highly variable economic and technological environment. Static efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare by intensifying the competition for providing differentiated services (service-based competition), whereas dynamic efficiency concerns the maximization of social welfare by incentivizing investments in competitive infrastructures (facilities-based competition). It is thus obvious that the role of regulators is to facilitate the gradual transition from static to dynamic efficiency by influencing the investment and competition outcomes through the regulation of the access price. Therefore, there is an interplay between regulatory policy and technological development which leads to rapidly changing market structures and industry performance